


JPRS-TAC-92-033
14 November 1992



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-033

CONTENTS

14 November 1992

CHINA

Contribution Pledged to UN Disarmament Institute [XINHUA 30 Oct]	1
Russia Halts Troop Withdrawal From Baltics [XINHUA 30 Oct]	1
Russia To Convert Missile Launch Sites for Civilian Use [XINHUA 30 Oct]	1
France Suggests Nuclear Powers Discuss Test Ban [XINHUA 4 Nov]	1
State Department's Boucher Cited on Baltics, START [XINHUA 5 Nov]	2

EAST ASIA

AUSTRALIA

Foreign Minister Expects Nuclear Test Ban Under Clinton [Melbourne International 5 Nov]	3
---	---

NORTH KOREA

Ministry Denies Stockpiling Chemical Weapons [KCNA 30 Oct]	3
Foreign Ministry Rejects Chemical Weapons Charge	3
Spokesman Comments [Pyongyang Radio 30 Oct]	3
Commentary Denounces Allegation [Pyongyang Radio 1 Nov]	4

EAST EUROPE

POLAND

Walesa Calls Soviet Army Withdrawal 'Historical Justice' [PAP 28 Oct]	6
Prime Minister Briefed on Russian Troop Withdrawal [PAP 29 Oct]	6

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

EGYPT

Foreign Minister Links CW Convention, Israeli Nuclear Policy [MENA 28 Oct]	7
--	---

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

Chelyabinsk-70 Redirecting Nuclear Work [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 43, 21 Oct]	8
Russian Defense Industry Official on Conversion Problems [V. Konkov; PRAVDA 21 Oct]	11
Russian Defense Budget in 1993 To Be Roughly 1992 Level [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 Oct]	13
Shaposhnikov Appeals for World Ban on Weapons of Mass Destruction [Moscow International 1 Nov]	13
Tomsk Deputies Debate Proposed Storage Site for Fissile Material [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Nov]	13

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

History of U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Agreements [V. Markell; MORSKOY SBORNIK Jul]	14
Commentary Views 'Problems' in Implementing START Treaty [B. Belitskiy; Moscow International 26 Oct]	19
Ukraine Joins Strategic Forces Inspection Agreement [Kiev TV 27 Oct]	19
Commentary Favors Open Talks With U.S. on Arms Cuts [V. Pesok; Moscow Radio 30 Oct]	19
New Long-Range Cruise Missile Launched From Tu-160 [Russian TV 31 Oct]	20

START-3 Could Threaten 'Already Fragile Peace' [P. Belov; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Nov]	20
Decree on Converting Missile Complex Resources to Economic Uses [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Nov]	21
Reports on Russian Ratification of START Treaty	22
Supreme Soviet Ratification Vote [ITAR-TASS 4 Nov]	22
Debate Over Ratification Described [Radio Rossii 4 Nov]	22
Deputy Defense Minister Details Cuts [INTERFAX 4 Nov]	23
Clinton Administration May Affect Status of START II [A. Shalnev; IZVESTIYA 5 Nov]	23
Yeltsin Proposes To Reduce Strategic Arms '3-4 Times' [INTERFAX 5 Nov]	23

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russian-American Global Protection Scheme Backed [V. Nazarenko; ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 27 Oct]	24
--	----

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Yeltsin Orders Suspension of Baltic Troop Withdrawal	25
Pullout To Resume When Agreements Are Signed [ITAR-TASS 29 Oct]	25
Names Commander To Head Up Commission [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	25
Text of Decree [INTERFAX 30 Oct]	25
Group Commander Examines Difficulties With Poland Withdrawal [L. Kovalev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Oct]	26
Lithuanian Reaction to Russian Troop Pullout Suspension	28
Home Guard Ministry: Withdrawal on Schedule [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	28
Landsbergis Comments [Vilnius Radio 30 Oct]	28
Supreme Council Spokesmen [Vilnius Radio 30 Oct]	28
Foreign Ministry: Suspension May Affect Agreement [BALTFAX 31 Oct]	28
Democratic Labor Party Hits Suspension [Vilnius Radio 31 Oct]	29
Parliament Official Decries Suspension [BALTFAX 1 Nov]	29
Foreign Minister Comments [ELTA NEWS BULLETIN 2 Nov]	29
Parliament Spokesman Comments Further [ELTA NEWS BULLETIN 4 Nov]	29
Latvian Reaction to Russian Troop Pullout Suspension	30
Acting Foreign Minister Summons Russian Ambassador [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	30
Premier: Recent Agreements in Jeopardy [Moscow Radio 30 Oct]	30
Negotiations Said Broken Down [Riga Radio 30 Oct]	31
Foreign Ministry Statement [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	31
Entry of Military Equipment Banned [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	31
Gorbunovs Urges Yeltsin To Reconsider [BALTFAX 5 Nov]	31
Estonian Reaction to Russian Troop Pullout Suspension	32
President Confers With Russian Ambassador [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	32
Premier Expects No Change in Policy Toward Russia [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	32
President: Suspension Violates CSCE Accords [Tallinn Radio 30 Oct]	32
Further on President's Comments [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	32
No Plans for Agreement [BALTFAX 3 Nov]	33
Russian-Estonian Meeting [ETA NEWS RELEASE 3 Nov]	33
Russian Officials Comment on Baltic Troop Withdrawal Suspension	33
Parliamentarian To Report to NATO [Russian TV 30 Oct]	33
Gromov Denies 'Pressure' on Baltics [ITAR-TASS 30 Oct]	33
Says Deadline for Withdrawal Remains Open [INTERFAX 30 Oct]	34
Kozyrev: Delay To Ensure 'Orderly' Withdrawal [ITAR-TASS 30 Oct]	34
Officer in Lithuania Expects No Delay [BALTFAX 30 Oct]	35
MFA Aide: No Position 'Offered' to Baltics [BALTFAX 2 Nov]	35
MFA Aide: Lithuanian Withdrawal Schedule 'Formally Void' [BALTFAX 2 Nov]	35
Churkin: Withdrawal Date From Estonia Unchanged [BALTFAX 3 Nov]	35
Churkin Comments Further on Estonia [Tallinn Radio 3 Nov]	36
Churkin: Directive Not Intended for Media [KURANTY 4 Nov]	36
Commander in Estonia: No Interruption [BALTFAX 4 Nov]	36
Shaposhnikov Asks for Understanding [BALTFAX 4 Nov]	36
Suspension of Russian Troop Withdrawal Evokes 'Alarm' in Baltics [Ye. Visens, T. Nikolayeva; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 31 Oct]	37

Ex-Advisers Say General Staff 'Misled' Grachev on Withdrawal Decision [BALTFAX 1 Nov]	37
Yeltsin Explains Baltic Troop Withdrawal Suspension	38
Lithuania Withdrawal Schedule 'Unchanged' [BALTFAX 3 Nov]	38
Holds Press Conference, Appeals to Baltic Leaders [ITAR-TASS 5 Nov]	38
Col Gen Gromov on Troop Withdrawal From Neighboring States [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Nov]	38
Russian Christian Democrats Back Troop Withdrawal Suspension [BALTFAX 4 Nov]	39
International Pressure Over Baltic Withdrawal Viewed [A. Golts; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Nov] ..	40
Baltic States Council Calls for No Delay in Troop Withdrawal [ITAR-TASS 6 Nov]	41

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Tactical Nuclear Missiles Said Removed From Pacific Fleet [Tokyo KYODO 6 Nov]	41
---	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Belarusian Defense Ministry Denies Existence of Test Site	42
Moscow Report [ITAR-TASS 28 Oct]	42
Minsk Report [BELINFORM 28 Oct]	42
History of Seismic Verification Techniques [V. Nedogonov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 4 Nov]	42

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production [NOVOYE VREMYA Oct]	44
Reports on CW Secrecy Case Against Mirzayanov, Fedorov	50
Third Scientist Arrested [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 23 Oct]	50
Validity of Case Questioned [O. Shlyapnikova, V. Gorbachev; KOMMERSANT-DAILY 27 Oct]	50
Arrest Said To Back Up Claims [I. Tsarev; TRUD 28 Oct]	51
Fedorov Issues Appeal [KURANTY 29 Oct]	52
Further on Fedorov Statements [IZVESTIYA 31 Oct]	52
Mirzayanov Released [INTERFAX 3 Nov]	54
Investigation To Continue [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 3 Nov]	55
MOSCOW NEWS Editor Rejects Charges [ITAR-TASS 30 Oct]	55
Mirzayanov Former Counterintelligence Aide [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 4 Nov]	55
MBRF Aide Comments on Case [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 6 Nov]	56
Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment'	56
Article Confiscated From ARGUMENTY I FAKTY [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 24 Oct] ..	56
Text of Article [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 30 Oct]	56
Kuntsevich Asserts Russia Complies With CW Pledges [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Oct]	59
Committees Examine Program for Destroying Chemical Weapons	59
Kuntsevich Comments [INTERFAX 30 Oct]	59
Further Report [V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA 4 Nov]	60

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukraine's Nuclear Stance Evokes Concern [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 1 Nov]	60
---	----

Contribution Pledged to UN Disarmament Institute

OW3010225792 Beijing XINHUA in English
1838 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Text] United Nations, October 30 (XINHUA)—China has pledged a voluntary contribution of 10,000 U.S. dollars to the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in support of its activities.

Making the pledge at the tenth U.N. pledging conference for world disarmament campaign today, Chinese delegate Hu Xiaodi said UNIDIR and other related organizations have carried out various disarmament activities which are very much conducive to the promotion of international peace and security and to the acceleration of world disarmament.

China, actively participating in "world disarmament campaign" and activities of regional disarmament centers and the UNIDIR, has provided financial support to these organizations.

In March 1992, China contributed 300,000 yuan (more than 55,000 U.S. dollars) to the UNIDIR and also in 1992 pledged 10,000 U.S. dollars to the U.N. Asia-Pacific Center for Peace and Disarmament.

Russia Halts Troop Withdrawal From Baltics

OW3010021792 Beijing XINHUA in English
0051 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Text] Moscow, October 30 (XINHUA)—President Boris Yeltsin today ordered a temporary halt to Russian troop withdrawal from three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with an accusation that the rights of Russian-speaking residents there have been often invaded.

The ITAR-TASS reported Yeltsin's announcement, but gave no details of the accusation.

Yeltsin was quoted as saying that the withdrawal will resume when Russia signs bilateral accords with the three Baltic countries.

TASS said that Yeltsin asked the government to draft an accord on the protection of the interests of Russian troops stationed in the three countries.

Yeltsin said that the implementation of economic agreements signed by Russia and the three countries depend on the solution of the problem.

Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry today issued a statement on protection of the interests and rights of the Russian-speaking residents in the three Baltic countries.

Russia To Convert Missile Launch Sites for Civilian Use

OW3010053292 Beijing XINHUA in English
0451 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Text] Moscow, October 29 (XINHUA)—The Russian Government has decided to turn the installations for launching strategic missiles already destroyed into civilian use.

ITAR-TASS news agency reported today that the decision aims at saving money needed for the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons.

The former Soviet Union had 11,000 strategic nuclear warheads, 80 percent of which are in Russia.

In June when Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited the United States, he reached an agreement with U.S. President George Bush that each side would cut down two-thirds of its offensive strategic nuclear weapons.

In line with a proposal of the Russian departments concerned, the installations will be used to launch spacecraft for domestic and foreign customers. Some launching vehicles and rockets will be dismantled and their parts will be used in economic construction and exported.

France Suggests Nuclear Powers Discuss Test Ban

OW0411031892 Beijing XINHUA in English
0214 GMT 4 Nov 92

[Text] Paris, November 3 (XINHUA)—French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said today he hoped that the United States, Britain, China, Russia and France would hold talks on nuclear testing.

Dumas, speaking in the national assembly, said representatives of the five nuclear powers participating in the conference on disarmament in Geneva should collectively consider the issue of nuclear tests.

He suggested the setting up of a supervisory system for the launching of ballistic missiles to prevent the proliferation of massive antipersonnel weapons.

France announced the suspension of its nuclear tests at the beginning of this year.

On European defense, Dumas said Europe had two forces now—the joint army corps of France and Germany and the Atlantic alliance. He regarded the Atlantic alliance as the cornerstone of European defense, but France did not hope to return to the military integration of the alliance.

State Department's Boucher Cited on Baltics, START

OW0511034892 Beijing XINHUA in English
0152 GMT 5 Nov 92

[Text] Washington, November 4 (XINHUA)—Russian ambassador to the United States has assured U.S. acting secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had reversed his decision to delay withdrawal of Russian troops from three Baltic states, the U.S. State Department said today.

Richard Boucher, acting spokesman of the State Department, said Ambassador Vladimir Lukin told Eagleburger during a meeting this morning at the State Department that Russian troops would withdraw from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

A plan for removing Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia would be completed within 10 days, Boucher said.

"We would expect the Yeltsin government will fulfill its commitments to do so," Boucher said.

Last week, President Yeltsin said he was halting troop withdrawals as a result of concerns that in their absence the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics might be abused.

The U.S. State Department said last Friday [30 October] that the United States was disappointed with Yeltsin's decision, and might respond by withholding more than 400 million dollars in foreign assistance to the former Soviet republics.

U.S. laws require the Bush Administration to report to Congress on progress being made toward withdrawal prior to release of the funds.

Meanwhile, the State Department welcomed the ratification by the Russian parliament of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the United States.

The Russian lawmakers today voted 157-1 to ratify the START treaty, which was signed in July 1991 by President Bush and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to cut by about one-third the U.S. and former Soviet arsenals of long-range missiles and bombers over the next seven years.

"We see this as a very important positive development towards bringing the treaty into force," said Boucher.

He also urged Ukraine and Belarus to complete their own ratification of START. "The governments of both countries have assured us that they strongly support ratification," he said.

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan still have strategic nuclear weapons from the Soviet arsenal, but Kazakhstan has ratified the treaty.

AUSTRALIA

Foreign Minister Expects Nuclear Test Ban Under Clinton

*BK0511083492 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0500 GMT 5 Nov 92*

[Excerpts] There has been a mixed reaction from Asia and the Middle East to victory in the American presidential election of Bill Clinton. [passage omitted]

Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans, said some of the biggest changes to be expected from the Clinton administration will be in arms control. Senator Evans said he expects to see America adopt a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

On Asian issues, he said China would be a test for Mr. Clinton's stated enthusiasm for human rights and democratic reforms.

NORTH KOREA

Ministry Denies Stockpiling Chemical Weapons

*SK3010105492 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1036 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Text] Pyongyang October 30 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea answered a question put by KCNA today regarding recent reports of some U.S. media quoting false materials of the South Korean authorities saying that the DPRK has "bio-chemical weapons."

On October 23 the Voice of America quoted a report submitted by the South Korean "security planning board" to the "National Assembly" alleging that the DPRK has established a "biochemical war strategy" and stockpiled chemical and germ weapons enough to totally destroy the South Korean population and that toxic materials are being produced at several factories.

This is another fabrication of the United States and the South Korean authorities to invent a new pretext for increasing the tensions on the Korean peninsula and resuming the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises.

As is widely known to the world, the "security planning board" of South Korea is a despicable plot-breeding tool which is engaged in fabrications to incite North-South confrontation and suppress the patriotic democratic forces of South Korea at the instigation of the United States. It is their habitual method to stage such groundless drama each time they are driven into a tight corner with the internal crisis getting serious and the truth brought to light.

The United States and the South Korean authorities are facing strong protest and criticism by public opinion at home and abroad for their decision to resume the "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers with an outcry over "suspicion of nuclear development" against the DPRK.

So, they are going to great pains to add the "biochemical suspicion" to the "nuclear suspicion."

No one would be cheated or fooled by such false drama in modern times.

The United States and the South Korean authorities can never be justified in resuming the "Team Spirit" even if they slander the DPRK on false charges. If they stage the nuclear war exercise despite our warnings, they will have to bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom.

Foreign Ministry Rejects Chemical Weapons Charge

Spokesman Comments

*SK3110013792 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2200 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Text] Some U.S. media have recently been circulating false information provided by the South Korean authorities that we have biochemical weapons. Yesterday [30 October] a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry answered a question asked by a Korean Central News Agency reporter as follows:

On 23 October the Voice of America quoted a report that the South Korean Agency for National Security Planning [NSP] submitted to the National Assembly. This report alleges that we have established a biochemical war strategy and stockpiled enough chemical and germ warfare weapons to totally destroy the South Korean population and that toxic materials are being produced at several factories.

This is another slander that the United States and the South Korean authorities have thought up in order to invent a new pretext for increasing tension on the Korean peninsula and resuming the Team Spirit joint military exercise.

This is not the first time the United States and the South Korean authorities have found fault with us, groundlessly alleging that we have biochemical weapons. However, they are using a somewhat different tactic this time: to prove the authenticity of the false report, the United States borrowed the name of the notorious South Korean NSP.

As the world knows, the South Korean NSP is a dirty plot-breeding tool engaged in fabrications to incite North-South confrontation and to suppress the patriotic democratic forces of South Korea at the instigation of the United States. They are in the habit of staging such a groundless drama each time the internal crisis gets serious, the truth is brought to light, and, as a result, they are driven into a tight corner.

The United States and the South Korean authorities are receiving strong protests and criticism from public opinion at home and abroad on their decision to resume the Team Spirit joint military exercise under the pretext

of suspicion about our nuclear development. Thus, they are going to take great pains to add the biochemical suspicion to the nuclear suspicion. It is very clear that no matter how many lies they fabricate, which no one would believe, the lies cannot become truth. No one will be cheated or fooled by such a false drama in modern times.

Even if they try to resume the exercise, the United States and the South Korean authorities will not be able to justify Team Spirit by slandering us with false charges. If they stage the nuclear war exercise despite our warnings, they will have to bear full responsibility for all the consequences that may arise.

Commentary Denounces Allegation

SK0111083792 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0023 GMT 1 Nov 92*

[NODONG SINMUN 1 November commentary: "Mean Maneuvers Aimed at Misleading Public Opinion"]

[Text] In a recent report to the National Assembly National Defense Committee on the so-called status of the North's biochemical weapons, the South Korean Agency for National Security Planning [NSP], a hotbed of anticommunist plot-breeding, made a lot of preposterous lies that we produced and stockpiled many biochemical weapons to strengthen a military offensive against the South. This group of political stratagists—which specializes in falsity and fabrication—made the chemical, foods, and pharmaceutical plants, including the Sunchon vinalon complex protein fodder plant and the Yongsong beer plant, take the form of plants producing biochemical weaponry, while inventing a far-fetched figure of stockpiled biochemical weapons in an attempt to give credibility to their deceitful propaganda.

It is a totally groundless lie that we are producing biochemical weapons and preparing for chemical warfare. It is calculated, tricky propaganda based on a scenario prepared at the NSP underground secret room to slander us. Undoubtedly the South Korean rulers attempted to give a fresh shock to public opinion when their anti-Republic strategic propaganda, including the resident spy case involving Kim Nak-chung and the Workers Party of Korea in South Korea case, ran out and when the falsity of the so-called suspicion of our nuclear development was brought to light proving unworkable, by inventing another drama that we have produced a large quantity of biochemical weapons and are preparing for biochemical warfare.

Through a series of tricky propaganda, the South Korean rulers are trying to turn the situation on the Korean peninsula, which is advancing toward reconciliation and detente after the North-South agreement was adopted and effectuated, back to distrust and confrontation. The tricky propaganda by the South Korean rulers has also been devised in an effort to get out of their serious political crisis and extend their military fascist regime by diverting the South people's sentiment against them to

anticommunism with the upcoming presidential election at hand and further strengthening the fascist suppression.

The South Korean rulers are making the strategic propaganda to pursue other purposes as well. It is part of the reactionary propaganda offensive that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean rulers are staging in collusion with each other to tarnish our Republic's image. It is also a mean maneuver to justify their preparations for biochemical warfare, which they are accelerating in South Korea, and the Team Spirit joint military exercise, which they decided to resume in the future.

The government of our Republic, as a signatory of the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the use of toxic chemical weapons, has always respected the relevant international agreements. Furthermore, our people suffered a miserable calamity because of the chemical and germ weapons which the U.S. imperialists used during the Korean war, and maintain the position opposing biochemical weaponry more than anyone else.

Through a Foreign Ministry statement dated 26 January 1989, we presented a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and a chemical weapon-free zone. Such a proposal by us shows a positive effort to eliminate the danger of nuclear and chemical wars and ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and it is supported and welcomed by the world's peace-loving people.

Biochemical warfare is being prepared by South Korea, not by the North. The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean rulers, who established an offensive strategy of air to ground warfare and made nuclear weapons and biochemical weapons basic strike means a long time ago, have earnestly accelerated the preparation for a chemical war along with nuclear war. They already brought some 10 toxic gas plants into South Korea in 1984. In the U.S.-South Korean annual Security Consultative Meeting held in May the following year, they hatched a plot for giving South Korea an independent chemical warfare capability and brought a large quantity of binary chemical weapons, a new generation mass-destruction weapon, into South Korea.

There are some 40 underground nuclear and chemical weapon armories in the area of Mt. Kyeryong, South Chungchong Province and in the area adjoining Suwon, Kyonggi Province. Stored in these armories are numerous binary chemical weapons. According to the information already made public by the U.S. imperialists several years ago, as many as 25,000 drums of chemical weapons of some 10 types, including toxic gas, are stockpiled in South Korea and its neighboring areas.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities have systematically conducted training relative to chemical warfare at the puppet navy's chemical, biological, and radiological unit school, the puppet army's combat infantry units, and schools, for many years. In particular, every time they conducted the Team Spirit joint military

exercise, they expanded and strengthened the offensive warfare exercise by means of biochemical weapons as well as nuclear war. All these facts confirm that it is the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean ruling group that produce and stockpile biochemical weapons and stage the maneuvers for chemical warfare on the Korean peninsula.

No matter how much mean and falsely fabricated propaganda the South Korean ruling bunch may employ, it

should clearly know that it can never veil the truth and cannot accomplish its dirty political purpose.

Instead of adhering to a stupid and reckless act of trying to find fault with us, the South Korean ruling bunch should take actions to withdraw the U.S. nuclear and biochemical weapons brought into South Korea, immediately stop its maneuver for producing chemical weapons and preparing for chemical warfare, and step down from power without delay as demanded by the people.

POLAND

Walesa Calls Soviet Army Withdrawal 'Historical Justice'

*LD2910105592 Warsaw PAP in English 2007 GMT
28 Oct 92*

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 28—Commenting on the withdrawal of the last combat unit of the former Soviet Army on Wednesday [28 October], President Lech Walesa stated that this fact ultimately confirmed Poland's sovereignty.

"If one can speak of historical justice, it was done precisely today," Walesa said in a statement released by his press office. "The constant presence of foreign state troops on our territory reminded us of an act of lawlessness committed against Poland, of trampling upon international law and human freedom," the president went on.

"Today violence and dictate suffered defeat. Law and the will of partnerly cooperation won. This was achieved by Poland and new Russia. Agreement and the road towards reconciliation was possible only in such circumstances. There is no freedom without democracy.

"Today we are looking into the future with hope. We know how to appreciate all what democratic Russia has done to overcome the painful past. The disclosure of truth about the Katyn crime and the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Army from Poland under the agreements concluded recently are two momentous events that are linked with one another in some way. They provide a solid foundation for mutual confidence and good neighbourly cooperation.

"Let truth and respect for law determine Polish-Russian relations. They are becoming fully normal, and they augur a favourable future," the Polish president's statement concluded.

Prime Minister Briefed on Russian Troop Withdrawal

*LD2910212492 Warsaw PAP in English 1611 GMT
29 Oct 92*

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 29—General Zdzislaw Ostrowski Thursday [29 October] reported to Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka on the withdrawal of the last Russian combat unit from Poland.

"On Wednesday, the last combat unit of the Army of the Russian Federation stationing in Poland left the sea base in Swinoujscie. Thus, after the 47-year presence of foreign troops in Poland, there no longer are any combat units of the former Soviet Army on Polish territory," Gen. Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for matters connected with stationing of the Russian Army in Poland, told Premier Suchocka.

He also reported that about 7,000 Russian soldiers and 1,500 members of civilian staff have stayed behind to coordinate the transit of Russian troops pulling out from Germany.

At the beginning of 1993 a number of Russian soldiers staying in Poland should decrease to 5,000 while the end of next year will see the last Russian soldier leaving this country.

According to Ostrowski all in all 64,000 Soviet troops stayed in Poland after the Second World War. The units were deployed in 15 provinces of Poland, staying in 59 garrisons and localities.

On April 8, 1991, recognized by the Polish government as the date of the official beginning of the pullout, there were 56,000 former Soviet Army troops in Poland, equipped with 600 tanks, over 1,100 armoured personnel carriers, 200 combat planes, 20 missile launchers and 24 torpedo cutters, General Ostrowski added.

Upon hearing the report Premier Suchocka observed that "this day is a meaningful symbol of Poland regaining full sovereignty."

EGYPT

Foreign Minister Links CW Convention, Israeli Nuclear Policy

NC2810190992 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1616 GMT
28 Oct 92

[Text] Cairo, 28 Oct (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa has said that Egypt is determined that the elimination of conventional and chemical weapons not be discussed unless the removal of nuclear weapons is discussed simultaneously. He added that the elimination of nuclear weapons should have priority over the elimination of other types of weapons.

In an interview with the magazine AL-MUSAWWAR, Musa said that Israel's nonparticipation in a nuclear nonproliferation agreement creates an unbalanced situation. This is why, he says, no country should be excluded in discussions about security or about eliminating or controlling armaments. The interview will be published in the Friday [30 October] edition.

Musa added: Specifically, we will not join an agreement about chemical weapons [CW] unless Israel participates in the international nuclear order. We made this proposal to the UN General Assembly and discussed it with the Israelis, the Americans, the Europeans, and with the multilateral negotiations disarmament committee.

We do not view Israel as an opponent of the Arabs, Musa said, adding: We see it as a Middle East country and as long as it is such it must act like one. There must be no exceptions in the region. The major powers must make Israel adhere to the general disarmament policy, he said. Otherwise, we will stay out of the chemical weapons agreement.

Musa commented on the peace negotiations, saying that the aim of the current peace talks is to attain a comprehensive solution. He remarked: Any solution that does not include a settlement of the Palestinian issue will take us back to the situation that existed before 1967. This is not the aim. The aim is to restore both the territory and the Palestinian people's rights.

The foreign minister discussed his recent visit to Israel, commenting: I did not go to Israel to perform remarkable feats. I made the visit to discuss some matters pertaining to the peace process. Among the issues we raised was Palestinian participation in all the committees of the multilateral talks. We reached an agreement over this. Palestinian participation used to be limited to economic development and refugee committees.

He added: We agreed on other positive points, including Israel's agreeing that Palestinians from inside and outside the territories can participate in all the committees. A negative point was that Israel expressed reservations about the Jerusalem issue and the PLO's participation in the talks.

Musa said: We must leave some issues for the Israelis and Palestinians to sort out with each other.

The foreign minister ruled out a meeting between Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. He described President al-Asad as a man of exceptional strategic intelligence who knows when to give if he decides to give.

Our role is to extend assistance to shorten the period of negotiations and to make the transitional period last one or two years instead of five or 10, Musa said, adding: We are not mediators. We are an Arab country committed to the Arab concept of a solution, he noted.

He added: We are now speaking of a transitional period, not final negotiations and not a final Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. This period includes a period of autonomy during which the Palestinians rule themselves prior to embarking on negotiations with the Israelis to reach a final and comprehensive peaceful solution.

Regarding Arab security and the challenges involved in this field, Musa announced: During the Arab League's recent meeting, we proposed a discussion of "pan-Arab security" in the context of current international and regional changes and challenges. A committee was formed from several Arab countries to discuss all aspects of this issue. It was given one year to make a study and determine the necessary mechanisms.

The foreign minister discussed the Damascus Declaration, saying that further progress has been made involving security and economic cooperation. He said bilateral cooperation between some Gulf countries and the United States, Britain, and France is another method being pursued.

GENERAL

Chelyabinsk-70 Redirecting Nuclear Work

934C0162A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 43, 21 Oct 92 p 12

[Report by Eduard Filatyev: "The Nuclear Chicken and the Golden Eggs"]

[Text] The scientific nuclear center in the open city of Chelyabinsk-70 was making ready to conduct the latest experiment.

47, 46, 45, 44....

Despite the firm and solemn moratorium proclaimed by our country, "secret physicists" nevertheless did decide to check the operation of a new "article."

22, 21, 20, 19....

When it learns about the upcoming action, the world community should certainly protest in desperation.

12, 11, 10, 9....

But....

4, 3, 2, 1....

They have tested the new item. And very successfully. And progressive mankind has indifferently ignored this alarming fact. And all because in the open city of physicists, they were testing not a threatening nuclear weapon, but only an installation for drying chicken manure.

The powers are drying out the "brightest minds" and the most "golden hands"....chicken manure! Do we need more eloquent proof that all is not well in the homeland's nuclear sector?

When on that day in May, at 26 degrees above zero, an ominous cloud suddenly appeared above the forest of Industrial Area No. 20, a mild panic immediately flared up in the city.

"What is that?" the inhabitants asked in some concern. "An escape of chlorine or a radioactive excursion?"

It is easy to understand the concern of the people in the city, because they live side by side with the project where the most threatening weapons—nuclear weapons—are born. The facility is VNIITF—the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics. Russia's second nuclear center.

The second center was created not to compete with the first. It was all rather more dramatic. In the mid-1950's it was reported to the Soviet leadership that America knew where the brain of our nuclear program was located and had targeted everything it had on it.

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, who at that time was totally engaged with the grandiose business of opening up the virgin lands and fallow lands, clutched at his head:

"So what should be done?"

"Secretly form a second, analogous center," an adviser proposed. "A backup. In case of an emergency. And send there the best minds from among those whom Kurchatov has not yet managed to recruit for his own needs."

Creation of a parallel nuclear structure threatened to cost the country a pretty penny. A lot. And Khrushchev was reluctant to divert funding from the insatiable virgin lands that were so dear to his heart. But it was more important to teach them a lesson. And on the boundless territory of the then still mighty and indivisible USSR, yet another unseen city appeared, and in it there was a nuclear center. A doppelganger center. A second scientific head, as it were, capable at any moment of replacing the first.

While bustling with a full life, our invisible city at the same time apparently did not exist at all: It was not shown on the maps, and the underground numbers of the conspiratorial city were periodically changed. During the 1960's it was not for nothing that we sang with pride about the "cities that have no names." Even today the center for the Ural nuclear people has two official names. One is something like a military rank conferred on everyone who has anything to do with the defense of the country or the army: Chelyabinsk-70. The other is a totally civilian name—Snezhinsk. Absolutely peaceful, almost poetical and lyrical. And at first blush so remote from what the city actually does.

However, is it really so remote? For the shape of a snowflake [snezhinka] is very similar to that of an explosion. The cunning physicists somehow outwitted the vigilant military people and gave their city a name that drops a hint. And a city emblem was devised for the dimwits—a star inside a snowflake, and inside the star the point of an atom. Even a schoolboy could guess that one!

Of course, it would be "suitable" for the main square in this kind of city to have a statue of some eminent physicist. Kurchatov, for example. And this is in fact what was initially suggested. But the strictest of secrecy was an impediment.

What if a foreign satellite discerned the personality depicted in the statue? And they would understand everything, guess everything! So the central square of Chelyabinsk-Snezhinsk was decorated with a bronze Ilich. And the memorial to Kurchatov, already cast, was banished beyond the forest and lakes and swamps and set up on one of the production areas. That same production site No 20 that so scared the city on that May morning.

However, all suspicions about harm from the mysterious emissions were dispelled the next day by the local

newspaper NASHA GAZETA. It reported on page one that "the green cloud caused a totally unnecessary mild panic among the city folk; it turns out that it was simply birch pollen."

By an irony of fate these measures of strict secrecy reached a unique culmination. Our own leaders never once visited the nuclear cradle of power. It was as if they had forgotten about its existence. And the first major state figure who managed to find time for Snezhinsk was U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. In memory of this official visit by a potential adversary, the inhabitants of Snezhinsk now call the street leading from the control and entry point to the city Baker Street.

During the secretary of state's visit to one of the laboratories, he unexpectedly asked why the physicists working in it had gray hair. They explained to the curious American that a gray head was merely the consequence of the constant worrying about the fate of the business entrusted to them. And, as is known, the business of the "secret physicists" is such that it cannot but trouble them....

It would, however, be more honest to answer that the "secret heads" have turned white because of the new questions raised by perestroika.

Why does the country allocate 100 million rubles [R] annually to the VNIITF, while in the United States the analogous center is given a billion dollars each year?

Why were the Soviet experts who were observers at the nuclear proving ground in Nevada given only \$15 a day, while the labor of a simple American worker at that same test site is paid at the rate of at least \$25 an hour?

Why are the wages of a trolley bus driver in Chelyabinsk Oblast more than the monthly pay of a top-class theoretical physicist from the closed Chelyabinsk-70?

But that is by no means all. Conversion and the moratorium have descended like a June snow on heads warmed by a sultry heat. The nuclear racer across the ocean has continued its fast gallop, as if nothing has happened, while ours has come to a standstill, like something rooted to the ground. An alarming silence hangs over the Soviet test sites. The sector has fallen into a half-sleep.

It would appear that this is the very time to plan for the switch onto peaceful rails and, having regrouped, to move forward in a new direction. But this has not occurred! The size of Russia has had its effect. Without thinking about it for very long, the energy reformers completely closed off the channels of funding for the nuclear programs. The flow of money that for so many years steadily turned the millstone of the insatiable nuclear mill suddenly ran dry and became a very small, gurgling sputter. It was as if the polarity of a gigantic magnet had instantaneously been reversed and had started to repel just as powerfully what it had previously attracted so strongly.

But the staff of VNIITF is made up of about 17,000 people! Of these, 10,000 were directly involved in the development of nuclear weapons. There was simply nothing for their "disarmed" brains to do. And then everywhere they started to talk about a "brain drain." The world was startled.

The U.S. secretary of state hurried to bring "first aid" to Snezhinsk. James Baker was generous in his promises, supporting in particular the idea of creating an international nuclear center, a kind of philanthropic shelter for Russian scientists losing their jobs.

President Yeltsin, too, decided not to be left behind by the United States. In order to maintain parity in terms of high-level visits, he went to Arzamas-16, where he signed an edict giving both Russian nuclear centers the status of federal centers. And when this was done, the scientists were promised comprehensive support.

However, the all-powerful bureaucratic structures were in no hurry to comply with the presidential edict. The promised pay raise was late in coming. Moreover, payment was constantly delayed in the spring and summer.

Of course, the institute of technical physics is not just waiting for the weather to roll in from the sea. In order to survive and to stay on its feet, they have put a multitude of various affairs in train there. Mainly those that do not "get on the nerves" of other departments. Thus, they have prepared a computerized topographical map the like of which no one in the country has. They have learned how to coat cutting tools with diamond dust, thus doubling or even trebling their service life. They have managed to organize the production of fiber optics for the most up-to-date communications facilities. Instead of disposable syringes, which are in short supply, they are suggesting that we use a more promising, stronger repeat-use syringe that is capable of withstanding high-temperature sterilization.

The latest achievement of the Ural nuclear people is an installation for grading chicken eggs and a unit for drying chicken manure. Do not be in any hurry to burst into sarcastic laughter; these things are extremely necessary for agriculture! Yes, and it is not so simple to manufacture them. The question is, why are the nuclear people doing this?

But what can they do, life is forcing them to it.

It is true that the scientists are somewhat puzzled by the complete indifference that the country is showing toward all their stunning developments. Foreigners, well, they are interested, and there is no end to the suggestions. But it is as if our domestic business world is not noticing their achievements, or the advantages that are hidden in the new "articles." The better minds of the power are prepared to show everyone what they are capable of. The nuclear chicken should be laying golden eggs! And for this only a little is needed—just keep them afloat for two or three years.

The despair has led to a situation in which some of the nuclear people who conceived "the bomb" and tested it almost a thousand times have started to be convinced that nuclear weapons are almost absolutely harmless items.

The splendid story is already being circulated in the pages of the newspapers that a thermonuclear weapon is not dangerous. They say that our glorious scientists thought through everything so scrupulously and studied and made provision so carefully that a modern "bomb" can be safely left at any busy crossroad—nothing terrible will happen. The "article," they say, may be sawed, drilled, kicked, and struck with whatever force you have available, and there will not be an atomic explosion. The most unpleasant thing that can happen is that the conventional explosive will blow up, smash the casing to pieces, and scatter splinters about. As a result, it will be easy to raise the background radiation at the site of the incident, and that is all!

It has, alas, now become possible to read and hear such carefree assertions repeatedly. But common sense still cautions and, like the world, suggests the old wisdom that God helps those who help themselves.

This is why another rule of the physicists is more to my liking: While even one single nuclear weapon remains on the planet, there must be experts who have a thorough knowledge of that weapon, everything: how to store it, how to move it from place to place, how to check its safety, how eventually to destroy a bomb that is too old.

Yes, the physicists do make the "bomb." But not only that. In this case, mankind has for the first time in its history encountered a unique phenomenon, when the creation of a weapon of destruction has been inseparably linked with the development of means to protect itself against it. A nuclear weapon is equally dangerous both for its "own" people and for "others." And the danger of radioactivity comes not only from weapons. It may descend on us from space. And even from the center of the Earth itself. So in the face of this threat it turns out that we do not have the right to be unarmed.

The somber law of nuclear balance for many long years determined the balance of power on the planet. If they exist, we exist. If they have the bomb, we have to have the bomb.

Now, apparently, there are no enemies. Our nuclear centers have put peaceful lilies of the valley and carnations in their buttonholes, rolled up their sleeves, and started to implement conveyor-belt and commercial programs, establishing the closest of links with foreign partners.

And then, like thunder in a cloudless sky, a perplexed voice rang out:

"And why did you not seek our advice? Why did you not ask us?"

This was a voice test from the modest public organization with the dreaded name of SRYaZ—the Alliance of Nuclear Weapon Developers. It includes the "secret physicists," the "secret mathematicians," the "secret designers," in short, the direct creators of nuclear weapons from both scientific centers—Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. A Lenin Prize laureate, the theoretical physicist B.M. Murashkin, was chosen as the head of SRYaZ.

The newly created public organization immediately issued a declaration in which it expressed its burning concern with the state of affairs in the nuclear sector.

"Have we not been too distracted by secondary issues?" the Alliance of Nuclear Weapon Developers people asked. "Yes, we can make instruments for the medical people, and fiber optics for the communications people, and sets of tools for the processing industry, and even units for poultry farmers! But we must not forget the main purpose of the nuclear scientific centers—to care for the defense of the motherland."

As is stated in one of the documents of the alliance of developers, in recent times too many "organizations and people have appeared that are supposedly concerned with the development of nuclear weapons," but the fate of our nuclear program is often "considered without the involvement of the experts." Commissions and delegations sent to resolve the issues of nuclear disarmament and conduct reciprocal checks at the international level are made up of people who, although sound enough, are very poorly versed in this specific field, or, to put it more simply, are simply incompetent.

It is the opinion of the Alliance of Nuclear Weapon Developers that as a consequence of this it is now a somber fact that the American side has gained significant advantages in the matter of conducting nuclear tests. So the alliance of developers considers that the treaty signed by Bush and Gorbachev, which essentially authenticated this for us disappointing inequality, needs to be amended immediately.

Perhaps at no time since the opposition to the official authorities by the rebellious Academician Sakharov has the nuclear sector experienced such stormy upheavals. The rank-and-file physicist-developers, who for years had looked only at the screens of oscilloscopes and computer displays, have suddenly had an opportunity to look around. And they have found with astonishment that what has occurred is, as it were, a change of the leading team: The places occupied by scientists with acute consciences and incredible loyalty to the common cause have been gradually replaced by energetic pragmatists, people without complexes but with a rigid, businesslike grip.

Hence the extreme increase in secondary, "nonprofile" work and the attraction for business trips abroad. At the same time, there is a desire to maintain the regime of top secrecy and lack of publicity, which also allows continued uncontrolled rule on a closed sector.

All of this is taking place against a backdrop where (we cite SRYaZ again) "the impoverished standard of living for leading experts is not in line with the degree of their responsibility for ensuring the defense capability of the country and maintaining Russia's scientific and technical parity with respect to nuclear weapons."

Of course, it is not for us to judge the scientists. One thing is clear: The unity of the ranks of the nuclear physicists has been disrupted. And this leads to very dismal reflection.

When the capital's theaters seethe and disintegrate, when the workers in the Hydrometeorological Scientific Research Center or Aeroflot threaten a strike, when the miners or the medical people or the teachers strike, it is undoubtedly regrettable, but quite understandable: People have the right to fight for their rights.

But when "intellectual ferment" seizes the nuclear centers, the reaction is unambiguous: This is also understandable, but it cannot stand on its own. One starts to fear for one's near and dear, for the country, for the planet. For scientists in dispute are like angry elephants let loose in a china shop. Is it really difficult to understand that our fragile world can be so easily transformed into a formless pile of shards? And skulls, too!

There is a reserved place in closed Chelyabinsk-Snezhinsk where almost no one is allowed to go. It is a secret museum where they keep examples of the "articles," or, to put it simply, examples of nuclear bombs of various force. Like a collection of little china elephants, the bombs, little ones and big ones, stand there, from the very first, big and clumsy, to the very latest, compact and graceful.

And a sympathetic globe adorns the front of the House of the Pioneers. It is big, about two meters in diameter. The children love to twirl it.

So: What is kept in this museum is quite enough to blow up this globe—the world.

Russian Defense Industry Official on Conversion Problems

934P0008A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Oct 92 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Potapov on Interview with Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Konkov, general director, "Kontekh" Corporation; place and date not given: "The Convulsions of Conversion"]

[Text] The "defense people" read PRAVDA and react to items published therein. Reactions to the article by Major General (Ret.) V. Surikov entitled "Disarm, but Intelligently," published in PRAVDA on 21 July 1992 in the International Section started alarm bells ringing from Kaliningrad to Moscow Oblast. Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Konkov, general director of the "Kontekh" Corporation, has approached the problem of disarmament from the

viewpoint of the Russian defense complex's participation and the fate of our gifted fellow-countrymen employed in it.

No matter how much garbage has been dumped on our country's defense complex recently, and no matter what kind of monster it has been depicted as, it is high time that we admitted the following facts to ourselves: Every human being has some latent or hidden talent, some unique originality that should be respected by Russia in the present-day, exceedingly pragmatic world; it must be saved or at least coped with. And it is also high time that our leaders wiped those smiles off their faces. After some meetings with our "defense people," this gloomy feeling of mine found some genuine outlines. Russia has possessed and to this day still possesses certain things commensurate only with its intellectual potential, as evolved under the harsh and unique conditions of "defense," things which—yes!—pursued military goals. Nevertheless, such things are part of its flesh and blood. To destroy them now would mean losing Russia for us.

No one in the world is waiting until the time of shocks is finished for us. Roles have already been distributed long ago to everybody in the world economy. We must find out and then explain just what role is being assigned to Russia now and whether we agree with it. And to do this, we must act before it is too late.

The future of our country's "defense people" is connected nowadays with the process which has acquired the name "conversion." This foreign word has quickly gone into circulation here. For the mass of people it signifies: We'll change missiles into saucepans, and then we will begin to live well! By now, to be sure, we have seen that the beautiful words spoken or written by the politicians are not worth as much as the—perhaps dry but vitally important—words of practical people. Conversion was proclaimed by persons who had no precise goals, directions, or mechanisms by which to implement it. But conversion turned out to be not something presented as a gift; it requires funds, programs, and a state-type of approach. People soon became convinced that even the best defense enterprises—which were not equipped to manufacture mass-produced, consumer goods—could not possibly make high-quality and inexpensive products, all the more so in that they were deliberately obsolete.

I admit that I asked the director of "Kontekh" the following question: Can we seriously say now that conversion is taking place in our country? He explained that there is a special law, dated 20 March of the current year. But what is hidden between the lines? What needs to be taken into account?

Our defense-industrial structure is fundamentally different than those abroad. Over there, for example, there are virtually no firms which operate solely for "defense." But in our country there is a narrow specialization due to the hypertrophied growth of "defense" in the past. A second characteristic of ours is a rigorous targeting on

the result at any price. And the heavy, defense shield of our fatherland has been forged by thousands of NII's [scientific research institutes], KB's [design bureaus], experimental, research laboratories and groups, all connected with the institutes under the Academy of Sciences and the system of higher schools.

—Believe me—I was told by my fellow-conversationalist [Konkov]—we built up our ties with scientists in this country not based on their titles at all, but instead strictly on their practical value. Our system attracted people by its scope, its high requirements, and the opportunity to fulfill oneself. And they worked in harmony, finding their own paths and solving what would seem to be unsolvable problems.

Of course, there were also plenty of "buts"—subjectivism in the evaluations of work and frequently in the very tasks assigned. But then, of course, the products, especially nuclear missiles, could not be tested under real-life conditions. And thank God for that! There were failures connected to the projects assigned and with their being shut down. Moreover, even nowadays it cannot be said whether certain decisions were right or wrong. **Such dependence inevitably led to the directors and project managers being too amenable to any orders which came down from above, and this isolated these supervisors from the actual performers.** Those on high solved their own problems, the creative people did well by any standards, and the technicians used to work furiously. Even now, when the upper echelons call for conversion, the reaction at the lower levels is ambiguous. We are still faced with the task of achieving trust and confidence in the policy of conversion.

Indeed, the goal used to be clear, faith was alive, and specific programs were in operation. What about now? How is conversion being carried out? Within the old structures—harmfully and unrealistically. We need to build new structures—but there is neither enough time nor resources. Hopes have been placed on help from the West. But that is naive. No one over there is going to create strong competitors for themselves. For help in saucepan production it is simpler to seek partners in a sphere other than "defense." Perhaps they could help us to dismantle our warheads and reoutfit our assembly-lines. But the elite portion of our unique potential, its "brain," here too remains fundamentally without anything to do. Of course, everything will find its proper place after some time. There is no state without a defensive capability, nor will there be one in the foreseeable future. It is not by chance that a military bloc—the Western European Alliance—is being revived in Western Europe. The Americans cherish their own military-industrial complex, and the Japanese are concerned for their own.... What can be done so that this portion of the Russian intellect may not be wasted or even ruined? Because, of course, the irreversible process has already begun.

There are persons who are ready, willing, and able to work, but so far there is no mobile structure capable of

responding flexibly enough to the tasks assigned by the state and the society, capable of activating the extremely complex mechanism for creating up-to-date technologies. Although a number of our developments are as good as western technologies even in the new sectors. A developer must find an opportunity to provide his potential buyer with models of his equipment. Therefore, we need to have targeted investments for specific programs. **But our present-day policy of conversion at best provides only for squeezing through "wage holes" at budgetary enterprises. The programs are supported neither by investments nor by acceptable credits.** But only programs can provide the intellectual forces of the "defense establishment" with the necessarily high and exacting requirements of the tasks assigned and their social significance.

Herd-type animals do not survive in isolation. Our defense complex belongs precisely to such types of creatures. And its "brain" does not want to be atrophied. At the end of last year a number of organizations which had worked together for a long time in the missile-and-space industry decided to create a corporation—to be named "Kontekh"—based on the words "conversion technology." This was a strictly voluntary business, with its initiative drawn from below. In May the corporation began to live officially, and we've been here since then—V.K. Konkov said with a wry smile.

We need state support—guarantees on investments, representation in a joint-stock form, and support on tax policy. Because, after all, the efforts of yesterday's "defense people" and the present-day "conversionists" are directed at resource-conservation technologies, environmental-protection measures, aimed at attaining the leading edge of technology. Is this really not in the interest of the state? We need support from the ministries of industry, science, and education.... Unfortunately, the papers and documents sent there—my fellow-conversationalist complained—have remained unanswered. Of course, they have many problems. But the requests of our "defense people" are modest—just examine their proposals, prepared in an initiatory manner, free of charge. Analyze them, and decide whether they are worth supporting.

The approach taken by our country's intellectuals to conversion is a uniquely original, Russian one. They propose to direct their efforts at solving specific Russian problems—moreover, the most important ones. In the first place, the food problem, our daily bread. We purchase 20-25 million tonnes of grain. But we lose just as much due to the lack of drying facilities and fuel. What if we were to attempt to preserve moist grain? To preserve it hermetically in a nitrogen unit and dry it gradually? There is such a program being worked on at "Kontekh." Nitrogen technology opens up enormous possibilities—whole supplies delivered without drying, spillage, preservation of the products.... That is something which we need and which we can do ourselves. Vyacheslav Nikolayevich told me about many such

programs, capable of changing the face of the agroindustrial, logging, and mining complexes, as well as restoring health to the environment of entire regions of our country. They also have good future prospects for international cooperation. Among these are the space isolation of radioactive wastes from the biosphere, searching for hundreds of thousands of tonnes of German chemical weapons which were dumped into the Baltic Sea by the Allies after World War II, raising them and neutralizing them, as well as the use of destroyed missile silos and the missiles themselves for everyday purposes.

The Russian intellect is still alive. But these days—as never before—it needs help and state aid. Because, you know, intellect dies away when it stops working.

Russian Defense Budget in 1993 To Be Roughly 1992 Level

PM3010145592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Oct 92 First Edition p 3

[RIA NOVOSTI report: "Military Budget Has Not Increased"]

[Text] Expenditure on defense in the draft Russian Budget for 1993 will remain roughly at the same level as in 1992 if you calculate in unchanged prices, acting Head of Government Yegor Gaidar said.

"At the moment, we probably should not go any further as far as this issue is concerned," he said, "since the main difficulties in the formation of a military budget are connected with the program for creating facilities in Russia for the troops returning from other states."

Shaposhnikov Appeals for World Ban on Weapons of Mass Destruction

LD0111203492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1900 GMT 1 Nov 92

[Text] The commander of the CIS combined forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, has made an appeal to gradually eliminate the world's nuclear arsenals and other means of mass destruction. In an interview to a military magazine published in the United Arab Emirates he also favoured a tougher control of nuclear weapons production to halt nuclear proliferation. Marshal Shaposhnikov has said the CIS countries are prepared to stop all nuclear tests if other nuclear states followed suit.

Tomsk Deputies Debate Proposed Storage Site for Fissile Material

93WN0106A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Chernykh under the rubric "Feedback": "Where Death Should Be Buried"]

[Text] The two ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA articles on the proposed construction near Tomsk of a storage site for fissile material of dismantled nuclear warheads have

stirred up the power structures and public of the oblast. The presidential representative in Tomsk Oblast, Stepan Sulakshin, made the first public evaluation. He had just returned from his latest trip to the United States of America. Speaking on oblast television, Sulakshin called the material in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA irresponsible. Of course it is customary to substantiate such a harsh description. But that was impossible to do since there were no arguments. Of course Sulakshin might also not have mentioned the "statement of the local press." But it would have been simply unimpressive to ignore the parliamentary newspaper. Just what else besides the statement about the irresponsible report did the presidential representative say?

The information received as a result of the American voyage merits special attention. It turns out that the government of the United States has already allocated 15 million dollars for design work on the storage site. Moreover, America's mass information media speak of the construction of the storage site specifically near Tomsk as a settled question. Sulakshin even showed on the TV screen one respectable publication where this information had been published. The presidential representative also reported that an authoritative conference on the storage site is to be held in Moscow in December. And there Tomsk will figure as the construction site. So how is the article in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA irresponsible?

Stepan Stepanovich was offended at the newspaper for an altogether understandable reason. He was called a supporter of this project in the article "Where Death Should Be Buried." But this assertion is exactly what the presidential representative could not dispute. To do that he would have had to abandon his own position which he expressed at two press conferences in June and July. Their results were extensively covered in the oblast mass information media. So at the end of the broadcast came the standard phrases, that he would protect the interests of Tomsk residents. How? By trying to ensure that an oblast representative would be present during all negotiations regarding the question of the proposed construction. It is altogether logical to mention in this regard that before conducting negotiations the opinion of the oblast's residents needs to be learned. In short, Stepan Stepanovich flew to Moscow after being in Tomsk for a short time.

But his presence was simply essential at the 16th session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies which opened on 27 October. It was essential, first, because Sulakshin is a deputy of this Soviet. And secondly, the newspaper article changed the session's proposed agenda. On the day it opened the deputies received xerox copies of the newspaper article. On that same day the article "Where Death Should Be Buried" was reprinted by the city newspaper TOMSKIY VESTNIK with a reference to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. And after a stormy discussion, the question of the proposed construction of the storage site in the closed city Tomsk-7 was specially included in the agenda of the session's work.

The discussion proved to be an emotional one. In principle one could assume from the sentiment of the hall that a sharply negative decision would be reached. And there could be no talk of any fundamental consensus on construction, which Russia's minister of atomic energy Mikhaylov requested in his letter.

The floor was given to the chief engineer of the Siberian Chemical Combine, Nikolay Sergeyevich Osipov. It is specialists of the combine who are supposed to service the nuclear storage site. One can guess the chief engineer's position. Is disarmament going on? Must the nuclear components be stored somewhere? So store them in the same place where the nuclear materials are produced. There are specialists able to provide control over them there.

From the standpoint of abstract logic the position is irreproachable. But if one adds to this that the storage site will meet all safety demands and can survive a direct nuclear attack, then the position is simply unassailable at first glance. Incidentally, the construction of the storage site is estimated at 1.8 billion rubles in 1991 prices.

And now for the counterarguments made by the deputies. The storage site is supposed to be built in a zone oversaturated with dangerous industrial installations. That includes the Siberian Chemical Combine itself with its nuclear production facility. That includes the atomic heat supply plant with two active reactors. That includes the open reservoir of liquid radioactive waste left from past times. Added to all this, a civilian industrial giant is located next door, the Tomsk Petrochemical Combine. And there have already been several serious accidents there. The launching of a fourth combine even had to be stopped. This picture characterizes the potential explosiveness of all the installations listed.

The ecological side. The concentration of high-powered production facilities has resulted in a steady growth in diseases registered among the local residents. The figures were cited at the session. Incidentally, the oblast ecology committee rejected the design of the storage site proposed to it at the expert study because it mentioned only the technical part. There was no word of its impact on ecology or of what consequences there could be for nature and people taking into account the harmful production facilities already operating. There was also talk at the session of the fact that according to international standards such an installation must not be located right next to a city of half a million people.

Tomsk is already within the 30-kilometer protected zone of the heat supply plant. A doctor of geological-mineralogical sciences invited to the session, Professor Gennadiy Rogov, expressed the opinion of a group of authoritative scientists. He pointed out that building such a storage site in the oblast is not wise given the existing mining-geological conditions.

The disagreement with the idea that such a global question is being decided by the government and, in particular, the Ministry on Atomic Energy, sounded

completely reasonable. Why has representative power been evaded? Why is a question of all-Russian scope not being discussed in Russia's Supreme Soviet? For it is not a simple storage building they want to build. And this question cannot be resolved by Tomsk Oblast alone. At the very least the opinion of the closest neighbors, and even of all Siberia must be taken into account.

And if it is in fact necessary to build such a storage site, then a suitable place far from populated points must be carefully chosen. Build both the storage site and an enterprise for processing the nuclear materials there. So that this complex has special status and is under federal jurisdiction. At the very least it is not a department which should decide such questions, or even the government, especially through some secret negotiations with the American government. That is the prerogative of the supreme organ of legislative power and the population of the Siberian region.

[Note]

And at This Time

Last Friday the question of the construction of the storage site for nuclear waste in the rayon of Tomsk-7 was reviewed at a large session of the oblast soviet. The construction of the storage site was rejected by a majority vote (80 percent). SNA.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

History of U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Agreements

92UM1502A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 7, Jul 92 pp 67-71

[Article by V. Markell: "On Reducing Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] Since the end of World War II, the leadership of our country has constantly advocated limiting, reducing, banning, and destroying nuclear weapons. However, at first the United States only went for negotiations on limiting weapons and on reducing these weapons only after we achieved nuclear parity with them.

The first peak of the nuclear arms race by the United States, which began in the 1960's, began to decline in the 1970's and particularly in the 1980's, which was associated with the massive removal of obsolete weapons systems from the inventory and replacing them with new ones. As was reported in foreign press, in 1983 the yield of the U.S. nuclear arsenal decreased 75 percent compared to 1960 as a result of this rearmament, and the number of nuclear munitions themselves decreased 25-30 percent. With the renovation of a considerable portion of the U.S. nuclear potential planned for the late 1980's and early 1990's, it was expected that the number of strategic nuclear munitions would be brought to 14,000-15,000 and the number of non-strategic munitions to 17,000. However, the second peak of the nuclear arms race did not take place for known reasons.

However, it should be noted that the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which entered into force for five years beginning in October 1972, already then established aggregate limits for ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) at 2,568 for the USSR and 1,710 for the United States. The USSR's advantage in number of missiles was equalized by the U.S. advantage in missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).

The Treaty Between the USSR and USA on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed in 1979, in which equal limits were set for each side on the number of strategic delivery vehicles—2,400. The treaty was to be in force until the end of 1985, but the 1979 treaty was never ratified.

The next treaty was signed in July 1991. Table 1 shows the changes in the correlation of components of U.S. strategic offensive forces [SOF] that took place between the signing of the last two treaties in the fiscal years of 1979 and 1991. According to the 1991 plan, the U.S. strategic offensive forces were to include 990 ICBMs, 616 SLBMs, and 215 heavy bombers, not counting the 10-percent active reserve and aircraft with conventional weapons or those performing various research and other work and mothballed. On the day the treaty was signed, the U.S. strategic offensive forces had 10,371 nuclear weapons (not counting reserve), including 2,353 heavy bombers, 2,450 ICBMs, and 5,568 SLBMs. These nuclear munitions could be aimed at approximately 9,000 targets grouped approximately around 3,600 ground zeros with a kill probability of 0.7 and higher.

Table 1

Characteristics	Correlation of SOF Components in 1979 and 1991, percent			Total, 1979/1991
	ICBMs	SLBMs	Heavy Bombers	
Nuclear weapons	23/23	50/54	27/23	over 9,200/10,371
Yield	39/41	11/28	50/31	4,600 megaton/over 2,750 megaton
Nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (regular)	50/54	31/34	19/12	up to 2,110/1,821
Number of delivery vehicles on alert	over 90/over 99	50/over 60	30/up to 20	about 1,400/about 1,400

Notes: 1. Figures rounded off to nearest whole percent.

2. Throw-weight of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs was 3,262 tons in 1979 and 2,361 tons in 1991.

3. In fiscal year 1991, the USA had for SOF 13,000 regular and reserve nuclear weapons, 10,371 of which were in the inventory of regular units.

After many years of negotiations, the Treaty Between the USSR and USA on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed for a term of 15 years. According to it, seven years after entering into force each side should retain up to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles and up to 6,000 counted strategic nuclear weapons, of which a maximum of no more than 4,900 can be on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. The

throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs must not exceed 3,600 tons.

The anticipated course of U.S. and USSR strategic arms reductions is shown in Table 2. The cited data on number of delivery vehicles may change considerably in connection with earlier unforeseen reductions in the number of ICBMs and heavy bombers on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan or their total withdrawal from these regions.

Table 2

Characteristics	Status as of Date Treaty Signed (31 Jul 91)	Ceiling Specified by Treaty by End of Phase for Each Party			Expected Number of Arms After Mutual Treaty and Unilateral Reductions by the Year 2003, in Russia/USA
		Phase 1 (3 yrs)	Phase 2 (2 yrs)	Phase 3 (2 yrs)	
Total number deployed in USSR/USA:					
ICBM launchers	1,398/1,000	-	-	-	%
SLBM launchers	940/648	-	-	-	%

Table 2 (Continued)

Characteristics	Status as of Date Treaty Signed (31 Jul 91)	Ceiling Specified by Treaty by End of Phase for Each Party			Expected Number of Arms After Mutual Treaty and Unilateral Reductions by the Year 2003, in Russia/USA
		Phase 1 (3 yrs)	Phase 2 (2 yrs)	Phase 3 (2 yrs)	
Heavy bombers	162/574	-	-	-	%
Total:	2,000/2,222	2,100	1,900	1,600	%
Number of nuclear weapons in USSR/USA:					
ICBMs	6,612/2,450	-	-	-	/Up to 500
SLBMs	2,804/5,568	-	-	-	Up to 1,750/Up to 1,750
Heavy bombers	855/2,353	-	-	-	/Up to 1,250
Total:	10,271/10,371	9,150	7,950	6,000	Up to 3,000/Up to 3,500
Including nuclear weapons on ICBMs and SLBMs	9,416/8,018	8,050	6,750	4,900	/Up to 2,250

On the whole, the treaty concluded in 1991 has great significance for future peace. But it could have been better for our side. For example, we are losing the invulnerability of part of our nuclear-powered missile submarines and part of our mobile ICBMs, being deprived of the right to place these submarines in underground shelters and being obligated to base deployed mobile ICBM launchers only in certain limited areas and at railroad stations. There are other provisions that are also unfavorable for us. However, we should not forget that any treaty is achieved through compromise on both sides, particularly an agreement concerning the supreme interests of two states—survival in the nuclear age.

In late September-early October 1991, the United States and USSR announced unilateral measures of each side for further nuclear disarmament. Removed from alert were 440 American Minuteman-2 ICBMs (with a single warhead) and 503 Soviet ICBMs (134 of them MIRVed ICBMs). In addition, both countries are ceasing the development of mobile ICBMs, and the USSR is freezing the number of rail-based ICBM launchers (the United States has none).

In 1991-1992, six Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) with 92 launchers for SLBMs are being withdrawn from the force composition, and 11 American SSBNs with 176 launchers for Poseidon SLBMs are being taken off alert with subsequent withdrawal from the force composition.

Forty American and an unannounced number of our heavy bombers with nuclear weapons aboard are being taken off alert at airfields, and both countries are stopping the development of short-range nuclear missiles for heavy bombers.

According to the U.S. strategic nuclear strike plan (SIOP) in effect on 1 October 1991, the number of planned targets has been reduced to 7,000 with a corresponding decrease in the number of designated nuclear burst ground zeros in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other areas of the Eurasian continent. Certainly Muscovites will be interested in knowing that instead of the 120 nuclear munitions aimed at 60 Moscow installations before, now the number of them is somewhat smaller.

At the same time, besides strategic nuclear arms there also exist non-strategic nuclear arms. The distribution of these weapons in the United States in general-purpose forces is showed in Table 3.

Table 3

Armed Service	Weapon System	Number of Nuclear Weapons (including in Europe)	
		1983	1991
Air Force	Aircraft bombs	3,080 (1,735)	Up to 3,375 (1,100)
	Pershing ballistic missiles	295 (295)	-
	Total:	3,375 (2,030)	Up to 3,375 (1,100)

Table 3 (Continued)

Armed Service	Weapon System	Number of Nuclear Weapons (including in Europe)	
		1983	1991
Army	203-mm artillery shells	1,200 (935)	800 (up to 500)*
	155-mm artillery shells	925 (735)	500 (up to 500)*
	Lance operational-tactical missiles	905 (695)	850 (up to 700)*
	Honest John operational-tactical missiles	300 (200)	-
	Nike-Hercules SAMs	745 (690)	-
	Nuclear landmines	605 (370)	-
	Total:	4,680 (3,625)	2,150 (up to 1,650)
Navy	Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles	-	Over 440 (.)
	Aircraft bombs	720 (.)	Over 360 (.)
	Depth bombs	895 (190)	About 800 (.)
	Terrier SAMs	290 (.)	-
	Asroc ASW rockets	575 (.)	-
	Subroc ASW rockets	285 (.)	-
	Total:	2,765 (190)	About 1,600 (.)
	Grand total	10,820 (5,845)	About 7,100 (up to 3,000)

*Subject to destruction.

It is known that U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons are intended for use primarily in forward areas for making strikes against targets in countries of the socialist community or their allies. Therefore, it is most convenient to trace the trend of their build-up and reduction in Europe. In 1954, the Americans made the decision to create in the European Theater of War stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in the amount of 15,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. This plan was about 50 percent implemented. In 1968, about 7,200 of these munitions were located on the territory of Europe. In 1980, as a result of the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear weapons, their number decreased to 6,000, and to 4,600 nuclear weapons in 1988 after the next reduction. A further reduction of nuclear arms in Europe took place between 1988 and 1991 in accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Land-Based Missiles, under which the United States destroyed 846 and the USSR 1,846 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

For the most part, the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons of the U.S. Armed Forces, including the Navy, came about through the removal of obsolete weapon systems from service: Lulu depth charges in 1971, nuclear torpedoes in 1977, Talos SAMs in 1980, Terrier SAMs in 1988, and nuclear versions of Asroc and Subroc ASW rockets in 1989-1990.

In September-October 1991, the USA and USSR announced forthcoming reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons. These mutual initiatives basically come down to the following:

Nuclear Weapons of the Ground Forces (Army). The USSR and USA are eliminating all nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for operational-tactical missiles. The USSR is withdrawing SAM nuclear warheads from the troops, concentrating them at central bases, and is also eliminating some of the SAM nuclear warheads and all nuclear mines (the USA no longer has these nuclear weapon systems). According to estimates published in the West, it will take the Americans from one to three years to remove from service and destroy all 2,150 nuclear weapons of the Army (1,300 artillery shells, including the neutron version, and 850 warheads of the Lance operational-tactical missiles).

Nuclear Weapons of the Air Force. The United States is withdrawing from Europe 50 percent of the nuclear aircraft bombs located there for its forces and NATO troops.

Nuclear Weapons of the Navy. The USSR and USA are removing non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines, and also units of carrier- and shore-based aviation, relocating the weapons to depots for centralized storage. True, this is taking place against the background of a sharp jump by the USA in mastering high-precision naval weapons and methods of getting stable target designation to them, where their priority was prominently demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War. Still, we are eliminating some of these nuclear munitions, and the USA about 50 percent, but primarily the obsolete B57 depth bombs. As far as the nuclear version of the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise

missiles [SLCM] and the B61 aircraft bombs are concerned, they are concentrated in depots and can be quickly returned to surface ships, aircraft carriers and coastal airfields, and submarines in the event of an emergency. Beginning 1 January 1991, American ships leaving U.S. ports are no longer carrying non-strategic nuclear weapons. Experts expect that removal of these weapons from the ships may be completed in May-June 1992, after the ships previously deployed to forward areas return to U.S. naval bases. The possible time period for dismantling the nuclear munitions being taken out of service is one to three years.

A positive thing is the fact that removing from service various types of non-strategic nuclear munitions that in a number of cases have become an anachronism will lead to a further decrease in the risk of nuclear war. As was reported in foreign press, the United States has already withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South Korea and has begun to withdraw the Army's nuclear weapons from Europe. In the near future we can expect a gradual elimination of the bodies in NATO ground forces for planning the use of these weapons and a reduction of half of the nuclear aircraft bombs in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. Alert duty for aircraft which carry nuclear weapons in NATO Joint Forces in Europe and patrolling in European waters by U.S. SSBNs activated to implement the SSP plan of the Supreme High Commander of NATO Forces in Europe have been terminated.

In January 1992, the military-political leadership of the United States and the Russian Federation announced new decisions for reducing strategic and non-strategic nuclear arms. The Americans have promised to stop:

- the production of the MX ICBM, W88 nuclear weapons, and Mk-5 warheads for the Trident-2 SLBM;
- the production program for the new Midgetman small ICBM;
- the purchase of the ACM air-launched cruise missile (360 missiles);
- the construction of B-2 bombers, limiting the number being built to 20.

All this will reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the strategic offensive forces from 13,000 (counting reserve) to 5,000. The Russian Federation has promised:

- to terminate the development or modernization program of several types of strategic offensive arms;
- to stop the production of heavy bombers;
- not to build existing types of long-range air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles;
- to cut in half the number of SSBNs on combat patrol;

—to speed up implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in July 1991.

With respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons, we announced:

- the termination of production of nuclear charges for tactical missiles, artillery, and mines;
- a plan for eliminating one-third of the sea-launched nuclear weapons, one-half of the SAM nuclear charges, and one-half of the nuclear charges of aircraft bombs.

The elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons will be concluded by the destruction of nuclear charges for tactical missiles and artillery shells in the year 2000, for mines in 1998, for surface-to-air missiles in 1996, and for the Navy in 1995.

Finally, the framed Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the USA on Further Reductions of Strategic Offensive Arms of 16 June 1992 specified that by the end of the seventh year that the treaty of 31 July 1991 has been in effect, each of the countries will have up to 4,250 strategic nuclear weapons (up to 2,160 of that number on SLBMs and up to 1,200 on MIRVed ICBMs, including up to 650 on heavy ICBMs) and up to 3,500 of these weapons by the year 2003 (up to 1,750 of that number on SLBMs), having eliminated all MIRVed ICBMs.

What is the attitude of other members of the "nuclear club" towards the reduction in nuclear weapons?

China, possessing several hundred nuclear munitions, and France, now having up to 550 nuclear weapons, do not plan to decrease their arsenals until the USA and USSR bring their nuclear stockpiles down to a level comparable to that of these countries. Incidentally, in the second half of 1991, France removed the obsolete AN-52 aircraft bombs from service and made the decision to decrease the number of its new Hades operational-tactical missiles from 120 to 40 and to place these missiles in depots and not in artillery units.

Great Britain, who has nearly 500 nuclear weapons stockpiled, announced in late September 1991 the removal of nuclear depth bombs and charges from ships and a reduction of non-strategic nuclear arms by one-half.

Israel, having about 200 nuclear weapons in various states of readiness, does not admit to having this type of weapon of mass destruction and makes no statements about reducing its nuclear potential.

The planned removal from service of approximately 35,000 nuclear munitions (about 13,000 of the existing 20,000 by the USA; about 22,000 of the existing 27,000 by the USSR/CIS/Russian Federation) based on mutual unilateral commitments can become an important step towards total renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1992.

Commentary Views 'Problems' in Implementing START Treaty

LD2710172192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 26 Oct 92

[Commentary by Boris Belitskiy]

[Text] This week, Russia's parliament is likely to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty with the United States. Although ratification is considered a foregone conclusion, some problems are almost certain to crop up in the debate on the subject. Boris Belitskiy now looks at these problems:

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, was signed last year by the then still existing Soviet Union and the United States. It calls for slashing their vast nuclear arsenals by 35 percent and was acclaimed all over the world. This month the treaty was ratified by the United States, following which a spokesman for Russia's Foreign Ministry said efforts would be made to speed up the ratification process in this country. Now it's expected the treaty may be ratified this week.

Although the treaty is certain to be ratified, several problems are likely to crop up in the debate on the subject. One of these concerns the mobile missile launch systems designated as RS-12M and known in the West as the SS-25. Since the START treaty virtually abolishes the huge RS-20 silo-based missiles known in the West as the SS-18, the role of the mobile SS-25 is greatly enhanced. These missiles are launched from either a seven-axle truck or from a railway flat car, which undoubtedly gives them an important military advantage in terms of survivability. However, what with the state of Russia's roads and railways, there's bound to be some concern about the danger of possible accidents involving these missiles in their travels about the country.

Questions may also be raised in parliament about what many people see, not without reason, as an edge that the treaty gives the United States. Indeed, while the treaty eliminates Russia's heavy land-based multiple warhead missiles, which the military see as the backbone of its nuclear deterrent, it allows the United States to preserve an advantage in submarine-based missiles.

Still another complicating factor is this: The treaty also has to be debated and ratified by the parliaments of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—three former republics of the former USSR where nuclear arms were deployed by the Soviet strategic planners. This naturally requires agreement between Russia and those member states of the new Commonwealth. And while such agreement with Kazakhstan and Belarus was practically achieved at the recent Commonwealth summit in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, full agreement with Ukraine has yet to be hammered out.

And finally there is the problem of the costs of implementing the START arms cuts. The cuts stipulated in the

treaty will involve very heavy costs. This being so, some members of Russia's parliament have already voiced serious doubt as to whether the country will at present be able to support the heavy burden of costs inherent in the START scenario.

All this being so, it should be interesting to follow the ratification process in the parliaments of Russia and the other three Commonwealth members involved, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.

Ukraine Joins Strategic Forces Inspection Agreement

LD2710175392 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya Television Network in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 27 Oct 92

[Text] Ukraine today joined the treaty on carrying out inspections concerning limitation and disarmament of the strategic forces and recognized its validity on its territory. The treaty was signed today [word indistinct]. At the same time, according to a representative of the Ukraine Foreign Affairs Ministry, our state favors searching for possibilities of reducing expenditures on reduction and destruction of strategic weapons and in carrying out inspections.

Commentary Favors Open Talks With U.S. on Arms Cuts

LD3110144592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1830 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Commentary by Vladimir Pesok]

[Text] A high-ranking U.S. State Department spokesman currently in Tokyo has ruled out any chance of a new treaty on strategic arms cuts with Russia being drafted in the near future, even though the two countries' Presidents agreed on one in June. He said that one of the problems is that Russia is having difficulties destroying large quantities of arms because of the high costs involved. Another is that President Yeltsin might not find it easy to get the opposition, namely the conservatives, to consent to it. Over to our commentator Vladimir Pesok:

[Pesok] This is not the first report from the United States mentioning the possibility that the two Presidents' agreement to draft a treaty on further strategic arms reductions might fall through. No details have emerged from official sources on how the drafting is progressing. The sides agreed to keep their talks confidential, to prevent any false interpretations being made of them. But the fact that drafting of the treaty has been dragging on for five months now, instead of the planned two or three weeks, plus these latest remarks from the unnamed State Department spokesman, shows that the talks have run into trouble.

You have to hand it to the Americans. Unlike in the past, they are not accusing the other side of intransigence. Washington's and Moscow's policy of forging friendly

and cooperative relations prevents things like that. The reasons for the hold-up in the talks are now being presented differently, from the standpoint of goodwill, compassion, and even the desire to help out. But they remain essentially the same: that an important treaty is being undermined and that Russia is the guilty party. However, if the sides are unable to reach a compromise it means that both of them are being intransigent.

To my mind, these latest remarks highlight the extent to which the public is disserved by the fact that the talks are being held behind closed doors. Would it not be worthwhile for the diplomats to reconsider their agreement in this respect? Opening up the talks could well enhance support for them both in the United States and Russia, even given the latter's current plight. After all, we know that the Yeltsin-Bush outline agreement turned out to be better than START, not only because it envisages deeper cuts in nuclear warheads for strategic delivery systems, down to 3,000, but also because the sides agreed to remove irritating disparities in individual types of nuclear weapons: Russia in its heavy land-based rockets and the United States in its sea-based ones.

New Long-Range Cruise Missile Launched From Tu-160

PM0511100592 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0700 GMT 31 Oct 92

[Report by V. Romantsov and O. Skalskiy; from the "Plus Eleven" program]

[Text] [Romantsov, over video of aircraft on tarmac] For the first time in Russia a long-range cruise missile was launched from a Russian-owned Tu-160 in the Saratov Oblast city of Engels on 22 October.

It can be claimed that the Tu-160 is a fourth generation aircraft. At least this is how the military describes it. According to them it contains more electronic equipment than a spacecraft. It has 32 computers on board. As for its technical specifications, it is superior even to the U.S. B-1 and B-2 aircraft of the same class.

On the subject of the cruise missile, we are only able to say that it is secret. We were allowed to film only part of it, and that was under wraps.

Externally it resembles this training missile, except that it has a drawing of a shark's mouth on its nose.

[Unidentified man in uniform] We are constantly ready to defend our fatherland, our country, our Russian Federation.

[Romantsov] They say that one such aircraft, fully armed with missiles, is capable of disabling any country's combat readiness. One man can win a war, after all. [video shows Tu-160 exterior and interior, cockpit instruments, missile under wraps being wheeled toward aircraft, training missile, more glimpses of exterior and interior of aircraft, pilot at controls]

START-3 Could Threaten 'Already Fragile Peace'

PM0211170692 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 92 First Edition p 4

[Article by Petr Belov, candidate of technical sciences: " 'Chernobyl' on Wheels: Do We Know What We Are Doing by Replacing SS-18 Missiles With SS-25's?"]

[Text] If the documents on strategic offensive arms reduction are implemented, the levels of confrontation between the CIS (Russia) and the United States will fall from a correlation of 10,271:10,371 at the end of last year, to one of 5,000:5,978 (under the 1991 treaty on a 50-percent reduction—START-2). Or to a ratio of 3,000:3,492 under the framework agreement of June this year (START-3).

The fundamental difference in the present framework agreement is that we are obliged to renounce heavy MIRV'ed ICBM's. These missiles are based in highly hardened launch silos and are designated by the code names SS-18 and SS-24. Instead, it is laid down that light-silo ICBM's and any other mobile ground-based missiles are to be kept. That means SS-25's on motor chassis, and these same SS-24's, but only on railroad cars.

Although the threefold reduction in nuclear missiles is certainly necessary and appears to be just, I venture to assert that the ratification of START-3 will lay further mines for an already fragile peace. In the opinion of L. Volkov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the RIA [expansion unknown; possibly Russian Engineering Academy], and chief of one of the Russian Defense Ministry's key scientific research institutes, "...the elimination of all heavy ICBM's is tantamount to destroying the structure of the strategic nuclear forces and establishing an undivided U.S. monopoly in the sphere of strategic offensive arms." The fact that these ICBM's, with 10 warheads each, ensured an "asymmetrical response" even in conditions of a retaliatory counterstrike [otvetno-vstrechnogo udara] is recognized even by the Americans, who at the same time deem one SS-18 to be the delivery vehicle for 1,000 decoy targets. In this situation the multibillion-dollar SDI was virtually useless. But given the implementation of START-3 the Americans could apparently make do with a considerably cheaper version, designed to deal with only 200 nuclear warheads.

The mobile SS-24's and SS-25's which are proposed instead of the silo heavy missiles are indeed more dangerous...to Russia itself than to anyone else. And here is why. Unlike the American Midgetman, which is more sophisticated in every respect—and which, incidentally, has not been put into operation—our mobile missiles are virtually unprotected against sabotage and are predisposed toward accidents with consequences that would be disastrous to everyone. This is due first and foremost to the unsuccessful design execution of the SS-24 and SS-25, the fact that their bases and redeployment routes

are known, and the impossibility in principle, for technical reasons, of preventing and reducing damage from sabotage or accidents. The Americans came to this conclusion on the real potential of our mobile ground-based strategic missile forces back in the mid-eighties. But we have not grasped to this day that these missiles are designed for the role of "time bombs" against ourselves.

That is why there should be no illusions about the combat potential of the Strategic Missile Forces with the ground-based ICBM's "permitted" to them under START-3. They will be annihilated even in the nonnuclear period of a war. Either by high-precision weapons or by saboteurs.

The creation of new silos for large single-warhead ICBM's is not presently in our power. Those that now exist and are to be preserved can be ignored: If one is ever launched, it will be filtered out by the system of "global protection against limited nuclear strikes." The aforementioned 200 warheads, divided by that system's large safety margin, constitute the actual combat might of the strategic offensive nuclear forces that we will have under the latest framework agreement.

The time scale for disarmament that is being imposed on us is also unacceptable. In total, more than 15,000 nuclear warheads must be dismantled [razobrat] within only 10 years, and some 100 tonnes of plutonium thus liberated must be destroyed. We do not yet have either an appropriate national program for this, or the means to ensure the safety of these operations. And bear in mind that dismantling one warhead takes a week, and a mere grain of plutonium is enough to kill any of us.

In my view we should also not rely on "manna from heaven" in the shape of Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] technologies in the event of the abandonment of the 1972 ABM Treaty and our involvement in operations to create a joint "nuclear umbrella." The term of the treaty will soon expire anyway—virtually simultaneously with the second stage of START-3. And there is no guarantee as yet that the "umbrella" is an umbrella for two. After all, two-thirds of its cost has already been paid for by the United States—without us.

As a result, the following far-from-reassuring conclusion seems logical. With the ratification of START-3, we will be adding "priority" SS-24 and SS-25 missiles to the Chernobyl-type nuclear reactors and the ill-considered burial sites for waste from the nuclear industry, and taken together this could lead to a second Chernobyl, but on a countrywide scale. To prevent this, it is necessary to more thoroughly analyze all the possible consequences of the proposed agreements, listening to the arguments of not only professional politicians, but also military-technical experts. And the one thing that must not be tolerated is naive and lightweight views on the absence of problems in connection with the implementation of agreements to reduce weapons of mass destruction.

I would like to warn against despair, panic, and the hunt for enemies within. The agreements achieved in June of this year are a notable step toward rapprochement between the Russian and American peoples. But the peoples' wisdom should not permit the "hawks" alone to achieve absolute supremacy over the others. That is always a danger to peace.

This is no time for Russia to seek equality on questions of strategic offensive arms. We have no time for the parities insisted on by the country's military-industrial complex, which often does not know what it is doing. Common sense suggests that we should abandon the practice of bilateral agreements and think about our own self-preservation, as the "little" nuclear states do. And get rid as quickly as possible of the mobile SS-24 and SS-25, which are supposedly designed for a retaliatory strike. These "Chernobyls" on wheels could be the death of us even in peacetime.

Decree on Converting Missile Complex Resources to Economic Uses

*PM0511153192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Nov 92 First Edition p 4*

[Decree No. 820 of the Russian Federation Government "On the Rational Use for National Economic Needs of Missile Complexes To Be Eliminated in Accordance With the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" issued by Ye. Gaydar in Moscow on 22 October]

[Text] For the purposes of saving state funds used to eliminate arms and of constructing housing for officers of the Russian Federation Armed Forces using revenues received from the rational use for national economic needs of missile complexes to be eliminated in accordance with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [START], the Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. The proposal by interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation for the rational use for national economic needs of the missile complexes (excluding nuclear warheads) to be eliminated in accordance with the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, which provides for the missiles' modification and use of spacecraft for commercial launches in accordance with orders from Russian and foreign firms; the dismantling of launch complexes and of missiles not to be used for launches with a view to obtaining systems, assemblies, and materials to be used in the national economy and for export; the conversion of the territory of launch complexes into private farms; and the construction of housing for officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces by means of the funds obtained (the "Housing for Missiles" project, hereinafter the project) is approved.

It will be taken into consideration that the project will be funded principally with funds attracted from Russian and foreign investors.

2. The proposal by interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation for participating in work on implementing the project of the "Scientific and Technical Progress" Association for business cooperation with foreign countries, the "SLBM Conversion" Association, and the "Joint-Stock Union for Conversion Activity," "Reusable Resources," and "Space Industry" Joint-Stock Companies is adopted.

3. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is confirmed as the project's general client.

4. The Russian Space Agency will ensure coordination of work on creating commercial space rocket systems on the basis of using the missiles to be eliminated.

5. It is established that:

Work on the project connected with modifying missiles for commercial launches of spacecraft during 1993-1994 will be funded in accordance with contracts with the client with appropriations from the Russian Federation republic's budget provided for under the subhead "Realization of International Treaties on the Elimination, Reduction, and Limitation of Arms";

Profits earned from the project will be used to construct housing for officers of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and to fund research and development on converting missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy into carrier rockets for launching spacecraft and to fund the development of basic progressive technologies for the production of national economic output on the basis of utilizing these missiles.

6. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense will transfer without payment to the organizations involved in work on the project the missiles to be eliminated, the launch and ship complexes, and equipment as they are removed from combat duty, as well as missiles and equipment with expired guarantee periods.

7. For the realization of the project, organizations involved in work on the project will be permitted to engage in foreign economic activity in accordance with procedures laid down in existing legislation with regard to concluding treaties and contracts for carrying out commercial launches of spacecraft and selling technical output, materials, and equipment obtained following industrial processing of missiles and the equipment of launch and ship complexes.

8. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with other departments and organizations involved in realizing the project, are to draw up and approve within two months a statute defining the organization of the fulfillment of work on the project, the timing and the procedure for the

handover of missiles and combat launch and ship complexes, the procedure for settling up for this work, the utilization of the revenue received, and the participation in the said work of elimination bases, troop units, and test sites of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

9. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with other interested departments and entrepreneurial structures, will ensure the preparation and holding of talks with the U.S. side and other foreign partners with a view to improving the possibilities of realizing the project.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

Reports on Russian Ratification of START Treaty

Supreme Soviet Ratification Vote

LD0411122092 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1114 GMT 4 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has ratified the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the reduction and restriction of strategic offensive weapons [START]. The parliament voted for the treaty today during a joint meeting of its two houses.

The treaty was signed in Moscow on July 31st, 1991. It fixes quantitative and qualitative restrictions on intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and nuclear weapons, as well as the number of warheads assigned to them.

Debate Over Ratification Described

LD0411145892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 4 Nov 92

[Report by correspondent Vyacheslav Osipov on the 4 November Supreme Soviet session]

[Text] Deputies very quickly ratified the treaty between Russia and France and focused all their attention on the START treaty. It emerged from a report delivered by a Russian Foreign Ministry representative that Ukraine may considerably delay the START treaty's adoption and implementation. The Ukrainian parliament recently reviewed its defense doctrine, from which it is apparent that the republic has no intention of parting with its nuclear weapons. A number of Russian deputies submitted a proposal that the problem be examined by the respective Supreme Soviets.

Passions also raged around ratification following an address by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov, who said that there are problems with destroying

solid fuel missiles, using nuclear power units from submarines, and reprocessing missile fuel. There was no clear answer to a question from Speaker Khasbulatov as to why these matters had not been resolved. Moreover, Deputies Sevastyanov and Pavlov saw only concessions to the United States and a diminution of Russia's security in the START treaty. Deputy Sevastyanov complained that deputies still did not know where our missiles have been sent.

Boris Gromov remarked that the Supreme Soviet is not the place to discuss this matter. The deputy defense minister affirmed that the START treaty does not undermine the army's combat effectiveness or Russia's security, although he admitted that in some cases the Defense Ministry had made mistakes in eliminating certain modern weapons.

Following the break, the deputies nevertheless ratified the START treaty.

Deputy Defense Minister Details Cuts

OW0411185892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1538 GMT 4 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday, the Russian parliament ratified the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons [START], concluded in July 31, 1991 (157 to 1 votes with 26 abstentions).

According to the parliament's decision, the exchange of the ratification notes between the US and Russia will take place after Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine join the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, signed on July 1, 1968 and after these four republics reach an agreement on the procedure of implementing it.

The president was instructed to charge the government with the task of drafting a state programme for implementing the agreement. This programme is expected to offer ways of eliminating and utilizing armaments and military equipment.

In the first quarter of 1993 the ministry of defence will present a report on the implementation of the agreement.

Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov told the parliament that for the first time ever it puts a strong accent on real cuts on the strategic offensive weapons, not merely on their limitation. According to the treaty, the former USSR is to cut down 42 per cent of the warheads and 36 per cent of the delivery vehicles, and the US - 43 per cent of the warheads and 29 per cent of delivery vehicles. Russia and the US are allowed to have up to 1,600 delivery vehicles and up to 6,000 warheads, including 4,900 warheads in deployed inter-continental ballistic missiles and in the submarine-based ballistic missiles.

The 1991 Soviet-American treaty on the strategic offensive weapons is expected to be ratified by the parliaments of nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union - Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. According to the agreements concluded subsequently, the strategic weapons located in them will be cut down within the framework of the treaty on the strategic offensive weapons.

Clinton Administration May Affect Status of START II

PM0411165192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Nov 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 5

[Report by Aleksandr Shalnev: "Bill Clinton Is New U.S. President"]

[Excerpts] Washington—The miracle did not happen. George Bush lost. On Tuesday Americans elected Bill Clinton, the 46-year-old governor of Arkansas, to be the 42d president of the United States. [passage omitted]

Be that as it may, you do not pass judgment on victors. And judgment will not be passed on Clinton during the first 100 days of his presidency, traditionally used for the new head of the White House to "get into the swing" and "find his bearings" in Washington and so on. But after the first 100 days judgment will begin: People will start to hold Clinton to account for his promises and for what he did not promise. But that is the Americans' concern.

There is, however, something that concerns us. Since foreign policy takes very much a back seat on the Clinton administration's agenda—at least initially—will questions and problems that directly concern us and which George Bush tackled, albeit with varying degrees of activeness, be forgotten by Clinton's people to some extent? Or, on the contrary, will the new president definitely want to leave his mark on matters that the Kremlin and Bush's White House have already decided on, and will the quest for a solution be protracted as a result. I am referring above all to the strategic arms reduction agreement (START II), the text of which was about to be agreed and which may now quite possibly have to be "recoordinated" with Clinton's White House.

But that is a thing of the future, although the not too distant future: The inauguration ceremony, that is the swearing-in of the president, will take place—as has been the custom since the thirties—at precisely midday 20 January. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Proposes To Reduce Strategic Arms '3-4 Times'

OW0511170592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1607 GMT 5 Nov 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, and Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has offered the United States' new president Bill Clinton to hold a summit meeting at any convenient time. Today, the two leaders will have a telephone conversation, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov announced during a briefing Thursday.

He said that besides official congratulations, Yeltsin sent Clinton a detailed draft agenda of a summit. Moscow proposed that both countries cut down their strategic arsenals 3-4 times, bringing them down to the minimal level.

[Moscow ITAR-TASS in English at 1133 GMT on 6 November, in an item entitled "Russian Foreign Ministry—Explanation", clarifies Yeltsin's disarmament proposal: "Following the questions coming from correspondents, we explain once again that when the Russian side mentions—in the context of a new Russian-American disarmament agenda—the dramatic reduction (by three to four times as against the present level) of the strategic offensive armaments of the United States and Russia, it means the implementation of the framework agreement, signed during the Russian-American summit in Washington last June. Now the United States and Russia are working hard for turning those agreements into a full-scale treaty. As we understand, U.S. President-Elect Bill Clinton shares this objective."]

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russian-American Global Protection Scheme Backed

934P0005A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
27 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Alekseyevich Nazarenko, colonel, candidate of military science, expert at the Center for International and Military and Political Studies of the RAU [Russian-American University] Corporation: "Russia Under the SDI Umbrella? A Joint Russian-American Anti-Missile Shield: From Idea to Constructive Algorithm"]

[Text] "We are prepared to jointly create and then to also jointly operate a global protection system in place of SDI." This brief sentence, uttered by the president of Russia on 20 January of this year, was heard by the entire world. Boris Yeltsin's proposal produced a powerful impression on many persons, particularly on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. It signified the following: Russia had not only ceased to play the role of critic of the "Star Wars" program, but itself was expressing a desire to participate in such a program.

These words were followed by deeds: on 17 June 1992 Boris Yeltsin and G. Bush adopted a Joint Russian-American Declaration on a Global Protection System Against Limited Strikes by Ballistic Missiles. Confronted by the probability of the spread of the nuclear-missile threat throughout the world, Russia and the United

States agreed to jointly work out a concept for Global Strategic Protection (GSZ). Several high-level working groups have already been created for this purpose. Meetings have already begun between representatives of the appropriate Russian and U.S. departments.

The GSZ idea is certainly consonant with the American concept of developing nonnuclear means of defense for protecting against limited missile strikes (nonnuclear ABM)—the concept named GPALS. Its structure includes two echelons—earth-surface and space.

Moreover, the latter, as may be seen from its name, assumes the utilization of space-based ABM components, but this would lead to a violation of one of the fundamental restrictions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which directly prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of elements of any basing, ensuring the protection of the country's entire territory.

In the opinion of the experts, however, retention of the ABM Treaty in its present form is not an end in itself. It was signed during the period of the "cold war" and reflected the realities of that time. But nowadays, when the nature of the relations between Russia and the United States have changed radically, the ABM Treaty, to my way of thinking, has become obsolete. It no longer corresponds not only to the level of Russian-American relations which has now been reached, but also fails to correspond to multilateral, international relations. It contains obvious gaps which allow its provisions to be circumvented without formally violating the letter of this agreement.

Moreover, the basic purpose or intention of the GSZ would consist of ensuring an early warning of a missile strike which could be inflicted from a potential danger zone. Another function of the GSZ would be to destroy or eliminate missiles presenting a "limited" threat from an enemy. And of course, such a threat has already become a reality and continues to grow rapidly.

But, of course, a global system of protection from limited strikes would not save anyone in a full-scale nuclear war. But it would defend against single strikes and—possibly—prevent them from escalating into a worldwide catastrophe.

The feasibility of an equitable cooperation between Russia and the United States in implementing the intention of these two sides with regard to working out a concept for such a system, and creating the funds and technologies for defending against ballistic missiles is obvious. In the first place, it is a matter of an ABM system designed to protect against "limited strikes from ballistic missiles," and not about the American SDI. In fact, it could become an inalienable component of the efforts to tighten up the system for preventing the spread of strategic weapons. In the second place, the creation of an effective GSZ—in tandem with the nuclear arsenals being retained by Russia and the United States—would reduce the incentives to possess nuclear weapons in third-world countries; and it would become a genuine

guarantee of their non-use by those states which already have such weapons or are on the brink of possessing them. In the third place, the GSZ was thought up as a multinational program. Consequently, its creation would mean a practical step in the direction of interdependence in the military sphere.

Furthermore, development of the GSZ would open up the possibility for exchanging technologies with the Western countries, albeit within a limited and specific framework.

Russia has something to offer the West and has something to obtain in return. Within the framework of the GSZ tactical unit [chast] we would be able to offer not only our own technology and certain design developments, but also some specific models of arms. For example, our S-300 (SA-10) antimissile system with regard to its effectiveness in hitting tactical-type ballistic missiles significantly surpasses the American "Patriot" system, which was used during the Persian Gulf War.

According to the assessments of Western specialists, the United States could purchase technologies from us in 50 areas, several of which have been relegated to high-priority categories.

It is particularly important for Russia these days to enter upon a truly effective path for ensuring security. If we are to remain within the framework of realism, we can state with assurance that we have common spheres of interests with the United States in strengthening strategic stability, including by means of joint measures in antimissile defense.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Yeltsin Orders Suspension of Baltic Troop Withdrawal

Pullout To Resume When Agreements Are Signed

LD2910182892 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1802 GMT 29 Oct 92

[Text] Moscow, 29 Oct (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed an order suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic Republics.

In accordance with this document, the press service of the Russian Federation president says, the troop withdrawal will resume after the signing of interstate agreements between Russia on the one hand, and Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia on the other. These must regulate the procedures for the withdrawal of the Russian troops and set out measures to provide social security for the servicemen and members of their families.

The president's decision is connected with his deep concern for the numerous violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in these republics.

The president gave the Russian Government three days to draw up temporary agreements with the Baltic states that provide social guarantees for Russian servicemen on the territory of these states. He also made the implementation of economic agreements with the Baltic countries dependent on a solution to this question.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has been instructed to draw up the draft of an appeal to the UN in which the president will ask the world community to examine the observance of human rights in the Baltic republics.

A number of measures have also been outlined to improve the situation of servicemen leaving the Baltic region.

Names Commander To Head Up Commission

OW3010141792 Moscow *BALTFAX in English*
1150 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed a decree naming Colonel General Leonid Mayorov, the commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, to the post of Russian Federation Commissioner for Questions of Temporary Housing and Withdrawal of Forces and Fleets from the Baltic states.

Aleksandr Orfyonov, spokesperson for the president, told Baltfax that the appointment was made in accordance with the president's arrangement of 29 October, which introduced the new post. Orfyonov refused to specify what the new commissioner's duties would be.

According to the measure signed by President Yeltsin on the suspension of the withdrawal of forces from the Baltic states, control and coordination of the activities of Russian state delegations at the negotiating table will be the responsibility of Yuriy Skokov, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council. The same document specifies that the recently-established Russian-American investment bank would serve as a bank empowered by the Russian president to resolve financial problems linked with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states.

Text of Decree

OW3010190292 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1617 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from "Presidential Bulletin"—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Yeltsin on Thursday [29 October] signed a directive to normalise and coordinate the negotiating process with the three Baltic states - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The full text of the document is given below:

1. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states shall be suspended pending a formal agreement between the Russian Federation and each Baltic republic regulating the procedure, order, terms, and schedules of troop withdrawals and providing for social security nets for servicemen and their dependents, with international law being strictly observed.

2. The government is given three days in which to sign interim agreements with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to ensure social security guarantees to Russian servicemen and their dependents residing in the three states including money and food supply.

The implementation of bilateral economic agreements shall depend on the way in which this question is resolved.

3. The foreign ministry is given a week in which to prepare and submit for scrutiny by the Russian security council following documents:

draft agreements worked out together with the leaderships of the three Baltic states on the interim status of Russian troops there; draft message from the Russian president to the leaders of the three Baltic states on Russia's external policies towards those states, specifically on the problems of Russian troop withdrawals and ensuring the rights of Russian-speaking communities there, including retired servicemen.

4. The foreign ministry shall inform the governments of leading western states, including CSCE countries, about Russia's position at negotiations with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and its desire to pull out troops from the region within short but realistic schedules proceeding from the need to protect human rights, with international law being strictly observed.

5. The defence minister shall make one of his deputies personally responsible for coordinated position by ministry officials who will act as part of government delegations at negotiations on troop withdrawals with the three Baltic states.

6. The government is given ten days in which to: work out and approve a programme of troop withdrawals from the three Baltic states; work out and submit to the country's security council a coordinated plan for the re-deployment of arriving troops in Russia;

include appropriate allocations in the defence budgets for 1992-1996 to cover the cost of the government plan for troop withdrawals from the Baltic states, with proceeds from the sale of property of the North-Western Group of Forces being taken into account.

7. Executive bodies of Russian republics, territories, districts and autonomies as well as the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg are instructed to: provide land plots to meet the needs of the government plan for troop withdrawals from the Baltic states within three months on receipt of appropriate applications from the defence ministry;

allocate 5 of new housing for the servicemen and their dependents arriving from the Baltic states with the subsequent return of resources at the cost of the said government plan.

8. An ordinance shall be issued on the status of Russia's envoy to deal with matters of the temporary deployment of troops and naval forces and their subsequent withdrawal from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (according to the enclosure)

9. The government shall accept an offer by the founders of the Russian-American Investment Bank to act as authorised bank to deal with financial problems arising from troop withdrawals from the region.

10. The security council security, Yuriy Skokov, is instructed to coordinate and monitor the activity of government delegations at talks with the Baltic states.

Group Commander Examines Difficulties With Poland Withdrawal

*PM0211151192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel General Leonid Kovalev, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, by Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Bugay; date, place not given: "Withdrawal of Russian Combat Units from the Republic of Poland Completed"]

[Text] On 28 October a detachment of Baltic Fleet missile boats based until recently in the Polish city of Swinoujscie (Szczecin Voivodship) put to sea and set course for their native Russian shores. This was the last combat subunit of Russian forces to leave Poland under the agreements signed by the presidents of the two states. It should be stressed that the Russian side completed the withdrawal of combat units two weeks ahead of the deadline set by the agreements. Around 6,000 Russian servicemen remain in Poland, engaged in withdrawing materiel.

Our correspondent met with Colonel General Leonid Kovalev, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Bugay] Leonid Illarionovich, the negotiating process concerning the problem of withdrawing our troops was tough and lasted not quite two years. How can its results be assessed now?

[Kovalev] The Polish side repeatedly presented us with versions of documents on the schedule for and form of withdrawal which it knew to be unacceptable. Not many people know that in one draft protocol regulating legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of what were still Soviet troops at the time, presented by Polish diplomats prior to the third round of intergovernmental talks on this problem, the Polish side proposed that servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces be withdrawn as POW's—in locked and sealed

railcars without their personal weapons or combat equipment. Later they made efforts to get us to sign relevant documents hastily, without detailed study of who owed whom and how much.

Russian diplomacy, aided by the tough stance adopted by the military on the problem of the withdrawal of our units, succeeded in defending our state's interests. We are keeping to the agreements signed by the presidents of Russia and Poland and are coming out with our heads held high and our combat banners unfurled.

[Bugay] The Polish mass media and some statesmen in Poland too have been accusing us all the time of taking too long about going home.

[Kovalev] And yet we managed to meet the tight schedule for the withdrawal of combat units two weeks in advance of the planned deadline. This, despite the fact that since the Moscow agreements were signed the Polish side has carried out several actions which are questionable from the standpoint of the accords existing between our countries and could have had an adverse effect on accomplishing the task of withdrawing the troops. For example, in July this year A. Glapinski, voivoda of Legnica at the time, initiated a disinformation campaign accusing the Northern Group of Forces command without foundation of helping to hide allegedly stolen vehicles at Legnica airfield and then airlift them to CIS countries.

This provocative story was picked up and spread as an incontrovertible fact by not just the Polish mass media but—especially offensive—but also sound, respected publications in Russia which, in pursuit of sensationalism, started to print the canard, refusing to acknowledge that they were undermining the authority of their own state's Army, which was already experiencing difficult conditions, as it was, outside the homeland.

The ultimate result of this campaign is only partly known to the broad masses of readers. They know that a two-week blockade of Northern Group airfields took place and that the schedule for the withdrawal of air units from Poland was disrupted—which we only managed to make up for by dint of incredible efforts. But the fact that Russia suffered losses of around \$800,000 as a result of this seemingly innocuous piece of anecdotal news about the Russian Army's being picked up so blithely by certain Moscow newspapers is known to few. I will say, moreover, that we have presented the Polish side with a check for the blockade of the Northern Group airfields, which was unlawful and unjustified by any documentation. I personally very much doubt that it will be paid. Why does this case not worry the editorial offices which boosted the canard about the smuggling of stolen vehicles?

[Bugay] Now, as far as I am aware, the planned withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces was complicated by the actions of the Republic of Poland's customs services.

[Kovalev] Yes, that is so. The Republic of Poland customs organs, in violation of existing intergovernmental agreements, have begun unilaterally to carry out customs checks on the freight that we were taking out. In so doing they do not confine themselves to checking the documents presented for sealed freight by the Russian military unit commands but demand that the seals be broken—which considerably complicates the process of bringing out the Northern Group of Forces' movable property and could jeopardize the withdrawal deadline. What is more, Republic of Poland officials are trying to impose "sanctions in the form of fines" on the Northern Group of Forces command for delays to trains and transport artificially created by the Polish side.

You do not have to be a lawyer to see that the Polish side's actions are manifestly at odds with agreements between our countries.

[Bugay] Leonid Illarionovich, providing servicemen with accommodations is one of the most acute problems in the Russian Federation today. Many Northern Group of Forces officers and NCO's figure among those without accommodation in their home country right now.

[Kovalev] The housing problem has always been at the center of the Group command's attention. Since 1989, when legislative acts envisaging the provision of material aid to members of housing construction cooperatives were passed, we have provided such aid to officers and NCO's. Many managed to build cooperative apartments before the leap in construction prices occurred. But an even larger number of people who have completed their service in the Northern Group of Forces find themselves in various corners of Russia without their own accommodation.

I would stress that the Russian Government and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are doing their utmost to ensure that housing is built for former servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces. For example, the combined unit withdrawn to Tver has received 300 million rubles to provide facilities for it.

As far as the problem of providing accommodation for those who are still performing service in the Northern Group of Forces is concerned, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry has authorized us to use the money which we obtain from selling our movable property to construct accommodation. To resolve this problem fully we have to build or buy around 500 apartments, and we actually do have the financial means for this at the present time. The question is how to manage this money when we are on the edge of hyperinflation. The money we have will be enough to purchase 500 apartments, but at this year's prices. By the end of next year our money will be enough, I think, to buy a 40-apartment bloc at most. So we will not be taking the risk and spending our available money on construction work, but I would like to take this opportunity to appeal through KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to any organization wishing right now to sell a

block, half a block, a floor, or even individual apartments that have already been constructed. Write to us. We can buy accommodation from you at today's prices or at a slightly higher price...

Lithuanian Reaction to Russian Troop Pullout Suspension

Home Guard Ministry: Withdrawal on Schedule

OW3010215692 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1742 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The spokesman for the Lithuanian Home Guard Ministry, Algirdas Meskauskas, said Friday that he has no information indicative of suspension of the Russian troops withdrawal from the republic as envisaged by the Russian President's decision.

He also noted that he found it difficult for his Ministry to comment on the Russian President's decision so long as it is merely a "technical executive of the agreements signed between Russia and Lithuania September 8". In the words of Mr Meskauskas, the agreements have been observed so far.

Landsbergis Comments

LD0111000392

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1400 on 30 October resumes its program of regular Friday broadcasts by Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis. The broadcasts were suspended during the election campaign. "It is good that a statement has been made on the troop withdrawal. But this coincidence that the Russian president has issued a decree on suspending the troop withdrawal provokes various thoughts. Events in Russia itself do not bode well for us either.

"Today we have not only a press report but the decree itself. It must be analyzed carefully. It is strange that it mentions an absence of troop withdrawal agreements between Russia and the Baltic states. We know very well that such agreements have been signed with Lithuania. They were being implemented; even today they are being implemented. Maybe this decree too widely embraces the Baltic states as a certain whole complex, not taking into account the fact they we have achieved more and have so far been managing the withdrawal well, together with Russia. I think that this should be carried on in the future, too, without changes to the program.

"Russia of course, wants more help in resettling the troops when they are redeployed, wants social guarantees, and wants to assure value of property, personal property and the disposal of apartments. An agreement was prepared in this respect, but Russia refused it. Now it acts as if, in reproach, there is no such agreement.

"But I think that we will clear this up. I phoned Moscow today looking for President Yeltsin, but he is away."

Supreme Council Spokesmen

LD3010123792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Text] The decree [on suspending the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states] by Russian President Boris Yeltsin was commented on at today's briefing by Supreme Council Press Attache Audrius Azubalis and Deputy Supreme Council Speaker Ceslovas Jursenas. To be more precise, it was the ITAR-TASS report that was commented on; according to Audrius Azubalis, the Lithuanian mission in Moscow has not yet received the text of the decree.

This morning, Azubalis said, Vytautas Landsbergis telephoned the Russian president's office, but was told that it would be possible to talk to Boris Yeltsin only on Monday and to Vice President Rutskoy maybe today.

Azubalis told journalists that the Supreme Council chairman would like to know, in coordinating the actions of all political forces in this issue, how the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party would appeal to Volskiy and Rutskoy, leaders of the related parties.

Ceslovas Jursenas said that it is important for all Lithuanian patriotic forces to make a statement, jointly or separately. He said that the Presidium of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party is at present examining this issue. A joint statement by the Baltic states would do no harm, either. The world and Russia must see that we are united, Jursenas said.

Both Azubalis and Jursenas commented on the statement in the decree that the withdrawal of the army will be resumed after interstate agreements and documents on social guarantees to the military have been signed. The interstate agreement with Lithuania has already been signed, and Russia itself has refused to sign agreements on social assistance, Azubalis and Jursenas stated. In Jursenas' opinion it is important to Yeltsin to neutralize the military, attract chauvinist imperialist strata, and manage the domestic situation. Thus, the decree is destined more for Russia itself, he said.

Foreign Ministry: Suspension May Affect Agreement

OW3110175392 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1618 GMT 31 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry published a statement last evening in which it says, in particular: "The Russian President's directive suspending the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Baltic countries may affect the mutually arranged schedule for the withdrawal of the forces."

Lithuania attaches great importance to the agreements on the schedule and procedure for the Russian forces' withdrawal which it signed with Russia on October 8, 1992, and which were then registered in the UN, the statement continues.

The agreements played an important role in building confidence, and strengthening security and stability in the Baltic region, the Foreign Ministry says.

It expresses the hope that both sides will keep to the terms of their agreements, making no additional demands, and maintaining good relations with each other.

Democratic Labor Party Hits Suspension

*LD3110094792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 31 Oct 92*

[Text] Statements by the Russian leadership on a temporary suspension of troop withdrawals from the Baltic states, using as justification the insufficient social guarantees to the families of servicemen, could create unnecessary tension in relations with Russia and raise some doubts about the strength of the positions of our government, according to a statement by the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP] Press and Information Bureau received by ELTA.

It states that the opinion of the LDLP, regardless of the results of the elections to the Lithuanian Seimas, remains unchanged. It completely corresponds with the demand of the June referendum that called for the unconditional withdrawal of the former Soviet army from Lithuania.

We wish to stress, the statement says, that the absolute majority of Lithuanian citizens—Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, and representatives of other nationalities—voted for this position. If Russia is really interested in strengthening national concord in Lithuania, it should understand that one of the most important conditions is the withdrawal of the army under the jurisdiction of Russia in accordance with the approved timetable.

Parliament Official Decries Suspension

*OW0111214892 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2045 GMT 1 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "The resolution of the Russian President dated October 29 on suspension of forces withdrawal from the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian territories arouses great concern," declared the deputy head of the Lithuanian parliament Ceslovas Stankevicius.

Speaking over the Lithuanian television on October 31, Stankevicius accused Russia of unilateral revision of principal agreements between two states and expressed his opinion that the resolution of the Russian President

was deliberately voiced during elections to the Lithuanian Sejm (parliament) and on the eve of the Congress of the Russian people's deputies.

The deputy head of the Lithuanian parliament noted that there were no deviations from the schedule for forces withdrawal worked out in the agreement between Russian and Lithuania on October 8 of this year. According to Stankevicius, this assists in the creation of the atmosphere of confidence between two countries and conditions for maintaining security in the Baltic region.

Foreign Minister Comments

*WS0311130492 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1640 GMT 2 Nov 92*

[Text] Vilnius, 2 November 1992—Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Saudargas said:

We evaluate very well the fact that the agreements of September 8, 1992 between Lithuania and Russia on the schedule, order and procedure of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the territory of Lithuania signed and registered at the UN, are being carried out. This is an important factor increasing trust, security and stability in the Baltic region. We are ready to sign also other agreements which have been reached between the Lithuanian and Russian state delegations.

The Decree of October 29, 1992 by the President of the Russian Federation rises a question, if the principal coordinated attitudes to the Lithuanian-Russian relations which have acquired the international approval are not being reconsidered by Russia.

The instruction to suspend the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Lithuania causes a threat that the signed bilateral time-table of the withdrawal of the Russian troops could be violated.

We regret, that the presumptions are being confirmed, that economic pressure and the execution of the Lithuanian-Russian trade agreements could be used in order to change what has been agreed by the two parties.

We hope, that new demands will not be put forward and mutual agreements will be observed as well as good neighbourhood relations and trust between the two countries will be preserved.

Parliament Spokesman Comments Further

*WS0511130192 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1743 GMT 4 Nov 92*

[Text] Vilnius, 4 November 1992—Commenting on Vytautas Landsbergis' telephone conversation with the Russian President, the Spokesman for the Lithuanian Parliament Audrius Azubalis noted that according to the Russian President the Russian forces' pullout had not been suspended. It is only being reorganized. With the beginning of early frosts in Russia. It would be irresponsible both from the humanitarian and political point of

view to move the troops to new locations where they would be subjected to the rigours of the early Russian winter without adequate housing facilities, yet they are sought for and the withdrawal should proceed in full accord with the agreements reached at the September 8 Moscow summit and signed by the authorized representatives of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania. The Russian President assured that the final term for the completion of the withdrawal remains unchanged. He also agreed that the military objects, such as the Northern Campus in Vilnius and the Slauliai airfield are to be handed over expeditiously on the basis of the mutual cooperation. Mr. Azubalis noted that very important is also the Russian President's remark that he has no reproaches to Lithuania regarding the situation of the Russian minority in Lithuania.

Mr. Azubalis also made a reference to the statement of the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann who voiced his concern over the Russian President's decree to suspend the withdrawal of the ex-Soviet forces from the Baltic States saying he could not see any logical ground for tying up the problem of the Russian troops' pullout to the Russian claim of violation of the Russian minority's rights in the Baltic States. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark urged the Russian Government to abide by the 1992 Helsinki resolution to the effect that all the foreign troops are to be removed from the Baltic States without delay.

Latvian Reaction to Russian Troop Pullout Suspension

Acting Foreign Minister Summons Russian Ambassador

OW3010195792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1905 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The press service of the Latvian MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] reports that Latvia's acting minister of foreign affairs, Martins Virsis, summoned Friday the Russian ambassador in Latvia, Aleksandr Rannikh, in order that he would provide information due to the decision by President Boris Yeltsin to suspend the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries.

Mr Rannikh called on the Latvian side to regard this decision in the context of international and internal situation in Russia. Mr Virsis, for his part, pointed out that Russia's decision is running counter to the Final Document of the CSCE Helsinki accord envisaging rapid, organized and complete withdrawal of the Russian Army.

The participants of the discussion agreed to intensify exchange of information in order to avert unnecessary misunderstandings in the relations between Latvia and Russia.

Premier: Recent Agreements in Jeopardy

LD3010181692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1446 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Report by Inar Skujins in Riga; from the "Panorama" program]

[Excerpt] I have just come from a news conference with Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis. He told of his fruitful meeting with Yegor Gaydar, in the course of which the long-awaited agreement between the Latvian and Russian banks was signed which will ensure—well, more correctly, will speed up—mutual settlements, payments of pensions to military retirees, maintenance payments, and other monetary settlements. An agreement in principle was also reached between the heads of the two governments to the effect that work will continue on most favored nation status in trade between the two states, and on deliveries of energy resources to Latvia and of components to Russia.

But Latvian Premier Godmanis said that yesterday's statement by the Russian president on the suspended withdrawal of Russian troops and the documents connected with this, which—according to Godmanis—the Latvian side has in its possession today, which reinforce with practical actions the statement by the Latvian [as heard] president, could cancel everything achieved in Moscow at the meeting between Godmanis and Gaydar and could sharply aggravate relations between the two states. That is to say, the president, according to Godmanis, links the suspension of the withdrawal of troops from Latvia with violations of human rights in Latvia—Premier Godmanis described this issue as far-fetched—and links it with further economic cooperation.

The premier briefed those present on the Russian president's instruction on fulfilling his decision on the suspension of the troop withdrawal. It envisages instructions to the Ministry of Defense, also the appointment of a plenipotentiary of the Defense Ministry of Russia who will supervise the withdrawal of troops and who is to be guided by the laws of Russia and the still nonexistent provisional agreements between Russia and Latvia; true, specific instructions are given there to the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry to prepare a draft on these matters in a very short time.

The head of government assessed this as gross interference in the internal affairs of an independent state, and as a threat to Latvia's sovereignty. As evidence of this he even adduced the fact that the other day Russian Deputy Defense Minister General Gromov visited Latvia; he came here and did not meet with any Latvian leaders or anyone from the Latvian Defense Ministry. Latvia did not even have advance notice of his visit. The Latvian head of government regarded this as a lack of respect for the sovereignty of an independent state.

Latvia's reaction to the president's statement is as follows: Evidently, either this evening or tomorrow an emergency sitting of Latvian Government will take

place. In a statement today Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, said that he had already instructed the Latvian Foreign Ministry to prepare and hand over Latvia's demand to the UN Security Council that this decision by the Russian president and the actions subsequently envisaged by the Russian side be examined. [passage omitted]

Negotiations Said Broken Down

*LD3110124292 Riga Radio Riga Network in Russian
2100 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Text] Yeltsin's order was described by Latvian Council of Ministers Chairman Ivars Godmanis as a violation of the agreement contained in the Helsinki Conference Final Act on a speedy, organized, total withdrawal of the Russian troops. Ivars Godmanis stressed that this instruction will also suspend the withdrawal of even the small number of troops and their property that has taken place up to now.

Apart from that, in effect, the negotiations between the two countries on the withdrawal of the Armed Forces have broken down.

The head of government announced that Latvia will obviously request that the issue be investigated by the UN Security Council and will also propose an urgent convening of the Baltic Council.

Foreign Ministry Statement

*OW3010125692 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1150 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian Foreign Ministry has published a statement today saying that Russia's decision to suspend the withdrawal of its armed forces from the Baltic states contradicts agreements reached earlier at Latvian-Russian negotiations.

The ministry expresses "surprise and bewilderment" at Russian President Boris Yeltsin's directive of October 29. "Latvia has repeatedly stressed that the withdrawal of the Russian forces from it should not be linked with any of its other internal or international problems," the document goes. Russian officials actually stated that they would not link the Russian forces' withdrawal with any other matters in the negotiation package, including the human rights issue.

The Latvian Foreign Ministry expresses the hope that "the Russian Government will have enough potential and political foresight to solve the problem of the withdrawal of its armed forces from the Baltic states in a manner stipulated by Helsinki final documents." "Otherwise Latvia will appeal to the international community to consider a new turn in relations between the Baltic countries and Russia," the ministry says in its statement.

Entry of Military Equipment Banned

*OW3010144092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1150 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian Foreign Ministry and the State Bureau for Control of the Withdrawal of Russian Troops have provisionally ordered that no military equipment of the Russian Army is to be allowed into the country. Baltfax was informed of this by Ilgonis Upmalis, the head of the bureau.

The measure was taken in response to Russian President Boris Yeltsin's directive suspending the withdrawal of forces from the Baltic states, and will remain in force "until the circumstances become clear." Earlier, Latvia had decided to allow Russian Army military equipment onto its territory only by special permission.

In connection with the Russian president's directive, the Latvians plan to hold a meeting on Friday with representatives of the Northwestern Group of Forces, according to Upmalis.

Gorbunovs Urges Yeltsin To Reconsider

*OW0511121592 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1125 GMT 5 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the Latvian parliament Anatolijs Gorbunovs has urged President Boris Yeltsin to revise his decision on the suspension of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Baltic countries. He sent an appropriate letter to the Russian leader on Wednesday [4 November].

He disagrees with the point in Yeltsin's decree that Latvia should be responsible for the solution of the social problems of the Russian soldiers and officers pulled out from the country. He says this contradicts the principles of the Helsinki declaration of July 10, 1992.

The Latvian leader also describes as groundless the attempt to link the solution of these problems with the implementation of economic agreements between the two countries. The letter indicates that such an approach can only worsen the position of Russian troops in Latvia. The linkage of the observation of human rights with the withdrawal of troops is unacceptable.

The chairman of the Latvian parliament says that he informed the UN leader Dr. Butrus-Ghali about the latest complications in relations between the two countries.

Estonian Reaction to Russian Troop Pullout Suspension**President Confers With Russian Ambassador***OW3010202092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1906 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian President, Lennart Meri, received Friday Russia's Ambassador, Aleksandr Trofimov. According to a report provided by the presidential press service, during the discussion the sides were addressing President Boris Yeltsin's directive of October 29 regarding the suspension of the Russian troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries.

The sides also exchanged opinions about the opportunities for the Russian-speaking population to actively integrate into Estonian society and discussed the options for the resolving economic problems in the North-Eastern Estonia.

On the same day, the Estonian President met with the Ambassador of the European Community in the Baltic countries, Ivo Dubois. Mr Meri and Mr Dubois discussed the problems related to Estonia's participation in European security and economic development.

Premier Expects No Change in Policy Toward Russia*OW3010200592 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1906 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian prime minister, Mart Laar, characterized as "unprecedented" the Russian President's decision to suspend the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries. "This directive is running counter to the provisions of Final Documents of the Helsinki CSCE Conference and the documents of other international forums," he said in an interview to BALTFAX.

However, the Estonian premier noted, Estonia will not change its policy toward Russia. He expressed hope that the Estonian government would preserve "businesslike relations" with the Russian government. Mr Laar maintains that President Yeltsin's decision was stipulated primarily by the internal political factors.

The Russian minister of foreign affairs has been instructed to work out the Russian President's draft appeal to the United Nations where he would ask the world community to address the human rights issue in the Baltic countries. In his commenting on this information, Mart Laar said that Estonia has no reasons to fear the discussion of this issue by international organizations.

President: Suspension Violates CSCE Accords*LD3010111192 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1000 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Excerpts] Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decision to stop troop withdrawals from the Baltic states caused a stir last night, but in fact it was but a part of an ongoing attack. [passage omitted]

Estonian President Lennart Meri reacted to Yeltsin's resolution yesterday on Finnish television. He said that it conflicts with the commitments undertaken by Russia within the Helsinki process. The Estonian president considers it necessary that the issue be included on the agenda of the meeting of Helsinki process foreign ministers in Stockholm.

Lennart Meri said that he understands the difficulties which Russia has to resolve as her society becomes democratic and the military-industrial complex is being reshaped. He gave assurances, however, that human rights are guaranteed to all inhabitants of Estonia and civil rights to all citizens of the Republic of Estonia. We are convinced that with the support of the international public Estonia and Russia will reach an agreement which meets national interests on both sides and will form a cornerstone for building of a calm and stable Nordic region, he said. [passage omitted]

Further on President's Comments*OW3010130192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1150 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonian President Lennart Meri said on Friday that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's directive halting the withdrawal of forces from the Baltic states "contradicts the responsibilities taken on by Russia in relation to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and all signatory states of the Helsinki Act." In an announcement issued on Friday by the president's press service, Meri emphasized that he considered it essential that the question of the force withdrawal be included in the agenda of the next meeting of the foreign ministers of the member-states of the CSCE.

Estonian experts note that the instruction to the Russian government contained in President Yeltsin's directive to form, within three days, a provisional agreement with the Baltic states is unlikely to be carried out, least of all with respect to Estonia. The country has still not formed a new (after the restructuring of the new government) state delegation for negotiations with Russia.

The Lithuanian and Estonian ambassadors to Russia, Egidijus Bickauskas and Juri Kahn, left for Vilnius and Tallinn on Thursday evening. The Latvian ambassador in Moscow, Janis Peters, has been in Riga since 28 October.

No Plans for Agreement

OW0311205292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1858 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia will not conclude with Russia any agreement regarding the status of foreign troops on its territory, chairman of the Estonian State Assembly, Ulo Nugis said following his meeting with Russian deputy foreign minister Vitaliy Churkin. The information circulated by the press service of the Estonian State Assembly on Tuesday contains a reference to the words of Ulo Nugis who spoke only of a possibility of "clarifying and regulating the provisions for their stay and withdrawal".

The Estonian Law on Citizenship will not be changed either, Mr Nugis said, emphasizing that up to the present Russia has been trying to "render pressure on Estonia regarding the issues of citizenship". "Estonia finds this principle ultimately unacceptable, and we are going to strictly adhere to the principle of legal continuity with the Estonian Republic of 1940," Mr Nugis averred.

Russian-Estonian Meeting

WS0411131692 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE
in English 1824 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Text] Tallinn, November 3—Estonia's President Lennart Meri met Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin on Tuesday [3 November] to discuss President Yeltsin's resolution on October 29 suspending troop pullout from the Baltics.

Churkin told Meri that Yeltsin's resolution was triggered by Russia's critical domestic situation and was focused at the country's domestic policy. Russia will keep the timetable of troop pullout and will not present any ultimatums to Estonia, Churkin said.

Meri and Churkin also discussed problems of Estonia's Russian-speaking community at the meeting that lasted 50 minutes longer than planned. Meri assured Churkin that Estonia's constitution guarantees human rights to all people residing in the country.

Russian Officials Comment on Baltic Troop Withdrawal Suspension

Parliamentarian To Report to NATO

LD3010231392 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Text] Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Defense and Security Committee, has announced that in mid-November he will deliver a report on plans for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic region at a session of the North Atlantic Assembly of NATO in Brussels. He stated that he is convinced Russia's stand on this matter will be supported by the representatives of most of the European states and also by the Canada and the United States.

Gromov Denies 'Pressure' on Baltics

LD3010190692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1759 GMT 30 Oct 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—The Russian president's instruction to suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states "is not a form of pressure on these states, although, in my opinion, there is a need for such pressure," Deputy Russian Defence Minister Colonel-General Boris Gromov told a news conference today upon his return from the Baltics.

In the general's opinion, there are political, economic and military aspects of this decision. He put the political aspect on the first place, relating it with the position of the Russian-speaking population. Gromov explained the economic aspect with the absence of the basis for the withdrawn troops. The general expressed the hope nato states will calmly take this decision.

The official told the news conference about the poor state the Russian servicemen, members of their families, military pensioners and the Russian-speaking population are in in the Baltics. In his view, the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian political leaders have begun a tough course to drive the Russian troops out.

By spring, 1993, there will be not a single soldier in the Baltics due to the authorities' prohibition to send newly-recruited men to the troops. In this case the withdrawal done by officers only will take seven or eight years. All in all, over 40,000 servicemen, not counting members of their families, are expected to be withdrawn. 24,000 of them were to be withdrawn in 1992.

Ships and units of the Baltic fleet will be re-located at the Kaliningrad, Baltiisk and Kronstadt ports.

Gromov told correspondents the withdrawal of Russian troops from the former Soviet republics and foreign states and their accommodation in Russia will require about 726 billion roubles and 594 million U.S. dollars. Troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were withdrawn last year, from Mongolia on September 25, 1992, and all political and payment issues have been settled with Germany and Poland.

A total of 67 per cent of personnel and 73 per cent of materiel have been withdrawn from Germany, only 6,000 servicemen remain in Poland. It is also planned to withdraw troops from Georgia, and, be needed, from Tajikistan and Moldova.

Speaking on the role of army under current conditions in Russian society, Gromov described the army as a depoliticized and party-free mechanism fulfilling orders of its supreme commander-in-chief—the Russian president. In his opinion, the army's interference in policy is inadmissible.

Says Deadline for Withdrawal Remains Open*OW3010195092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1736 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy Russian Defence Minister Boris Gromov has said at a Moscow press conference on Friday [30 October] that the deadline for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States had remained open after a decision by President Yeltsin of October 29th. He told an INTERFAX reporter that he considered the withdrawal unlikely to take place before 1994, as the Baltic nations would have liked. The most likely date for the withdrawal would be, in Gromov's opinion, the end of 1995, and the very earliest conceivable date would be the end of 1994.

Gromov said that NATO's possible reaction to the Russian president's decision to suspend the troop withdrawal "ought to be calm." Yeltsin's decision provided for the resumption of the troop withdrawal after inter-state agreements are signed between Russia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on social security for servicemen and their families.

Gromov stressed that the withdrawal deadline would depend on how the Baltic States would address the conditions presented to them by the Russian president. Gromov was particularly concerned about the problem concerning the rights of the Russian speaking population, particularly of the 40,000 pensioners, in the Baltic States, and the manning of the Russian units stationed there.

Gromov said that a total of 40,000 servicemen (24,000 this year) would have to be withdrawn from the Baltic States. They would have to be re-located in regions where between 2,000 and 19,000 people are today without accommodation.

Since 1989, a total of 500,000 servicemen have been withdrawn from the territory of foreign states, as have over 12,000 tanks, 13,000 artillery systems and 3,000 aircraft, including helicopters.

The cost of accommodating the troops being withdrawn could amount to over 600 bn. [billion] rubles (as of January 1st, 1992).

Kozyrev: Delay To Ensure 'Orderly' Withdrawal*LD3110064192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2320 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Krasulin]

[Text] Moscow, 31 Oct—The decree by the Russian Federation president suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries is aimed at regulating this process and even accelerating it. This was stated by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev

speaking live on the "Ekho Moskvy" radio station late on the evening of 30 October.

In this process, Kozyrev said, as with the withdrawal of troops from the countries of Eastern Europe, two extremes are being observed. On the one hand, soldiers are inclined to protract the timescales groundlessly. But when an attitude of intolerance appears towards servicemen and their family circles, they begin to depart all of a rush. The president's decree will make it possible for the conditions for the stay and resettlement of the troops being withdrawn to be well coordinated, the minister emphasized.

Kozyrev noted that the agreements between Russia and the Baltic countries on troop withdrawals were prepared hastily and were not fully worked out. As an example he cited the point in the draft agreement stating that Russia is liable for the ecological damage done by its troops. Under this provision, he said, skilled experts could present a multi-million bill. But why should Russia pay? After all it did not send the troops there. They were the armed forces of the USSR.

The minister said that at the present time a number of Russian departments including the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Social Security Ministry have been instructed to draw up a package of documents providing for an orderly withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries, so that it may be accomplished as quickly as possible and in as well organized a way as possible.

Regarding Russia's internal situation in Russia, Andrey Kozyrev emphasized that a big political struggle has developed on the eve of the Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies. "We are not clinging to power and are ready to yield our seats to more competent professionals, he said, but we will not make way for revanchist forces and for a new state of emergency state committee. Nor do we want to allow the coming congress to be a congress of restorers. We are therefore appealing to public opinion."

After the "Ekho Moskvy" interview, Andrey Kozyrev commented in conversations with an ITAR-TASS correspondent on the Russian president's recent meeting with the collegium of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry. "It was an extraordinarily important and constructive talk," he said. "In the course of it, the diplomats felt the need to build relations with our foreign partners in a new way and promote the success of reform in our country." On the other hand, this meeting will also give the foreign leaders food for thought. In the reactions of the foreign media to the president's remarks at the Foreign Ministry it is already being noted that we need to proceed to a new level of relations with Russia and cannot "keep her waiting in the hall."

Officer in Lithuania Expects No Delay

OW3010201792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1906 GMT 30 Oct 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Colonel Valeriy Frolov, commander of the 107th motorized rifle division stationed in Vilnius believes that the Russian President's directive on the suspension of the troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries will not reflect on the terms of withdrawal of his division from the Northern Military Community Area.

In the words of Col. Frolov, his division personnel has been provided with housing in its new deployment area.

The division commander cannot guarantee, however, that the Northern Military Community Area will be fully vacated by the end of this year. His servicemen will not be delaying their withdrawal while he also regards as a critical factor the division command's cooperation with the Lithuanian authorities.

"We are strictly abiding by the withdrawal timetable," Col. Frolov said in an interview for BALTFAX.

MFA Aide: No Position 'Offered' to Baltics

OW0211200292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1655 GMT 2 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Vasilij Svirin, head of the Russian delegation at the talks with the Baltic republics, said in an interview for BALTFAX that Russia has not offered its position to its Baltic partners in relation with its announced suspension of troops withdrawal from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

In the words of Vasilij Svirin, the Russian MFA [Foreign Affairs Ministry] is completing drawing the interim agreements with the Baltic countries in compliance with President Yeltsin's directive. The draft agreements will be presented to the President for approval, after which Russia's final position in regards to this issue will be conferred to the Baltic partners, Mr. Svirin said.

The Russian diplomat preferred to abstain from commentaries as regards Russia's possible position during the forthcoming negotiations, saying it will fully depend on the position taken by the president.

Russia's deputy foreign minister, Vitaliy Churkin, said at a press conference Friday [30 October] that Russia intends to "present its position" to the Baltic diplomats in the near future. In the meantime, he expressed hope that Russia's position, explained by the MFA, will not provoke any negative response from its partners.

**MFA Aide: Lithuanian Withdrawal Schedule
'Formally Void'**

OW0211194692 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1655 GMT 2 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The deputy chief of the 2nd European department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Aleksandr Udaltsov has described the time- tables for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, signed in Moscow on September 8 as "formally void". The Russian diplomat referred to President Yeltsin's instruction "On the Coordination and Systematization of the Negotiating Process" with the Baltic states, signed on October 29.

The time-tables provided for the full withdrawal of the Russian army from Lithuania before August 31 1993.

Udaltsov said drafts of temporary agreements with each of the Baltic states containing social guarantees for the Russian servicemen and their families were being considered by Russian government ministries concerned and would be presented to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shortly. They would be discussed by government delegations at bilateral negotiations. The dates remain unclear, the diplomat said.

Udaltsov said that the presidential instruction was due to "the desire to handle the problems of Russian servicemen in a comprehensive way". He said that Russia was going to firmly defend the rights of Russians in the Baltic states.

Udaltsov said Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin would visit Tallinn to discuss President Yeltsin's instruction and ways of resolving the problem of the troop withdrawal.

**Churkin: Withdrawal Date From Estonia
Unchanged**

OW0311174992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1654 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The date for the final troops withdrawal from the territory of Estonian proposed by Russia - end of 1994 remains the same, Vitaliy Churkin, Russia's deputy foreign minister, said at a press conference in Tallinn Tuesday.

In his words, Russia is still not relating the issue of the Russian troops withdrawal with the solution of any internal political problems in this republic.

Churkin Comments Further on Estonia

*LD0311171892 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1500 GMT 3 Nov 92*

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Our correspondent Urmas Loit has just returned from Vitaliy Churkin's news conference. What was attention focused on there?

[Loit] The news conference was delayed by about 20 minutes because the discussion between Vitaliy Churkin and Ulo Nugis stretched from half an hour to an hour. Vitaliy Churkin also met our foreign minister Trivimi Velliste.

At the news conference Vitaliy Churkin emphasized once again that Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states cannot be linked to ensuring the rights of the Russians in the Baltic countries. For this reason the Russian deputy foreign minister also said that the Russian side did not ask for any Estonian legislation to be amended. Unfortunately, deadlines for the troop withdrawal were not touched upon.

The Russian deputy foreign minister said that Yeltsin's document is not an international document; it is meant for Russian state bodies for resolving Russian domestic matters, and for that reason it does not contain precise legal formulations, a fact which the Russian deputy foreign minister regretted. Unfortunately the president's adviser was not present to consult the Foreign Ministry when the document was drawn up.

Another quite interesting detail from the news conference is that the Russian deputy foreign minister accused the press of causing the confusion around Yeltsin's decree. He also said that if one needs to know Russia's position on a political issue, one should ask the Foreign Ministry, and if it is a Russian military issue, one should ask the Defense Ministry. [passage omitted]

Churkin: Directive Not Intended for Media

*MK0411115592 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
4 Nov 92 p 2*

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin by Mikhail Bredis; place and date not given: "We Have Given Cause for Concern"]

[Text] We have given cause for concern. That is what Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin thinks about the reaction in the Baltic to the Russian president's directive on suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops.

[Bredis] How is the president's directive being implemented?

[Churkin] We have prepared the drafts of temporary agreements. On Saturday they were submitted to the Russian Defense Ministry for coordination. As soon as we get the "okay" from the military, we will pass the drafts on to our Baltic colleagues.

[Bredis] The presidential directive swiftly became famous. What has been the reaction in the Baltic countries?

[Churkin] Negative. This is explicable. After all, the established canons of world practice require that the Baltic countries first be informed of such political decisions through diplomatic channels. We also need to explain the decision. Instead of this the information was given to journalists, to TASS. The mass media, no offense meant, began to pick out particular points and interpret them, often distorting the meaning of the directive. Not to mention the fact that a directive is an internal document not intended for circulation. Our task now is to explain that nothing catastrophic has happened.

[Bredis] Please say a few words about your trip to Tallinn.

[Churkin] This trip has been planned for a long time. I think I will simply explain the situation. It has to be admitted that the Estonian president's reaction to the famous directive was rather considered.

Commander in Estonia: No Interruption

*OW0411235092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1723 GMT 4 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia was already in full swing and could not be interrupted, according to a statement made to the Estonian telegraph agency by Major-General Ziyautdin Abdurakhmanov who is in command of the Russian units stationed in the republic.

In Abdurakhmanov's opinion, the Russian president's order to suspend the withdrawal could be applied only to the families of the servicemen, whose re-location to Russia was certainly fraught with great difficulties.

Shaposhnikov Asks for Understanding

*OW0411120792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1126 GMT 04 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] If the Baltic countries show due understanding to the problems Russia has come to grips with and follow a "civilized path", the problem of the Russian troops withdrawal will be resolved far more expeditiously and less painfully, CinC [Commander in Chief] of CIS Joint Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, told correspondents in an interview November 4 prior to the beginning of a session of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers.

Commenting on the problem of the Russian troops withdrawal from the so-called "new foreign countries", first of all, from the Baltics, Marshal Shaposhnikov warned that this problem cannot be resolved on the basis

of any rigid positions and statements, such as "Occupants Go Home!". In his words, any pressure on Russia through various international organizations, NATO, CSCE, and referendums can only "pump up passions" or "explode the situation both in the Baltic region and in Russia".

Suspension of Russian Troop Withdrawal Evokes 'Alarm' in Baltics

MK3110120192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Oct 92 p 1

[Reports by Yelena Visens and Tamara Nikolayeva under the "Baltic" rubric and the general headline: "A Whirlwind of Activity by the President. Boris Yeltsin Suspends, Bans, Protects, and Ultimately Intends To 'Make the Rounds of Russia' in Order To Find Out What To Do About the Congress"]

[Text] October 29th could in a sense be called Russian diplomacy's "Baltic" day. At least three times that day—at a meeting with Mrs. Lalumiere, in Boris Yeltsin's directive on temporarily suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Baltic states, and in the survey material "On the Activity of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry To Protect the Rights and Interests of the Russian-Speaking Population in the Baltic States" circulated by the Russian Foreign Ministry—there was mention of the problem of human rights violations in this region and the withdrawal of Russian troops from there. In conjunction with the statement made last week by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry on the temporary cessation of the Russian troop withdrawal, this looks like the prevailing official position of the Russian authorities. Its basic points have long been known: Until numerous instances of human rights violations against the Russian-speaking population are stopped in the Baltic states, or the leadership of these countries at least defines ways of improving the situation, Russia will adopt tough measures. Russia considers the protection of the rights and interests of the Russia-speaking population in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania as "the main priority in this sphere." The Russian president has instructed the government by Monday to formulate temporary agreements with the Balts that will provide social guarantees for Russian servicemen as well as make "the implementation of economic agreements with Baltic countries dependent on the solution to this particular issue."

The "other side" is currently not in the best position to take active and primarily diplomatic action against Russia. Parliamentary elections have recently taken place in Estonia and Lithuania: The new parliament in Tallinn has only just held its first plenary sessions, and confusion reigns in Vilnius following the victory of Brazauskas' party. In Riga the foreign minister has been ousted from his post. Nevertheless, Latvia and Estonia reacted to this offensive by Russian diplomacy almost immediately and adopted answering statements yesterday morning (Lithuania restricted itself to a briefing

in the Supreme Council). All three Baltic states note the disparity between Russia's statements and the understandings that have already been reached, the documents that have been signed and ratified, and international norms. The Estonian president believes that the statement by his Russian colleague "is disagreeable and at odds with the Helsinki accords," and he threatens to appeal to the EC for help and support, which, incidentally, Russia too has not refrained from doing, having itself on several occasions asked international organizations to act as intermediaries in protecting the rights of the nonnative population of the Baltic countries. For the time being it is unclear whether there will be a new round of the now habitual diplomatic skirmish between Russia and the Baltic countries and of assurances by the former that it will protect Russians, or whether matters will continue to be confined to an exchange of notes. [Visens ends]

Yeltsin's directive was greeted in Lithuania with a great deal of alarm. At a Supreme Council briefing, press attache Audrius Azubalis expressed his incomprehension of the Russian side's disregard for the relevant agreements, especially as Lithuania has already prepared an agreement on social guarantees for Russian servicemen in the republic. Supreme Council Deputy Elder Ceslovas Jursenas noted that Russia cannot look after its compatriots properly either at home or abroad: "The military," he said, "is social dynamite owing to Boris Yeltsin's behavior." It was noted at the briefing that the situation needs to be analyzed at party level and a joint statement must be prepared.

Ex-Advisers Say General Staff 'Misled' Grachev on Withdrawal Decision

OW0111214092 Moscow BALTFAX in English 2044 GMT 1 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian President passed a decision on suspension of the Russian forces withdrawal from the Baltic states basing on the materials of the Russian Defense Ministry which did not correspond with reality. This was declared to BALTFAX by Gennadiy Melkov, Vasiliy Sadovnik, and Aleksander Yevstigneyev, the recently resigned advisers of the Russian Defense Minister, at the radio station "Resonance".

According to them, Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, was misled by the General Staff. The ex-advisers insist that, for example, there are no 30 thousands of the Russian officers without flats in Lithuania, as the generals point out. According to the data presented by the former advisers, there are only 1305 such officers.

The advisers expressed perplexity due to the statement of the chief of the Financial Department of the Russian Defense Ministry, General Yegunov, that it is necessary to build 182 barracks for 50 thousand people and houses

having 43 thousand flats for the units to be withdrawn. 60.8 billion rubles are needed to realize this plan.

For whom will these barracks be built, the former advisers ask, if by May 1993 there will be not a single soldier of active service in the Baltic states?

The advisers expressed their doubt due to the statement of the chief of the Main Quartermaster-Maintenance Department of the Russian Defense Ministry, General Kotelev. In his statement General Kotelev said that 41 families of the retired servicemen are living on the territory of the Baltic states. 75% of them express wish to leave for Russia. It is necessary to build 30.8 thousand flats for them which will cost 33.7 billion rubles. But these people, one of the ex-advisers, Gennadiy Melkov, says, have privatized flats already. They can sell them and buy flats in Russia.

The former advisers assert that following their statement to the Russian Defense Minister that these numbers on the Baltic states are not real, they were isolated and in some days were forced to resign.

They explain these actions of the generals by the fact that they are afraid of their own reduction. The former advisers presented comparative data on the armed forces of Russia and United States.

"In the U.S. there are 5 thousand troops for one general and in Russia one general has 300 subordinate servicemen," they pointed out.

Melkov, Sadovnik, and Yevstigneyev insist "that to preserve their places the generals demand to re-deploy the military units from former Soviet republics and former Eastern European countries, and billion funds are needed to realize their plan." The ex-advisers believe that it is necessary to man military units stationed on the Russian territory by the withdrawn forces because many of them are staffed only by 10%.

Yeltsin Explains Baltic Troop Withdrawal Suspension

Lithuania Withdrawal Schedule 'Unchanged'

OW0311114192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1107 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin has assured the head of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis that the deadline of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic remains unchanged - August 1993.

According to Lithuanian television in a telephone conversation on Monday [2 November] night with Mr. Landsbergis the Russian leader confirmed their understanding of September 8.

Last Thursday President Yeltsin ordered a halt in the withdrawal of Russian troops from Baltic countries.

According to Lithuanian television, the Russian leader also said he has no complaints about the position of ethnic minorities in that country.

Holds Press Conference, Appeals to Baltic Leaders

LD0511174992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1631 GMT 5 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Nov—"My decision to suspend the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics is not the result of pressure from any side whatsoever," Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated at a news conference in Moscow today. We definitely will withdraw all our troops from there, he said, but we have to sign agreements and schedules for their withdrawal. We agree to this. Everything has to be done in a civilized manner. A schedule has been signed with Lithuania, and a commission now has been set up to sign corresponding agreements and schedules with Latvia and Estonia.

Today, Boris Yeltsin reported, I signed an appeal to all three leaders of the Baltic republics proposing that we meet at the negotiating table on the question of troop withdrawals. "We are not linking this question directly to any other, but nonetheless, we wish to also discuss the violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population because clear discrimination is taking place, which is impermissible in any country of the world at the end of the 20th century. We cannot allow violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population, our fellow-countrymen, on our borders, in three republics," the president stressed.

On the subject of the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania, which has begun, Boris Yeltsin noted that the Ministry of Defense "has overdone it": They are loading personnel into railcars and moving them to Russia, into the countryside [v pole], when winter has already begun. Such an attitude toward people is impermissible; it is a violation of human and citizens' rights, testimony to an absence of social protection, and is the reason the decision on halting the withdrawal of troops was signed, the head of the Russian state explained.

The Russian president requests that this measure not be seen as a political decision. It is necessary, in his words, to appraise this as a measure to create the necessary social protection for servicemen. The final deadline remains the same, however: the middle of 1993, the president stated.

Col Gen Gromov on Troop Withdrawal From Neighboring States

PM0411141592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Nov 92 p 3

[Vitaliy Strugovets report: "Russian Troop Withdrawal Continues, Although It Is Proceeding in a More Organized Manner From Distant Foreign Parts Than From Nearby Ones"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin recently signed a directive suspending the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states. In accordance with this document, the troop withdrawal will resume after the signing of Russia's interstate agreements with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. They must govern the Russian troop withdrawal procedure and provide for measures for the social protection of servicemen and members of their families. The president's decision is connected with his profound concern at the numerous violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the said states.

The president entrusted the Russian Government with drawing up temporary agreements with the Baltic states within three days to ensure social guarantees for Russian troop servicemen on the territory of those states. He also made the realization of economic agreements with the Baltic countries dependent on the resolution of this question.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has been entrusted with drawing up a draft presidential appeal to the United Nations asking the world community to examine the question of observance of human rights in the Baltic states. At the same time a number of measures have been outlined with the aim of improving the position of servicemen who are leaving the Baltic region.

Colonel General Boris Gromov, Russian Federation deputy defense minister, spoke of this at a news conference for Russian and foreign journalists on Friday 30 October. In particular, Boris Gromov emphasized that the task of withdrawing Russian troops from distant and nearby foreign countries is one of the most important today not only for the Defense Ministry and the whole Russian Federation but also for other countries. Primarily for the three Baltic states, Moldova, and the Central Asian republics.

Russian troops were withdrawn fully from Hungary and Czechoslovakia last year, 1991. The troop withdrawal from Mongolia was completed by 25 September. All political questions relating to the troop withdrawal from Germany and Poland have also been resolved. The plans which have been drawn up for the departure from these countries are being fulfilled in full. To date, all the combat units and combined units have already been withdrawn from Poland, for example. Just approximately 6,000 servicemen are left there, putting military camps in order and restoring the land of test grounds, i.e. resolving questions connected with the transfer to the Polish side of real estate and territories previously occupied by troops. Approximately 67 percent of the personnel of the Western Group of Forces and 73 percent of the combat hardware have already been withdrawn from Germany. In addition, talks are being concluded on the withdrawal of a separate motorized rifle brigade from the territory of Cuba. The Russian side is satisfied, on the whole, with the progress of these talks. It is planned to complete the brigade's withdrawal by 30 June 1993.

As regards problems of the Russian troops' presence in and withdrawal from nearby foreign parts, here Col. Gen. Gromov called the situation more complex. This applies, above all, to the Baltic countries, whose tough stance on the deadlines for the Russian troop withdrawal has greatly complicated the situation in combined units and units of the Northwest Group of Forces. And not only among the troops. Almost 40,000 veterans of the war and of the Armed Forces living in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have become second-class people today in those countries. They have essentially been deprived of many privileges, medical services, and even citizenship of those states.

Approximately 40,000 servicemen, not counting members of their families, have to be withdrawn from the Baltic states. This year alone it is planned to withdraw more than 24,000 men, of whom 10,382 are officers and ensigns with families.

Col. Gen. Boris Gromov pointed out that the Defense Ministry's position on this question is clear: Troops must be withdrawn only to where stocks have been prepositioned for them in their new places of stationing. As for the timing, the optimum option is the end of 1995, and the very earliest, the end of 1994. But no sooner.

In all, starting in 1989, approximately 500,000 servicemen, more than 12,000 tanks, approximately 13,000 artillery systems, and up to 3,000 aircraft and helicopters have already been withdrawn from the territory of foreign states.

The total costs of transferring and providing amenities on Russian territory for the troops being withdrawn will amount to more than 600 billion rubles [R] in the prices as of 1 November 1992. Taking into account the cost of maintaining them abroad—R725.9 billion and U.S. \$594 million.

The most painful and important question today, Col. Gen. Gromov emphasized, is the accommodation of troops on Russian territory. During 1992-1995, according to the data he cited, it is necessary to construct 1,600 apartment blocks, 580 sociocultural and domestic projects, 500 barracks, and 2,500 stores for combat hardware and property.

Therefore a special state program has been prepared, as Boris Gromov reported, for the withdrawal and the provision of amenities for Russian troops on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Russian Christian Democrats Back Troop Withdrawal Suspension

*OW0411235192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1723 GMT 4 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Christian Democratic Movement has expressed its approval of Russian President Boris

Yeltsin's decision to suspend the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the Baltic countries.

In his statement published today, the movement's chairman, Viktor Aksyuchits, says that, given the grave political and economic crisis in Russia and the Baltic states, hasty attempts to solve the Russian forces problem would be "unrealistic and politically dangerous".

The movement also insists that the Russian leadership react to the "campaign of persecution and discreditation of Russia and everything Russian" launched by extremist forces but raised to the level of government policy.

International Pressure Over Baltic Withdrawal Viewed

PM0411110992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by observer Aleksandr Golts: "What the 'Baltic Litmus Paper' is Testing and How"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Boris Yeltsin's decision to suspend the withdrawal of forces until agreements are signed giving guarantees of the social protection of servicemen appears to be the only correct decision (and although there is no direct link between the withdrawal of forces and safeguarding of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic area, it is obvious that they must be tackled together).

The Baltic states' capitals overreacted to this decision, to say the least. There was a torrent of appeals to the West, statements about the need to condemn Russia's stance at the CSCE. But what about the West itself?

A U.S. State Department spokesman was swift to declare that the suspension of the withdrawal of forces placed a question mark against the rendering of promised assistance to Russia. The Canadian Government also voiced concern. A NATO representative was worried. Wolfgang von Stetten, chairman of the German-Baltic parliamentary group in the FRG Bundestag, described the suspension of the withdrawal of forces as "attempted interference." Finally, the Swedish foreign minister declared his "profound regret."

An astonishing business. The withdrawal of forces "as swiftly as possible" is being demanded essentially by the very political circles who never tire of reiterating their support for the Yeltsin administration. But is it not obvious that the redeployment of thousands of servicemen and their families to places which have not been prepared for normal life would considerably increase the pressure in the already overheated caldron of Russian domestic politics. Does the West not see what trump cards the extreme opposition will acquire in its efforts to oust the president if the forces are followed to Russia by a flood of Russians who have failed to obtain political, economic, and social rights in the Baltic area!

But perhaps even though they appreciate all this, our partners simply cannot abandon principles which they regard as fundamental for them? Perhaps, with heavy heart, they are saying: "Yeltsin is my friend, but the truth is more precious." Indeed, international law clearly states that foreign forces must not remain on a state's territory if it does not want them there. But no one is disputing this right as far as the Baltic states are concerned. The problem is one of considering Russian interests as well as those of the Baltic republics. And international pressure is actually encouraging ambitions and hindering a quiet, civilized solution.

Yet the Western states should be better equipped than anyone to appreciate the complexity of the situation in Russia. These states have had and still have military bases and facilities in dozens of states. And they have been told on more than one occasion, when there has been a change of power or even of political course in a particular state, that there is no longer any need for the military presence. It has happened, for example, to the Americans—in Cuba and the Philippines—and to the British—in Egypt and Singapore. And on each occasion, I can assure you, Washington, London, and Paris acted not only and not such much on the basis of the letter and spirit of international law, as on the basis of their own strategic requirements. Occasionally, in order to maintain their presence, they would arrange for the government's removal, as happened, say, in Greece.

[Excerpt] But that was the time of irrational politics in the cold war era, you will retort. It is no secret, however, that even though confrontation is now becoming a thing of the past, the United States does not intend to relinquish its base in Guantanamo, although Havana has long been demanding the elimination of this outpost. As for the bases in the Philippines, talks about them went on for some years. Just as long as was needed to prepare for the withdrawal of forces.

In fact it was not a matter of providing tolerable conditions of existence for the forces that were being withdrawn. That is not a problem for the United States and its allies, of course. There are other problems, though. It is no secret that the military presence is not due to the ill will or goodwill of politicians; it is a response to particular strategic requirements. But our partners must appreciate that that a rapid and ill-prepared withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic area will not only seriously increase domestic political tension, but will also wreck Russia's current defense plans. Experts believe, in particular, that it will seriously reduce the potential of our ABM defenses and naval activities.

Indeed, if you follow the logic of confrontation, the more uncertain Moscow feels both in the domestic political sphere and from the defense capability viewpoint, the better the West will feel. Then the pressure is warranted. But now that it has been declared that the United States sees stronger security for Russia as stronger security for the United States itself, where did the efforts to apply pressure come from? Why has the declaration of respect

for Russia's national interests so far not been expressed in any way in actual policy? The "Baltic litmus paper," which tests the West's assurances for sincerity, is only raising questions at the moment.

Baltic States Council Calls for No Delay in Troop Withdrawal

*LD0611092992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0739 GMT 6 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Kazis Uscila and Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius November 6 TASS—"Complete and undelayed withdrawal of Russian troops is the unconditional international commitment of Russia as the successor to the USSR. The Russian troop withdrawal from the three Baltic countries should not be linked to any political, social and economic circumstances of any of the sides nor to economic relations between the sides". This conclusion has been made at the meeting of the Council of Baltic States that ended late Thursday evening in Vilnius.

The meeting attended by the delegations of the three Baltic countries headed by Estonian President Lennart Meri and presidents of the parliaments of Lithuania and Latvia Vytautas Landsbergis and Anatolijs Gorbunovs discussed the situation that formed in connection with Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decree of October 29, 1992, signifying Russia's intention to suspend troop withdrawal from the three Baltic countries.

The leaders of the three countries signed the address to heads of the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as to heads of such international organisations as NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the Commission of the European Communities and the North Atlantic Assembly. The address voices concern "over the suspension of the withdrawal from the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian territories of Russian troops staying there in violation of norms of international law".

The Council of Baltic States rejected Russia's attempts "to link troop withdrawal to alleged violations of human rights in Latvia and Estonia". The Council urged the Russian Government "fully to withdraw troops from the territories of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia without any delays and not later than the summer of 1993". The Council declared against attempts to preserve Russia's military presence in any form in territories of these countries after that period".

The leaders of the Baltic countries sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Butros-Ghali in this connection.

The meeting also stressed the expediency of the participation of mediators or representatives of third countries and international organisations in the negotiations with Russia, and, after the conclusion of appropriate agreements, in the observance of their implementation which,

as a statement for the press notes, would promote speedier and more effective solutions of issues related to the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic countries.

After the signing of the documents, Lennart Meri, Vytautas Landsbergis and Anatolijs Gorbunovs gave a news conference.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Tactical Nuclear Missiles Said Removed From Pacific Fleet

*OW0611030692 Tokyo KYODO in English 0249 GMT
6 Nov 92*

[Text] Moscow, Nov. 5 KYODO—The Russian Navy has completed the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from vessels in the former Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet, Russian defense sources said Thursday.

The removal of the weapons, part of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's October 1991 proposal for nuclear disarmament, was completed at the end of September and the missiles have been stored in warehouses on land, the sources told KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

With this development in arms limitations in the Far East, the only nuclear weapons of the now-defunct Soviet Union that remain stationed at sea are tactical missiles carried on nuclear submarines.

Moscow military sources, however, cautioned that the Pacific Fleet appears to have strengthened its conventional military power, which may become a source of tension in relations between Japan and Russia.

With the exception of the fleet in the Black Sea which is under the joint administration of Russia and Ukraine, the old Soviet naval fleets have been reorganized under Russian control.

Among the tactical nuclear weapons removed from the Russian vessels were the SSN-22 Cruise missiles with a range of 550 kilometers, which were carried on Soviet cruisers stationed in the Pacific, as well as sea-to-land missiles and nuclear depth charges.

Meanwhile, the land-based nuclear arms of the Soviet Union are supposed to [be] moved from the former Soviet republics to Russia, where they are scheduled to be disposed of.

Plans for the disposal of the weapons have been hampered by a lack of money and disposal facilities.

Regarding the removal of the sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian Defense Ministry said that international treaties say nothing about the destruction of such weapons.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Belarusian Defense Ministry Denies Existence of Test Site

Moscow Report

LD2810120892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1129 GMT 28 Oct 92

[By BELINFORM correspondent Leonid Tratsvskiy for TASS]

[Text] Minsk October 28 TASS—There is no nuclear testing site on the Belarusian territory, nor has there ever been, the Belarusian Defence Ministry said in a statement received by BELINFORM news agency.

The statement was prompted by reports in the media, including the Radiofakt programme alleging that a secret military testing site functioned for a long time in Stolinskiy district of Brest region, where nuclear weapons were tested.

The reporters concluded that large-scale land amelioration was being carried out to reduce the level of radiation in ground water.

The Belarusian Defence Ministry officially renounced these reports and categorically denied that nuclear tests had ever been held on territory of the Belarusian Republic.

Minsk Report

WS2910133492 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian
1427 GMT 28 Oct 92

[Text] There has never been and there is no nuclear testing area in Belarus, the press center of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense states.

This statement was prompted by mass media reports on the existence of a secret military nuclear arms testing area in Stolinskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast. Newspaper reporters tried to prove it by reporting facts concerning a continuous, large-scale land reclamation carried out in Polesye to reduce the level of radiation.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense officially denies both the facts concerning nuclear arms testing and the media reports on them.

History of Seismic Verification Techniques

934P0014A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by V. Nedogonov: "In Kazakhstan They Heard the 'Rustling' in Nevada"]

[Text] The Materik system could predict earthquakes, if it were not a secret facility.

Until recently only those privy to state secrets were aware of the Materik. The seismic service of Russia's Ministry of Defense is still strictly classified (as is its counterpart in the USA, by the way). What we know about this service today comes from a brief glance into the unknown world of Soviet defense secrets, a passing glimpse of grand projects and money invested in superb equipment which no mere mortal has ever seen.

The professional atomic seismology service began to be formed in the USSR in 1959. Experts on the monitoring and testing of nuclear weapons had met in Geneva a year earlier, in 1958. After exchanging monitoring know-how, they understood that agreement on a nuclear test ban was possible. The main thing was to be able reliably to verify how such a treaty was being implemented. And by whom.

Since then the life of those monitoring nuclear activities has been like a card game with very strange rules. Their job is to build up a hand of the highest possible trump cards (that is, technical monitoring facilities). As the game (that is, the arms race) progressed, however, the rivals would place some of what they had accumulated onto the table for universal scrutiny and verification. When they acknowledged one another's trump cards, they would conclude another treaty.

The first hand of trump cards, the smallest, we laid onto the negotiating table in Moscow in 1963, when the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmosphere, Under Water and in Space was signed. This only required demonstrating a reliable Geiger counter and describing methods for visually monitoring the nuclear mushroom.

The treaty went into effect, and the explosions were moved into underground pits. This is where the nuclear seismologists had to have the most highly refined "ear" to be able to keep the government informed on who was conducting explosions, what was being exploded, when and where.

As early as 1974 Soviet military equipment made it possible to identify a nuclear explosion with a force of more than 150 kilotons (that is, a fairly powerful one). It was time for the Americans to lay their trumps onto the table, and they turned out to possess the same methods. This meant that it was time to sit down at the negotiating table and sign the Treaty on Underground Testing of Nuclear Weapons of up to 150 Kilotons.

The treaty was signed, but it took the experts 16 years to establish mutual trust in the instruments of the treaty partners. It was not ratified in the USA until December 1990.

In 1978 the Soviet press gave a great deal of coverage to the beginning of talks on a universal and total ban on nuclear weapons. It was explained to trusting citizens that this was another initiative on the part of the "peace-loving Soviet state." In fact, it was at the end of the '70s when military geophysics saw the light at the end

of the tunnel. Improved methods for monitoring all nuclear explosions on the planet appeared on the horizon. The Materik was to be the USSR's main trump in future talks.

So what held things up? Just lay the Materik on the table and sign the treaty. It had taken 7 years to create the system, however. During that time new stations had been built, an improved information network had been set up, the Information Processing Center had been built at Dubna near Moscow, communication satellites had been launched into space....

We find the first official mention of the Materik in the 19 November 1990 Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Priority Steps to Create a Unified System for Monitoring and Predicting Earthquakes." It was to be developed by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry, the Ministry of General Machine Building and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The document indicated that the entire project was to be completed in 1992.

There is no longer a Council of Ministers of the USSR or a Ministry of General Machine Building, but the Materik is being completed right on schedule. The system is undergoing state testing this year. In the office of Capt 1st Rank A. Rogozhanin, chief of the Seismic Service of the Russian Ministry of Defense, stands an enormous globe. Behind him hangs an equally enormous map of the former USSR. Aleksandr Viktorovich is afraid that nuclear weapons may show up at any time in those countries which are eager to have them. There are fears that these countries will want to test them, which means that there will be new testing ranges. There could also be extremely weak explosions or disguised explosions (with special interference added to the seismic nuclear wave). Who will detect them and promptly report them? The Materik people, of course. And if other countries join the Russians in their moratorium on nuclear explosions, who will see to it that they do not deceive us? Those same people, the specialists in the officers' shoulder boards.

This is a very good time to recall that there is also a civilian geophysics in addition to the military. During all of these "nuclear decades" it continued to develop somehow or other, unsuccessfully attempting to find a short-term method of predicting earthquakes. The civilian geophysicists have long looked with envy upon the fully developed military Materik. Our planet is made in such a way that there are special sites which are the best places for the seismologist, both civilian and military, to place their "ear" to the earth. There was a reason why the military took such a liking to the Kazakh platform. They could detect explosions in Nevada from there. The Ural stations were tuned to the Sahara, and stations in Central Asia monitored the Marshall Islands. And wherever one can hear the reverberations of nuclear explosions, one can also hear everything else, including so-called "weak oscillations," the precursors of future large geologic cataclysms.

I shall be so bold as to suggest that this "double life" of seismic science has done it a disservice. P. Shcherbakov, director of the Scientific Center at the Seismic Service of the Russian Ministry of Defense, believes that the discovery of a method of short-term forecasting has been delayed until the 21st century. Today we have only home-bred soothsayers instead of reliable forecasts by scientists.

A decree of the Gaydar government on the establishment of a unified seismic network in Russia will possibly soon be signed. Its main objective will be to involve the Materik in the development of a method of predicting earthquakes. The conversion has reached this top-secret field as well. If the decree goes into effect, equipped ranges will be set up in particularly active seismic areas, instruments of the Academy of Sciences will be installed at the military stations, and the Materik's "ear" will be required to listen to all underground rustlings, without exception.

All of that is good, but it is perfectly possible that there will soon be no one to receive the information at the Academy of Sciences.

"The School of Civilian Geophysics is falling apart before our eyes," complains A. Gufeld, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences and senior scientific associate at the Earth Sciences Institute.

A petition from the scientists to President Yeltsin is now being circulated at the institute, and the scientists are weighing plans for a hunger strike and making preparations to go to Manezh Square.

In the meantime, seismic activity is increasing by the year in the territory of the former USSR. It is perfectly possible that the Spitak earthquake was the precursor of increased seismicity in the Caucasus. According to the Institute of Earth Sciences, the Urals are also "awakening." It is perfectly possible that we do not have time to wait until the 21st century for accurate predictions. We are just not yet aware of this.

Incidentally:

Recent studies by A. Nikolayev, corresponding member of the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences], and Professor G. Vershagina (Institute of Geophysics imeni O.Yu. Shmidt of the RAN) demonstrated that seismicity is clearly affected by nuclear explosions in both California and Central Asia. The authors set the probability of seismic activity during the first 10 days following nuclear explosions at almost 100 percent. In Central Asia the probability of man-induced seismic activity during that first 10 days is particularly great for the Southern Tien Shan and the Hindu Kush.

The authors believe that seismic waves from an explosion stimulate development of the process at the site of an earthquake "ready to happen." This means that we could direct the occurrence of earthquakes artificially to avoid devastating natural disasters.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production

PM0311095592 Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA*
in Russian No. 44, Oct 92 (Signed to Press 27 Oct 92)
pp 4-9

[Interview with Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov by Oleg Vishnyakov in Moscow on 22 October under the "Backstage Story" rubric: "Binary Bomb Exploded. First Victim Arrested by State Security. Can a State Crime Be a Departmental Secret? Chemical Weapons Are Banned, But Is the Military Continuing With Chemistry?"]

[Text] The chemist who discussed the creation of a new kind of chemical weapons—in violation of international accords—has been arrested. On the eve of the arrest Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov and his colleague Lev Fedorov came to *NOVOYE VREMYA*. They answered questions from *NOVOYE VREMYA* correspondent Oleg Vishnyakov.

[Vishnyakov] You are the first Russian chemists to openly disagree with state policy on chemical disarmament. Why had none of your colleagues protested before? What prompted you to take this step?

[Mirzayanov] I worked for more than 25 years in the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GSNIIOKhT) on Moscow's Shosse Entuziastov. The institute was and is still developing new kinds of toxins and production technology. My specific expertise is determining the microconcentration of toxins in the air, in water, and in the soil. I was involved in starting up production of new toxins and in field trials of chemical weapons. For the past five years I held the post of chief of the department for countering foreign intelligence services.

I will immediately remark that sober-minded scientists who develop chemical weapons have always understood the pointlessness and practical uselessness of their research. Many of us tried to find out from the military whether there is a general concept of the use of chemical weapons. Atomic and hydrogen weapons exist—it is still possible somehow, with a big stretch, to explain their use. Regarding chemical weapons, in the whole time we have worked we have not once received an intelligible explanation of how, where, and against whom they might be used.

We understood deep down that we were engaged in something wrong, but we kept working more out of inertia than anything. Where else could we go? Wages at the institute were slightly higher than the national average; there were certain privileges... In addition, our specialty is virtually unamenable to "conversion." I do not know a single able scientist in our institute who tackles his work with pleasure. But this is all they know how to do. That is the whole tragedy.

[Fedorov] I am a purely academic scientist. After graduating from university in 1964, I joined the Academy of Sciences, where I still work.

It was from civic positions that I arrived at the idea of tackling questions of chemical disarmament. As a scientist, I was disconcerted by the fact that the changes occurring in the USSR's relations with its "likely enemies" were not touching at all on chemical weapons. Moreover, when the United States ceased mass production of toxins at the end of the 1960's, we were only starting up the Novocheboksarsk Chemical Combine—the mightiest enterprise in the USSR for production of chemical weapons. Clearly, we had been preparing to commission it for several years, and yet we might have stopped it in time...

The Novocheboksarsk Chemical Combine is of special concern to me. I am a Chuvash by nationality, and I am not indifferent to the fate of my own people.

[Mirzayanov] After the commissioning of the plant at Novocheboksarsk and our scientists' development of a new supervirulent toxin—circumventing the Geneva Convention on Chemical Disarmament—it became clear to me that escalation in this sphere benefited only the chemical generals who created for themselves a sinecure in the form of research appropriations, awards, and Lenin Prizes.

[Vishnyakov] Let us dwell in greater detail on the new toxin.

[Mirzayanov] Approximately two years ago scientists at our institute created a new toxin which, in terms of its combat characteristics, is five to eight times superior to the most toxic of the VX-type toxins now in existence. If someone is affected by it, even if it only gets on the skin, it is practically impossible to effect a cure. I know people who were subjected in the past to the effects of this toxin. They were all left invalids.

On the basis of the new toxin we developed our own binary weapons, which proved considerably more effective than the U.S. ones. How was this achieved? The thing is that, unlike the U.S. binary weapon, the components of which are individually totally safe (this is its advantage), one of the components in our weapon is a toxin.

An experimental industrial batch of the new toxin was produced at a plant in Volgograd, after which several scientists who developed it and chemical military chiefs who had attached themselves to them received Lenin Prizes from the hands of President Gorbachev himself. This was in the spring of 1991, i.e. after the signing of the bilateral "Bush-Gorbachev" agreement on the nonproduction and destruction of chemical weapons. Consequently, we thoroughly duped the Americans.

[Vishnyakov] And yet the bilateral agreement says nothing about the development of chemical weapons. As

far as I know, similar laboratory research is also conducted in the United States.

[Mirzayanov] In this case it is not a question of laboratory research. The Lenin Prize is awarded only after the production of an experimental industrial batch. Of course, we are not speaking of a batch of several thousand tonnes, but we produced between five and 10 tonnes of the new toxin. This is accurate. Precisely this amount was needed for field trials, which were ended this spring on the Ustyurt Plateau near the city of Nukus. By that time this was already the territory of the sovereign state of Uzbekistan, and I doubt that Islam Karimov, the country's president, knew of these trials.

[Fedorov] The most unpleasant thing in this story is the fact that the two components of the new binary weapon are not on the list of intermediate substances which, under the draft Geneva convention, are subject to inspection. That is, technically we are not violating the convention, but we are undoubtedly acting in a dishonorable manner. In point of fact, the talks on chemical disarmament must be started all over again.

[Vishnyakov] Which of the Soviet leaders knew of the new weapon? For example, in 1987 Eduard Shevardnadze, who was then foreign minister, declared that the USSR was unilaterally ceasing development and production of chemical weapons. Did he know he was lying?

[Mirzayanov] They simply might not have told Shevardnadze. The monopoly on this kind of information was in the hands of those who were creating these weapons. By the way, at least another two years after that statement we were still producing toxins of the soman type.

[Vishnyakov] Did Yeltsin know?

[Mirzayanov] I doubt it. Although, as first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee, he was responsible for all military-industrial complex installations in the capital.

Does he know now? You see, as far as I can judge, our president, like his predecessor, is not very trusting of alternative sources of information, preferring to receive it exclusively from his own aides. Yeltsin's chief aide for problems of chemical weapons is now General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, who in the past was deputy chief of the chemical troops. This is the man who in 1982 promised not to respond to the U.S. escalation of U.S. binary weapons and who gave an assurance in 1987 that we had stopped producing toxins. But in 1991 he received the Lenin Prize for creating a new weapon. Draw your own conclusions.

[Vishnyakov] To judge from Anatoliy Kuntsevich's quite successful visit to the United States, people there do not really believe in the existence of a new type of chemical weapon.

[Mirzayanov] It seems to me that on the eve of the election the U.S. Administration does not wish to acknowledge publicly that the Russians deceived them.

There is still time before the convention is signed. Maybe they will be more active after the November election.

[Fedorov] The thing is also that U.S. military chemists are more friendly with their colleagues from Russia than with their own politicians. Military people find a common language with each other far more quickly. There has been and is no confrontation between them. This is just a means of existence for both sets of people.

[Vishnyakov] According to our official data, Russia possesses 40,000 tonnes of toxins. To what extent, in your opinion, does this figure tally with reality?

[Mirzayanov] When I was working in the institute, specialists said that we had approximately 60,000 to 70,000 tonnes. I have never heard the figure of 40,000 tonnes. This figure is undoubtedly understated.

[Fedorov] Under the terms of the bilateral "Bush-Gorbachev" treaty on chemical weapons, the total quantity of toxins on each side must not exceed 50,000 tonnes. Officially we have 40,000 tonnes (the Americans have 35,000 tonnes), of which 30,000 tonnes are the new, phosphorus kinds—toxins of the sarin, soman, and VX types—and 10,000 tonnes are the old, skin-blistering kinds of the mustard gas and lewisite types and a mixture of mustard gas and lewisite. The structure of the phosphorus toxins has never been made public. The structure of the skin-blistering toxins is as follows: 7,000 tonnes of lewisite and approximately 1,500 tonnes of a mixture of mustard gas and lewisite. Mustard gas accounts for something like 1,500 tonnes. These are the official data. I personally am convinced that this is not the truth. Rather, not the whole truth. Maybe what is meant by the 40,000 tonnes is just the toxins **ready for use**.

[Vishnyakov] That is?

[Fedorov] The thing is that it is far more complex to destroy the old toxins than the phosphorus ones. In addition, mustard gas and lewisite really are very difficult to handle, and it is possible that, so as not to frighten the world too much by putting our stocks of mustard gas and lewisite up for general review, they decided partly to do away with them **before this**.

Let us calculate. Starting in 1942, the plant in Chapaevsk (Samara Oblast) produced approximately 1,500 tonnes of mustard gas and lewisite a year. This continued through the end of the war. In addition, after the war we brought out of Germany another plant for the production of mustard gas and lewisite and set it up in Dzerzhinsk (Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast). It operated until approximately 1952. Productivity there also was no less. Plus a small experimental plant in the grounds of the GSNIIOKhT in Moscow, which also produced mustard gas and lewisite, albeit not in such quantities. Incidentally, during the panic of October 1941 in Moscow all the mustard gas and lewisite was buried right in the institute's grounds. If a bulldozer were used there, I am convinced that it would be possible to find wartime shells containing toxins...

[Mirzayanov] There is another gap in the history of our chemical weapons. When relations with China became extremely exacerbated at the end of the 1960's, and military clashes were threatening to escalate into a full-scale war, the military declared that they had nothing with which to protect the border. Then the command adopted the decision to "additionally furnish" the troops stationed on the border with China with shells containing mustard gas and lewisite. It was then that the toxins store at Chapayevsk, which had to be offloaded to build a new plant, was emptied. It was also then that there were rumors of a new chemical weapons base in the Transbaykal region.

[Vishnyakov] Only rumors?

[Fedorov] We do not know that yet... There are seven bases with toxins located on Russian territory. We know of only two of them: the city of Kambarka in Udmurtia and the settlement of Gornyy in Saratov Oblast. Mustard gas and lewisite are there. Under the "Bush-Gorbachev" agreement we pledged to tell the Americans the location of the other bases. True, as is known, this treaty has not been ratified, and we could delay over fulfilling it. Only when I wrote the letter to the Foreign Ministry asking them to tell me, an independent ecologist, the coordinates of these bases, they refused, but they pointed out that they had already reported this to the Americans confidentially. The Americans know, while the residents of nearby cities and villages do not.

Incidentally, the Americans themselves make no secret of the location of their bases with toxins.

[Vishnyakov] If I have understood you correctly, did the military decide quietly to do away with mustard gas and lewisite?

[Fedorov] The residents of Chapayevsk maintain that some of the mustard gas which was not taken away to the Transbaykal region was buried right on the territory of the chemical site. There are eyewitnesses among local residents of the village of Pokrovka who observed a strange phenomenon in the early eighties: The ground flared up and rose up. From the chemical viewpoint this is explicable: The mustard gas had been buried and covered over with alkali or bleaching powder. This resulted in an exothermic reaction. When, in September of this year, I requested permission to enter the territory of the plant and the chemical site to take ground samples, I was not admitted on the personal orders of General Petrov, chief of the chemical troops.

An occurrence at the Kambarka base also dates from the mid-1980's. There a poisonous smell suddenly and unexpectedly issued from the stores. People began to fall ill. It turned out that the military had been independently burning lewisite there, and had done so openly. Naturally, the residents were told nothing.

It is known now that during the 1950's we sank considerable stocks of mustard gas and lewisite in the White

Sea—of which we were "notified" by starfishes several years ago. Even earlier, during the 1940's, we sank mustard gas in the Pacific.

Finally, there is the small station of Kotelnikovo not far from Nizhny Novgorod. Officially an air detachment was stationed there, but in fact it had nothing whatever to do with aviation. All the shells containing toxins which had started to leak (this happened quite frequently) were taken there, where the "air detachment" workers used up these shells and burned them. The forest there is rust-colored all year round.

This is where they are, these missing 20,000-30,000 tonnes of mustard gas and lewisite—sunk in the Pacific and the White Sea and buried in the ground, at Chapayevsk and maybe also Dzerzhinsk.

[Vishnyakov] Hardly anything is known about what the production of toxins cost us over all these years. Nor are there any data on the victims of this production...

[Fedorov] In Chapayevsk we sent many thousands of people "through the mill" during the war. Soldiers who had been deemed unfit worked in the plant. Production was completely open: Mustard gas and lewisite were poured into shells from kettles and scoops! In the space of a few months the "workers in the rear" became invalids and died. New people were brought into production.

Once during the war a train bringing reinforcements was delayed for some reason, and the plant stopped work. There was simply no one there to work!

In nearby villages and hamlets there is probably no family which has not had a relative die in chemical production.

[Mirzayanov] Closed technology was introduced in Dzerzhinsk only in the fifties, and prior to that the process had been entirely open.

[Vishnyakov] Many experts, including military experts, believe that not all kinds of toxins were that essential to us or their production justified.

[Fedorov] I am profoundly convinced that we should not, above all, have had anything to do with lewisite. Mustard gas and lewisite have identical characteristics. But mustard gas has an induction period, while lewisite acts instantly. This was why the military liked it—the results of its "work" are visible at once.

In addition, lewisite is an extremely highly toxic substance based on arsenic. But lewisite is many times more toxic and dangerous than arsenic.

The Germans, despite their "love" of toxins, did not take up lewisite. The Americans abandoned production of lewisite during World War II. But we began production before the war and continued right up until the fifties.

Or let us take soman, which replaced sarin in our country in the early sixties. The Americans at once rejected soman, considering its production technology unjustifiably expensive. For, in order to produce soman, it is necessary first to obtain several intermediate substances, including penakolinovyy [translation unknown] spirit—very complex technology! But our scientists did this, putting in so much effort and state money. Lenin Prizes were their reward for this.

[Vishnyakov] Officials have repeatedly declared that there was not a single accident in the USSR during the whole time at plants producing toxins.

[Fedorov] That, to put it mildly, is not quite so. I personally know of two major accidents at enterprises producing toxins. Thus, in 1974 Shop No. 83 of the plant in Novocheboksarsk, where VX gas was being produced, was badly damaged by fire. I do not have any data about the consequences of that disaster or the casualties.

[Mirzayanov] A no less terrible disaster occurred in Volgograd in 1964. All the general discharges from Shop 34, where sarin was being produced, were concentrated in one place and were then diluted by general production waste. A so-called "white sea" was formed—a general dump of highly toxic waste. In the spring of that year there was high water, and the "white sea" joined with the Volga. Eyewitnesses recall that the entire river from Volgograd to Astrakhan was white with fish floating belly-up.

It is said that a furious Kosygin, who then held the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, outlined a resolution: "Punish by way of an example." Boris Libman, chief engineer of the Volgograd plant, was chosen as the "scapegoat." By that time he had been awarded a Lenin Prize. He was jailed. The prize was rescinded. True, while in the camp, he wrote and defended a candidate's dissertation. He now lives in Philadelphia.

[Vishnyakov] Have there been any cases of the use of chemical weapons in the USSR?

[Fedorov] In 1921 the civil war hero Mikhail Tukhachevskiy—there is documentary confirmation of this—used toxins against the rebellious peasants of Tambov Province.

There is information that we prepared to use chemical weapons at the time of the Finnish campaign of 1940.

In 1970 the Polish authorities used CS police gas manufactured in the USSR against demonstrators in Gdansk.

Finally, April 1989. Tbilisi. According to official data, the military used CS to break up a demonstration, but...

[Mirzayanov] I know for certain that this was not CS but something more serious. I have talked with colleagues at the GSNIIOKhT who analyzed samples that were taken. The analysis records were destroyed and subsequently falsified.

[Vishnyakov] Reports occasionally appear in the press that during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict one of the sides has used toxins. Is this possible?

[Mirzayanov] I do not rule out this possibility. The Russian military command has denied that there are chemical weapons on the territory of those states. Meanwhile, I know for sure that there was a chemical munitions dump near Baku and that a battalion of Soviet Army chemical troops was stationed there.

[Vishnyakov] What is your attitude to the program we have adopted for the destruction of chemical weapons?

[Fedorov] As far as I know, such a program has not yet been approved.

In an interview on Russian television A. Kuntsevich remarked bitterly that "unfortunately, production of toxins in our country, as distinct from the United States, was located in densely populated areas." What is meant by "densely populated areas" is the cities of Volgograd, Dzerzhinsk, Novocheboksarsk, and Chapayevsk.

[Mirzayanov] The Americans plan to destroy their chemical weapons directly on military bases located in uninhabited places. They are obliged to do this by a law adopted by Congress banning any movements of toxins about the country's territory whatever. The chemical weapons sited at U.S. military bases abroad have already been removed and are being destroyed on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

Unlike the Americans, our generals plan to return toxins from military bases to their places of production, i.e. to "densely populated areas," where they are to be destroyed by burning. There are no guarantees that the cities' residents will not be affected by toxins.

The situation is also exacerbated by the fact that neither sarin nor soman nor VX is destroyed completely at the moment of burning but remains in a concentration thousands or tens of thousands of times greater than the maximum permissible concentration. Here it is not a question of technology, it is simply that it really is **impossible to destroy** these weapons. Therefore the Americans do not play the fool but burn toxins in remote places, knowing in advance that ecological pollution cannot be avoided. In my view, our program for the destruction of toxins is total adventurism.

[Vishnyakov] What, in your opinion, must be done?

[Mirzayanov] In our country chemical disarmament is being carried out by the same people who armed us chemically. Until we replace the whole concept of the destruction of toxins and discuss it publicly, until we replace the executors, I personally do not believe that this will be done safely for man and for nature.

[Box One] Despite the arrest of Doctor Mirzayanov and the clear warning by security ministry staffers, NOVOYE VREMYA has published this interview. Why?

State secrets have to be kept in order to safeguard Russia's national security. But are the development, testing, and industrial production of new, lethal weapons of mass destruction in line with our security interests?

At the beginning of next year Russia is to sign the Geneva Convention on Chemical Weapons, whereby our country is supposed to destroy all chemical arsenals and stop creating new ones. This means that Russia **does not need** chemical weapons: Production and storage of them are much more dangerous than the destructive effect they are expected to have.

This is the policy of the Russian president and parliament. It is the official position of the Defense Ministry. And if, as Doctors Mirzayanov and Fedorov claim, binary weapons are nonetheless being developed—in top secret conditions—in whose interests is this secret being kept? Doctors Mirzayanov and Fedorov describe the activities of the military-chemical lobby and, in particular, talk about the personal interests of certain “chemical generals” who pass off departmental secrets as state secrets. Are these departmental secrets not too dangerous for the state and society and are the “chemical generals” therefore not damaging Russia's national security?

[Box Two] Chronicle of an Arrest

The conversation with Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov took place at the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial offices on Tuesday 20 October. On Thursday 22 October two Russian Security Ministry staffers turned up at the office of NOVOYE VREMYA correspondent Oleg Vishnyakov, who had prepared the piece, and asked him to go with them.

At the Security Ministry investigation administration in Lefortovo the correspondent was told that he had been summoned for questioning as a witness. They told him that criminal action was being taken against Vil Mirzayanov under Article 75 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code—“divulging state secrets” (between two and eight years' imprisonment) and that Mirzayanov had been arrested because of the piece “Poisoned Politics,” written by Mirzayanov and Fedorov and published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI a month earlier. The article was about a new type of binary chemical weapon that had been developed in the USSR in circumvention of international agreements.

During the interrogation senior investigator Aleksandr Cheredilov asked in what circumstances the NOVOYE VREMYA correspondent had met with Mirzayanov and Fedorov, on whose initiative the interview had taken place, and whether the correspondent had recorded the conversation. After the interrogation the investigator and the witnessing officer accompanied the correspondent home in order to confiscate the tapes of the interview.

As Lev Fedorov said in a telephone conversation with the NOVOYE VREMYA correspondent, they came for him, and for Mirzayanov, early in the morning of 22

October. The chekists' first question was: “What did you say in the interview with NOVOYE VREMYA?”

The officers searched Fedorov's apartment and, having seized two copies of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI containing the “Poisoned Politics” article, took the doctor of sciences to Lefortovo. He was kept there for half a day. Fedorov is also a witness in the “divulging state secrets case” since he is not a “repository” of state secrets.

On the morning of 23 October Russian Federation Security Ministry staffers turned up at the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial offices with an order to seize the text of the interview with Mirzayanov and Fedorov, which had been prepared for publication. They explained that the text had to be examined for state secrets. The results of the examination were promised for a week later at the earliest. The advice was to delay publication.

[Box Three—caption to photograph of Mirzayanov] Chemist Vil Mirzayanov has spent a lifetime honorably carrying out the orders of his “chemical generals.” He no longer intends to do so. He deems it his duty as a citizen of Russia to make dangerous departmental “secrets” public and thereby safeguard the interests of the state and society. Now he faces a trial. It must be held in open court. It is perfectly possible, though, that Mirzayanov, as a repository of state secrets, will be tried behind closed doors, in accordance with restricted instructions and legally binding departmental acts.

[Box Four] State Secret Shrouded in State Darkness

What is a state secret? And who decides? In the early 1980's the USSR Council of Ministers issued a list of state and military secrets. The list itself was a top-secret document. Only a few items in it came under KGB jurisdiction, in particular: operational technical state security facilities and facilities to safeguard border security. More secrets belonged to the Defense Ministry: organization, development, and production of new types of weapons, their composition and tactical and technical properties. Glavlit [Main Administration for Literature Publishing Houses] experts had a copy of the secret list. It was their job to censor the press and the appearance of state secrets in it.

But the secret list was abolished by the Constitutional Oversight Committee in 1989. Glavlit was disbanded. The law on state secrets, although prepared by the Russian Justice Ministry, has not yet been adopted by parliament, so it does not exist (the rumor is that they want to make it secret too!). So who decides, now whether published articles conform to article 4 of the Russian Federation Law on the Press, which rules out the “use of the media to divulge information that is a state secret or other secret specially protected by the law”?

The NOVOYE VREMYA editorial board approached the Russian Federation Press and Information Ministry. At the state inspectorate for the protection of the media,

which is responsible for monitoring the publication of state secrets, they were hard put to reply: "There is no precedent."

"Those who have state secrets should reply, not journalists," inspectorate deputy chief Nina Kostyukova said. "In our view, the provision on state secrets should be removed from Article 4 of the law. But since it is there, we have to monitor its implementation. And if your journal publishes information containing state secrets, the journal will first be given a warning (in the case of repeated offenses the publication can be shut down—Editor)."

But, according to Nina Kostyukova, there are no specialists at the inspectorate who would be able to provide expert assessments on state secrets. Nina Vladimirovna suggested that "an employee who had worked at Glavlit for a long time might have "a list of state secrets, but this employee has left.

There is no list of state secrets at the press ministry registration department either.

We then turned to Boris Kuznetsov, well-known Russian lawyer and chairman of the law office. He has defended many people accused of divulging state secrets, in particular KGB General Oleg Kalugin and Captain 2d Class Vladimir Verbitskiy.

[Kuznetsov] "Experts define state secrets by expert means. In my view, this is entirely illegal. Because we need to have a law and list of secrets that are accessible to journalists."

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Does this mean that all arrests made on a charge of divulging state secrets are illegal?

[Kuznetsov] "Right."

"At the Kalininskiy Rayon court in Moscow Boris Kuznetsov is currently representing Gleb Yakunin and Lev Ponomarev, who are accused of divulging state interests. L. Ponomarev was head of the Russian parliament deputies' commission to investigate the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case and G. Yakunin was a member of the commission. They obtained access to KGB materials relating to KGB agents among the church leadership. The authorities considered that they were divulging state secrets by publishing the information.

"But KGB agents did not figure in the state category even in the USSR Council of Ministers list. The lack of any precise legal regulation of a specific legal institution, on the one hand, makes for mayhem and, on the other hand, could damage Russia's security. You cannot punish a person for committing an act against which there is no legal protection."

[NOVOYE VREMYA] But Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code penalizes the divulging of state secrets (between two and eight years' imprisonment).

[Kuznetsov] "The article stating the penalty for theft indicates what theft is. The same should apply here. The article you mentioned should not only state the penalty for divulging state secrets, but also contain a definition of state secret."

Boris Kuznetsov illustrated the kind of legal mayhem that can result by citing the case of Captain 2d Class Vladimir Verbitskiy, Baltic correspondent for the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN.

The military journalists got hold of some materials of the Liepaja garrison. They concerned the manufacture of minisubmarines for intelligence and sabotage purposes at an enterprise in the military-industrial complex. The military program provided for the construction of around 20 submarines, each one costing 22 million rubles [R] (in 1990 prices). But when one of them was launched it sank to the bottom. The sailor in it was only just saved. Vice Admiral Kuzmin, deputy commander of the navy, prohibited the submarines from putting to sea. But several boats already constructed by then were accepted by the Navy. Although they were on shore they had operational bills and crews, training was being carried out, and the officers were being paid!

Verbitskiy wrote an article and offered it to several publications. But no editorial board dared publish the article. On meeting with USSR people's deputy Neyland, Verbitskiy found a correspondent for the Swedish newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET, Olofsen, in his office. Verbitskiy showed the Swede his article and reassured him: The Swedes need not fear these submarines since they are not combat-capable. Verbitskiy also pointed out what the military industrial complex was investing the people's money in. A few days after the article was published in the Swedish newspaper Verbitskiy was arrested and charged first with spying for Sweden and then with divulging state secrets.

When Boris Kuznetsov began his defense of Verbitskiy, he found details of the "secret" Soviet submarine in numerous foreign military handbooks, which described not only the minisubmarine, but also the mother-submarine, carrying several minisubmarines. The Swedish papers even published drawings of the submarine.

Boris Kuznetsov managed to obtain materials on the talks between USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov and the Swedish defense minister and naval commander. The Soviet delegation not only talked about the tactical and technical properties of these boats, but also confirmed that they were not combat-capable.

B. Kuznetsov was intending to use these documents in court, but the matter did not get that far. Seeing that it was futile to pursue the investigation, the KGB abandoned it "in favor of" the military prosecutor's office. It, in turn, dropped the case against Verbitskiy...

Reports on CW Secrecy Case Against Mirzayanov, Fedorov**Third Scientist Arrested**

934P0009C Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 23 Oct 92 p 13

[Report by Vladimir Opryshko: "Authors of 'Poisonous Policy' Detained: The Chemists Are Suspected of Divulging Secrets"]

[Text] Yesterday morning Russian Ministry of Security officers detained Vil Mirzayanov, an associate of the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNIIOKhT], and Lev Fedorov, an associate of the State Scientific Research Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who on 20 September 1992 published an article "Poisonous Policy" in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

In the article the authors maintained that Russia continues the development of chemical—including binary-type—weapons. According to information in their possession, during the first quarter of this year new field tests were conducted for a recently developed binary toxic substance that is superior in its parameters to its American counterparts. The test was allegedly conducted at the Ustyurt plateau in Uzbekistan. Employees of various research institutes received monetary bonuses for this.

In addition, according to the authors, an industrial consignment of a new toxic substance that in its characteristics surpasses the American VX substance was produced in the spring of last year.

These contentions by Mirzayanov and Fedorov contradict the statement made by Academician Kuntsevich, head of GSNIIOKhT, that Russia has not been producing chemical weapons since 1987.

According to information received from reliable sources in the Russian Ministry of Security, Lev Fedorov was released yesterday evening. Vil Mirzayanov remains in detention and will quite possibly be charged under Article 75 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code (divulging state secrets). As KOMMERSANT has learned, Sarkisyan, an employee of another secret scientific research institute, was also detained yesterday but released by evening on condition that he not leave town. The Ministry of Security confirmed the fact that the three chemists had been detained, but refused to provide detailed comments.

Yesterday evening Russian Ministry of Security officers confiscated the original of Mirzayanov and Fedorov's article from the editorial offices of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

Validity of Case Questioned

934P0013A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 27 Oct 92 p 14

[Article by Olga Shlyapnikova and Valeriy Gorbachev: "Scientists Violated the CPSU Testament: The Chemists Divulged State Secrets in the Press"]

[Text] As promised, today KOMMERSANT reports on the details of the incident in which Russian Ministry of Security officers detained two scientists, the authors of the article "Poisonous Policy" published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. The scientists are accused of divulging state secrets.

On the morning of 22 October state security officers detained Vil Mirzayanov, a former associate of the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNIIOKhT], and Lev Fedorov, an associate of the State Scientific Research Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The grounds for arrest was the article "Poisonous Policy" published by them in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on 20 September 1992. The subject of the article was the production of chemical and binary weapons in Russia.

After being interrogated (as a witness), Fedorov was released, while Mirzayanov was sent to an investigative detention facility. The Ministry of Security investigators initiated a criminal case under Article 75 of Russia's Criminal Code (divulging state secrets). The "chekists" have to charge Mirzayanov formally no later than 10 days after his arrest.

According to KOMMERSANT's information, the scientists are suspected of divulging state secrets on the basis of a certain USSR Glavlit [Main Administration for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press under the USSR Council of Ministers] document approved by the CPSU Central Committee in 1971, which lists the data prohibited from being published in the press. On the basis of this, an equivalent Russian normative act was born and signed by Boris Yeltsin in the spring of 1992. KOMMERSANT experts point out that the document signed by Yeltsin does not differ in any way from the Glavlit list, which the administration for the protection of state secrets in the press under the USSR Council of Ministers used as guidance for "spiking" materials in the mass media during the stagnation times.

As Lev Fedorov told a KOMMERSANT correspondent, he did not have access to secret materials; as to Mirzayanov, he did not sign any nondisclosure agreements at the time he left the institute in January 1992.

Fedorov related the details of the arrest. On 22 October at 0730 seven people in civilian clothes "burst" through the door of his apartment. Fedorov was shown papers identifying them as Ministry of Security officers and a

search warrant sanctioned by the office of the procurator general of Russia (state security confirmed this information).

Before commencing the search, the "organs" officers demanded that Fedorov immediately hand over to them all notes and tapes related to the case on divulging the state secrets. Although Fedorov did not acknowledge the existence of such a case, he nevertheless gave them three draft materials and a newspaper with the article. After that he was handed a subpoena to appear for interrogation.

At the interrogation the investigator told Fedorov that he is "in charge" of the case of "dissemination beyond the boundaries of secrecy of information" that falls under the normative act signed by the president of Russia. After giving his testimony, Fedorov was released, having first signed an agreement not to disclose the contents of the conversation. Mirzayanov's arrest proceeded in a somewhat different manner. According to Fedorov, the former would not let the Ministry of Security officers into his apartment for an hour, while he called acquaintances on the phone and informed them of the incident. Finally the security officers lost patience and removed the entrance door off its hinges. According to KOMMERSANT's information, secret documents were found in Mirzayanov's apartment; however, Fedorov maintains that this could not be true.

Aleksey Smirnov, executive director of the Center for Human Rights, qualified the case as "very strange." Smirnov is also very concerned that the proceedings under Article 75 will be closed to the public, but the center will try to conduct an independent investigation.

KOMMERSANT will report further details of the case on 31 October.

Arrest Said To Back Up Claims

934P0009B Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Igor Tsarev under the column heading "Reporting the Details": "The Case on Divulging State Secrets"]

[Text] Russian scientists made a statement in the press (see TRUD, 24 October 1992) that our country continues to test and produce chemical weapons. A month after the article "Poisonous Policy" appeared in print (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 20 September) one of its authors—Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov—was arrested by Ministry of Security officers on charges of "divulging state secrets." Does this mean that the scientist told the truth?

The article published by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI under the rubric "Scandal" maintained that the State All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GSNIIOKhT) in Moscow had developed a new toxic substance and that industrial consignments of a binary weapon based on it have been

put into production. In addition, the authors—Doctors of Chemical Sciences Lev Fedorov and Vil Mirzayanov—reported that during the first quarter of this year the new weapon underwent field tests: "This was done at a chemical test site on the Ustyurt plateau near the city of Nukus rather than at "revealed" Shikhany (it has become too cumbersome to try to avoid the American satellites)."

The information is indeed scandalous. Especially considering that this fall a draft Convention on Banning the Development and Production of Chemical Weapons was adopted in Geneva, and that in June 1990 the presidents of the United States and the USSR signed a bilateral agreement "On the Liquidation and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons." A month had passed since the publication, however, before there was a reaction—and a very unexpected one at that. On 22 October the scientists' apartments were searched, after which they were taken to the Ministry of Security's investigations administration in Lefortovo, where V. Mirzayanov was informed that he was being charged with divulging in the press information containing state secrets, while L. Fedorov was told that he would be called as a witness in the case.

In addition, a ready-for-print text by the same authors was seized from the editorial offices of the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly. A similar action was taken with respect to the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA.

All that has transpired indicates that the article "Poisonous Policy" does indeed contain true facts. But then a logical question comes up: Why did the security service react so belatedly? After all, similar information authored by Mirzayanov appeared in KURANTY a year ago, but to the best of our knowledge there was no reaction on the part of state security at the time...

There are several versions explaining the current actions of the MBRF [Russian Federation Ministry of Security]. First, several days before Mirzayanov's arrest the American newspaper BALTIMORE SUN published an article about our secret program Foliant and a new weapon code-named Newcomer. Second, this could be the result of some pressure on the part of General A. Kuntsevich, academician, who is rather harshly criticized in Mirzayanov and Fedorov's article. Third, quite possibly someone simply wants to initiate a scandal on the eve of the congress and to discredit the national leadership in the eyes of the world community.

Whatever the reason, one thing is obvious right now—there is an attempt to present practically as an enemy of the people the scientists who told in the press that contrary to all the international agreements the military continues to "experiment" with chemical weapons. But is this so? Perhaps it would be more correct to say that they are the "enemy" of those who continue to secretly manufacture banned weapons.

Fedorov Issues Appeal

*MK2910143592 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
29 Oct 92 p 3*

[Report by Igor Yermakov: "Will the President Defend the Scientist?"]

[Text] The scientist Lev Fedorov yesterday sent an open letter to the president, the Constitutional Court, and the Russian prosecutor. Together with Doctor of Sciences Vil Mirzayanov, who has been arrested by the Security Ministry for "disclosing a state secret" about chemical weapons production in the Russian Federation, he is the author of the article "Poisoned Policy" which appeared on 20 September in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. For the details, see KURANTY dated 24 October.

The reason for his appeal to the Republic's leadership, the letter indicates, is the "obvious illegality" perpetrated by the Security Ministry. This illegality is displayed both in the details and in the overall approach to the case. For example, the search of V. Mirzayanov's apartment, during which "proof" of his guilt was discovered, was not conducted in the presence of the "accused" who by that time had already been taken off to the Lubyanka.

Moreover, the scientist notes, V. Mirzayanov "gave notice of the organization of the experimental industrial production of a new toxic substance, which is what the investigation is accusing him of, a year ago—in KURANTY dated 10 October 1991. Consequently there can be no doubt that 'V. Mirzayanov's arrest' is a matter of 'expediency' that is the result of 'political games,' and that A. Kuntsevich, deputy chief of Chemical Forces, V. Petrunin, director of the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNI-IOKhT], and S. Golubkov, deputy minister of the chemical industry, 'received the Lenin Prize specifically for organizing industrial production of a new toxic substance.'" Nor does Lev Fedorov doubt that the prosecution of his fellow author has been organized by precisely these people and Chemical Forces Chief S. Petrov as the leaders of the domestic military-chemical complex, who have recently "started to take their seats in the Mercedes of fighters for chemical disarmament."

Lev Fedorov believes that the military-chemical complex, which is behind this entire story, is pursuing aims that are at odds with Russia's national interests. The author of the letter asks the Russian president and Constitutional Court to lift the seal of secrecy "from the senseless and barbaric theme of the new toxic substance, under cover of which V. Mirzayanov has been arrested within the framework of ordinances surviving from the totalitarian past." And Fedorov asks the general prosecutor to free V. Mirzayanov and start searching for the culprits "who have dragged Russia into a chemical arms race."

Further on Fedorov Statements

*934P0010A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 92
Morning Edition p 1, 2*

[Article by Andrey Illesh, Sergey Mostovshchikov, and Valeriy Rudnev, IZVESTIYA: "'Selling the Motherland' From the Point of View of the 'Sellers' and of the Law'"]

[Text] A few days ago our newspaper published material titled "Every Journalist May Now Become a 'Traitor to the Motherland.'" Let us recap: The subject was two people—MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI authors detained (one was immediately released) by Russian Federation Ministry of Security [MBRF] officers for "divulging state secrets": publishing the article "Poisonous Policy" (No. 38, 1992). We now have an opportunity to find out one of the participants' view of the incident—Doctor of Chemical Sciences Lev Fedorov. After being interrogated and released from the special detention facility, he wrote a letter to the president of Russia and the chairman of the Constitutional Court. Below is a rendition of this letter.

The Arrest—a Farce That Has Nothing To Do With the Security of Russia

On 22 October 1992 the Russian security organs conducted a search of his and Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov's apartments in connection with the article "The Poisoned Policy" published by them. The subject of the article was the fact that the military-chemical complex (MCC) has set up experimental-industrial production and testing of a new highly poisonous toxic substance (OV).

"I have been brought into the proceedings as a witness, while Mirzayanov—who ostensibly was bound by a 'nondisclosure' agreement—is under arrest." The scientist maintains that the search was conducted unprofessionally: A doctor of chemical sciences was treated like a racketeer—in Fedorov's apartment five young, fit-looking men in the presence of two special witnesses looked for materials related to an article they had not read... At V. Mirzayanov's apartment the same number of agents "discovered evidence" at a point when the apartment owner had already been taken in for interrogation.

Lev Fedorov does not want to take credit for pioneering the discovery that Russia manufactures super-weapons. He believes that Vil Mirzayanov made public the setting-up of experimental-industrial production of a new toxic substance as early as a year ago—on 10 December 1992 in KURANTY. "At the same time, I do not want to deny responsibility—through my participation in the article 'Poisonous Policy' I consciously helped Mirzayanov be heard beyond Mayakovskiy Square and the Lubyanka—across the whole of Russia," is the opinion of the author of the letter.

Fedorov is convinced that Mirzayanov's arrest is an opportunistic event related to large-scale political games that are shaking up the Russian leadership. The scientist

was put behind bars a year (!) after "divulging" state secrets. In his opinion, this fact confirms that A. Kuntsevich, deputy chief of chemical troops, V. Petrunin, director of the GSNIOKhT [State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology], and S. Golubkov, first deputy minister of chemical industry, received a Lenin Prize precisely for organizing the experimental-industrial production of the new toxic substance.

He is convinced that Mirzayanov's arrest has nothing to do with the security of Russia, let alone its national interests. The arrest was wanted personally by the chief of chemical troops, General S. Petrov, and his deputy, General A. Kuntsevich, who is currently chairman of the Chemical Disarmament Convention Committee. "They have just started getting a taste of the Mercedes that the fighters for chemical disarmament are entitled to by office. Some people in their entourage are already trying on the civilian suit of a Russian representative at the observers council in the Hague. The rest are dreaming of the credentials of UN experts on chemical disarmament..."

What Is it We Can Poison the World With?

The chief of the chemical troops, General S. Petrov, made public the existence of only five toxic substances in our warfare arsenal—none of them developed by us, writes Fedorov. He mentions only mustard gas, lewisite, sarin, soman, and VX. This composition of the arsenal contradicts the commonly known fact that Russia is an unchallenged world leader when it comes to chemical weapons. It is a matter of elementary logic, believes the author, to arrive at a conclusion concerning what exactly had been left out of the picture—a new toxic substance or a half-century of parasitism of our military-chemical complex.

"By itself, creating chemical weapons in Russia was a strategic mistake. In the war against the fascists it could play only an indirect role, as a means of intimidation... Chemical weapons have only been used in war against our own people; in 1921—by Marshal M. Tukhachevskiy in crushing the Kronstadt mutiny and the Tambov insurrection. In 1989—by Marshal D. Yazov in suppressing the nationalist movement in Georgia. At the same time, creating and maintaining chemical weapons in Russia is direct evidence of the inhumanity of our military-chemical complex. The military-chemical complex absolutely does not want to bear responsibility before people and nature—an example being that it had allowed the mass production of lewisite, which resulted in long-term contamination of Chapayevsk, Dzerzhinsk, Moscow, and some areas of Udmurtia and Saratov Oblast..."—these are lines from the scientist's letter.

Lev Fedorov arrives at an unequivocal conclusion: The military-chemical complex is devoid of any sense of responsibility both before its own people and our partners in negotiations, considering that it could jeopardize the Geneva agreements on chemical disarmament for the

sake of laying its hands on a new toxic substance. So, the conclusion is: Why do we need such a military-chemical complex?

What the Procuracy Thinks on the Subject of "Selling the Motherland"

We remind you: Investigation of a case involving divulging state secrets is conducted by investigators of the Ministry of Security of Russia under the oversight of the Office of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation.

Sergey Balashov, chief of the Administration for Investigations of the Ministry of Security of Russia, refused to comment on the progress of the investigation in the Mirzayanov case. His advice was to contact their Center for Public Liaison. There, the recommendation was to wait for the press conference which is supposed to take place next week. We learned from unofficial sources, however, that the MBRF investigators are convinced that Mirzayanov has violated the law. The substance of charges against him is that he named the site where the secret work was conducted. The investigators' opinion is based on the information in the article as well as the relevant secret list of information that falls under the category of state secrets and the USSR Law "On State Secrets," which, in the opinion of MBRF personnel, is still well and alive on the territory of Russia.

Responding to IZVESTIYA questions, Leonid Syukasev, chief of the Administration for Overseeing Compliance with the Laws on Federal Security and International Relations, remarked that it is too early to talk about the conclusions arrived at by the investigative team on the case. There were, however, no violations of the law committed in initiating the criminal proceedings, conducting the searches, detaining the suspects, and V. Mirzayanov's arrest.

Mirzayanov still has not been formally charged. He is under arrest as a suspect in the matter of divulging state secrets (Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code). The investigators have until Sunday to decide on the specific formula of charges and to obtain proof of evidence that the charges against the suspect are substantiated. Otherwise Mirzayanov will be released. Which, of course, does not preclude a continuation of the investigation into the case...

Leonid Syukasev reminded us that the issue of divulging state secrets applies only to persons who are entrusted with certain information in the course of their work or by their official position and who voluntarily pledge not to divulge it. The nature of the material in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI shows, in his opinion, that it was based on information entrusted specifically to Mirzayanov as a former associate of the GSNIOKhT. Therefore, this incident cannot be regarded as a witch hunt on journalists and editors or as an encroachment on the freedom of speech. "On the other hand," remarked L.

Syukasev, "in the absence of Glavlit (censorship—Auth.), journalists should stay on their toes and remain alert."

Was There a Secret?

L. Syukasev declined to discuss the question as to exactly which state secret the suspect divulged: The very fact that Russia is developing chemical weapons despite the obligations it undertook to abandon this kind of work? The site where the toxic substances are manufactured? Their formula? Or the consequences of toxic substance use? L. Syukasev only remarked that the investigators are the ones to come up with the specific formula of charges. "One thing that is beyond argument," said the procurator, "is that the facts made public by Mirzayanov are included on a special list of items that constitute state secrets. This list is approved by the government upon the recommendation of the appropriate departments." This does not mean, however—L. Syukasev assured IZVESTIYA—that the same department will pronounce "sentence" on Mirzayanov. In order to get to the bottom of the matter we have invited experts from independent organizations. Their expert opinion will be the main evidence in the case.

Let us take the words of the procuracy's administration chief at face value. And let us hope that the investigation will sort things out, and that in the process there have not been and will not be procedural violations. But could it be that at the time when the Mirzayanov case was being initiated and his arrest planned, state security and procuracy officials did not ask themselves a simple human question: Is it at all humane to initiate proceedings against a person who is warning everyone, including his bosses, of mortal danger? Is it fair to jail someone whose concern is all of us? Actually, we could even switch to the legal language understandable to our opponents. Even if Mirzayanov did divulge state secrets, does the leadership of the MBRF and the Office of the Procurator General not believe that he acted in circumstances of extreme urgency? In the event they have forgotten the law, let us quote Article 14 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code in its entirety: "An action is not considered a crime if, while exhibiting the attributes of an action envisaged by the Special Part of this Code, it was committed in circumstances of extreme urgency, that is, in order to remove a danger threatening the interests of the state, public interests, the person or the rights of this person or other citizens, if such danger under the circumstances could not be removed by other means and if the harm inflicted is lesser than the harm averted."

Do we need to explain this legal formula to the procurator and the investigators? Do they need any more arguments in defense of Mirzayanov? Is it not time to correct the error: to immediately free Vil Mirzayanov from detention, and drop the trumped-up criminal case on divulging state secrets.

"The KGB Is Coming Out of the Trenches..."

On 30 October MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI held a press conference with the participation of Lev Fedorov. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Chief Editor Lev Karpinskiy termed the MBRF action with respect to the arrest of an author of an article published in his newspaper as the KGB coming out of the trenches. Such a zealous defense of Russia's secret production of super-powerful chemical weapons makes one wonder, in his words, whether there still exist in our society some Bolshevik secrets, which in the past also included information on milk yield per cow, harvest, crime statistics, and athletes' training methods.

Lev Fedorov told journalists that on the morning of 28 October he called the office of Minister of Security Viktor Barannikov and put in a request for a personal appointment in order to express to the minister personally his ideas regarding the illegality of his colleague's arrest. So far there has been no response from the office. Lev Fedorov confirmed his intent to continue the fight against the military-chemical complex which, in his words, is doing tremendous harm to the country.

Another speaker at the press conference was attorney Aleksandr Asnis, whom Vil Mirzayanov's wife entrusted to defend the interests of her husband. Aleksandr Asnis was not permitted by the MBRF to review the materials in the case or to see Mirzayanov. Officers of the MBRF administration for investigations explained their refusal this way: The attorney does not have the clearance to work with top secret documents. According to our information, Mirzayanov is being offered the services of a lawyer selected by the MBRF itself. The identity of this person is not known. Also still unknown are the names of the experts who evaluated the information published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI for the state security.

In Aleksandr Asnis' opinion, there are three possible versions of the further development of events. Since the deadline for keeping Mirzayanov in detention without formally charging him with a crime expires on 31 October, either charges will be filed and the scientist will remain in Lefortovo, or the measures to secure the appearance of the defendant will be changed and he will be released, or there will be no charges, which also means he will be released. Hence, the doctor of chemical sciences' chances of coming home are estimated by lawyers as two to one.

Mirzayanov Released

OW0311132492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1153 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The court of the Kalininskiy district in Moscow has decided to release Vil Mirzayanov from custody on Tuesday [3 November]. On October 22, after publishing an article in the weekly MOSCOW NEWS claiming that Russia continues to develop new types of war chemicals,

he was arrested by the Security Ministry. According to the ministry's public relations center, Mr. Mirzayanov was charged last Friday with disclosing a state secret which could land him a two to five year prison term.

Investigation To Continue

93P50018A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Nov 92 p 1

[NG report: "In Brief": "Scientist Leaves Lefortovo"]

[Text] In response to a complaint by Vil Mirzayanov, who has been charged with revealing state secrets—reporting on Russia's new chemical weapons—the court has changed the means of detaining him—from arrest to a written promise not to leave the country. The investigation itself will continue.

As was expected, two speeches about this matter were delivered in the Supreme Soviet yesterday. General Procurator Valentin Stepankov and Ecology Minister Vikto Danilov-Danilyan expressed their points of view.

The latter, in a conversation with a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, expressed deep indignation at the fact that he, even though he is a government official, has to find out what is going on in the capital from the newspapers.

"As before, secrecy remains the indisputable authority, by comparison with which the ecology doesn't matter," the minister emphasized.

MOSCOW NEWS Editor Rejects Charges

LD3010180592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1518 GMT 30 Oct 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Gvritshviliy]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Lev Karpinskiy, chief editor of "MOSCOW NEWS" weekly, described as "baseless" charges of divulging state secrets levelled by Russia's Security Ministry against two journalists who wrote an article about chemical weapons.

At a press conference called today, Karpinskiy characterized as "activization of revanchist forces in Russia" the criminal persecution of Lev Fedorov and Vil Mirzayanov—authors of the article "The Poisoned Policy", published in the weekly in September 1992, in which the authors told about the production of chemical weapons in Russia.

According to Karpinskiy, "in the accusation one can see through the political motive and deliberate provocation against President Boris Yeltsin and his policies." "Besides this, there exists a real danger of the revival of state security of the old order," the chief editor added.

Lev Fedorov, in his turn, expressed confidence that Vil Mirzayanov, who is still being detained in the Butyrskaya prison for investigation, will be freed in the near future, as "they cannot level any official charge against him."

Mirzayanov Former Counterintelligence Aide

93P50018B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Nov 92 p 2

[Dmitriy Frolov report: "Mirzayanov Was Head of a Technical Counterintelligence Department, But Soviet Secrets Are Still Real"]

[Text] As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reported yesterday, Dr Vil Mirzayanov, accused of revealing secrets about new chemical weapons [CW], was released from Lefortovo Prison. The accused himself is now most disturbed by the fact that his lawyer was not present at the interrogations, since he has no clearance for secret information.

As for the essence of the accusations against him, Vil Mirzayanov is still sure that he is in the right; in his words, his knowledge about binary weapons is only the result of scientific research, and he gave no written promise to keep that research secret. And he also gave out no information about the "Foliant" program to the reporter of the American newspaper BALTIMORE SUN.

The situation acquires special interest from the fact that Vil Mirzayanov, while he worked at the institute he described, the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNIIOKhT], headed the department there for action against foreign technical intelligence. It is very likely that this fact will be unambiguously interpreted in the course of the investigation. Mirzayanov himself is determined to insist that this was a purely technical service, concerned with keeping track of airborne emissions and analyzing outflows.

It is obvious that Mirzayanov's former colleagues will be among his main opponents; this is being felt already. In any case, it is precisely from among his former colleagues that rumors are being spread about the scientist's ties with the CPSU Central Committee. It stands to reason that these rumors could not and should not have been taken seriously unless Mirzayanov himself had not begun to deny that he had such ties.

This last circumstance, of course, is not the most important thing. It is important only because as a result of the court case, information about Russian chemical military potential can become even more secret, especially if one takes into account the president's well-known decree re-establishing the previous, Soviet, list of especially important types of information considered to be state secrets.

MBRF Aide Comments on Case

934P0017A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
6 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Sergey Ovsienko: "The Court Will Decide Whether State Secrets Were Divulged"]

[Text] The situation surrounding the notorious article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in which the Russian Federation Ministry of Security [MBRF] saw a violation of Article 75 of the Criminal Code of Russia (divulgence of a state secret) is still the focus of attention. Security organs caught hell because of a number of articles which discerned in the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation a "new censor," a violation of the laws, etc. The ministry's prolonged silence and the absence of an informed commentary on the article about chemical weapons only added fuel to the fire.

Just yesterday the chief of the legal support administration of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, Yu. Demin, and the chief of the administration for problems of chemical weapons of the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the president of Russia, A. Gorbovskiy, gave some clarification, albeit not complete, of V. Mirzayanov's article.

Only the court can determine the degree of guilt of the article's author, A. Demin emphasized in a news conference, and we are not responsible for the legal aspect of bringing criminal charges under Article 75. Mirzayanov is not a journalist but a "secret bearer" and therefore there can be no discussion of a "new censor" in the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.

Commenting on V. Mirzayanov's article in the press, A. Gorbovskiy stated that one could get the impression that Russia is violating international agreements on chemical weapons, although there are no agreements prohibiting their development and production. Work is being done on this convention at the present time. Such groundless statements only delay the time of the conclusion of radical agreements regarding chemical and biological weapons. Nor does the assertion about the augmentation of Ministry of Defense arsenals with this kind of weapon have any basis in reality.

Regarding the question of why the 1990 agreement to destroy chemical weapons is not being implemented, A. Gorbovskiy noted that it has not been ratified. And even if it had been ratified, Russia does not have the capacities to destroy these weapons—the plant in Chapayevsk has not been put into operation.

But for now, by a decision of the Kalininskiy Rayon court, the article's author, V. Mirzayanov, has been released from Lefortovo prison and has signed a pledge not to leave town.

Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment'**Article Confiscated From ARGUMENTY I FAKTY**

934P0009A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Oct 92 p 1

[Report by Dmitriy Frolov under the column heading "Special Services": "MBRF Is Seriously Concerned With Chemical Secrets: Another Search and Seizure of Manuscripts"]

[Text] Events surrounding the arrest of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI author Vil Mirzayanov (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 23 October of this year) continue to unfold.

Yesterday MBRF [Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation] officers conducted a search of the apartment of Professor Lev Fedorov—coauthor of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI material that was the reason for Mirzayanov's arrest.

In addition, a ready-for-print text by the same authors was seized from the editorial offices of the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Editor in Chief Vladimir Starkov confirmed to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that all formalities were observed in carrying out the procedure. Similar actions had been taken earlier at MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and NOVOYE VREMYA magazine.

Professor Fedorov, who is now appearing as a witness, maintains that there was no new information about chemical weapons in the article offered to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

Moreover, a year ago these facts appeared in KURANTY, and at that time there was no reaction on the part of the special services.

It is quite possible that the reason the MBRF got into the act was the 18 October 1992 article by a Moscow correspondent of the American newspaper BALTIMORE SUN, in which Will Englund told of a secret chemical program named Foliant and a prototype weapon code-named Newcomer [Novichok]. The order for Mirzayanov's arrest was signed two days later—on 20 October of this year.

Text of Article

MK3010113592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Oct 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Lev Fedorov and Vil Mirzayanov under the "Environment" rubric: "We Waged Chemical Warfare on Our Own Territory: Article Confiscated From ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Editorial Office"—first two paragraphs are NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] The text published below was confiscated by Russian Security Ministry staffers from the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editorial office. This was because one of the authors, Vil Mirzayanov, has been arrested by the ministry and accused of disclosing a state secret (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Nos. 205 and 206).

While following our principle of providing a platform to anyone who cannot speak out elsewhere, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA hopes, nevertheless, that the information about damage caused our own people by chemical weapons supposed—so the military claimed—to defend them does not constitute a state secret.

The first stage of the long military chemical marathon is over. We were ready for chemical warfare, but a question that will not be superfluous is this: Exactly why were we dragged into this adventure? In order to deter the probable enemy, according to the chief of Chemical Troops, who failed to spot the clear illogic that it is difficult to intimidate people with weapons the existence of which you deny, as we did for many years. Sometimes there were elegant attempts to reduce chemical weapons merely to toxins planned for battlefield use somewhere a long way from our borders. We would like to warn people against this simple substitution, especially as the Geneva Protocol, which we signed in 1925, does not provide for the use of chemical weapons for offensive purposes. Our goals were related to our revolutionary shamelessness. Back in 1921 our deeply revered military leader, M. Tukhachevskiy, used chemical weapons to kill insurgent Tambov peasants. The last case was the use of chemical weapons in the spring of 1989 in Tbilisi: the CS riot control gas.

One general wrote recently: "At various times chemical weapons were produced in Russia in Berezniki, Chapayevsk, Dzerzhinsk in Gorkiy Oblast, Novocheboksarsk, and Volgograd." The revelation is belated and less than complete. It makes no mention of herbicide weapons from Ufa, psychotropic substances from Volsk, or riot control gas from Slavgorod. The capital was left out of the list of producers, too. For your information, before and after the war a factory, which produced the vesicant toxins mustard gas and lewisite, operated on the territory of the State Union Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology. They were poured from teapots and tested on people: prisoners. During the October panic of 1941 the existing stock of toxins—tonnes of it—was buried on the spot and forgotten.

During the history of the military-industrial complex each branch has had its troubles: Rocket scientists had the deaths of cosmonauts and marshals, nuclear scientists had the explosions at Chelyabinsk's "Mayak" plant and in Chernobyl, shipbuilders had the loss of the Komsomolets. What about the military chemical complex? The official story is that "not even the slightest accident or emergency took place" at chemical weapons production plants in Russia. We will confine ourselves to doubts specifically regarding the production of highly poisonous phosphorus-based neuroparalytic toxins:

Sarin, soman, and VX. The technologies were developed in Moscow at the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, and additional work was done in the institute's subsidiaries. The toxins themselves were tested primarily at Shikhany (Saratov Oblast) and were produced at the "Khimproms": the giant plants in Volgograd (sarin and soman) and Novocheboksarsk (VX). Soman was produced prior to and for at least two years after 1987, when M. Gorbachev announced a halt to toxin production. Sometimes the decontamination measures to remove phosphorus-based toxins from the waste at Shop No. 34 of Volgograd's "Khimprom" plant were not effective: The content of sarin and soman in effluent from the production unit was hundreds of times the maximum permissible concentration. This effluent was disguised among general effluent and discharged into the so-called "white sea" adjoining residential areas of Volgograd. During the spring flood of 1964 this "sea" overflowed its banks and reached the Volga itself. Residents recall the consequences with a shudder: The entire surface of the Volga, as far as Astrakhan, was white with dead fish. The problems of cause and effect were solved easily; the chief engineer was stripped of the Lenin Prize he had received for starting up production of the phosphorus-based toxins. This was not the only event, but to this day residents do not know the real causes.

Novocheboksarsk's "Khimprom" plant firmly led the USSR in the production of chemical output. The fire that took place in 1974 in its Shop No. 83 was a large-scale environmental crime the consequences of which were covered up and still have not been eliminated. This secret shop produced the most powerful phosphorus-based toxin: VX gas. So much for the absence of accidents at the flagship enterprises of the secret chemical industry.

According to official figures, Russia has 30,000 tonnes of phosphorus-based toxins. The remaining 10,000 tonnes (out of the declared 40,000 tonnes), including 7,000 tonnes of lewisite, according to General Petrov, constituted "our stocks of chemical weapons accumulated in the prewar years and during the war," although the production of lewisite and mustard gas in Dzerzhinsk was scarcely possible before the end of the war and the appearance of the spoils of war. The absence of mustard gas is astonishing: There is a small quantity of mustard gas-lewisite mixture, but there is no place for mustard gas itself in the declared tonnage. It remains unclear what the workers of the Chapayevsk chemical fertilizers plant were doing from 1941, when they began to receive chlorine (without which it is impossible to produce mustard gas), until the end of the forties. Most of the workers have died, but the survivors remember hellish labor that culminated in the production of 10,000-15,000 tonnes of mustard gas and was rewarded with 62 Orders of Lenin. The "Kaproaktam" plant in Dzerzhinsk also produced mustard gas for many years, with great productivity, otherwise there would have been no point in shipping the plant from Germany as spoils of war.

So although Russia was no laggard in terms of mustard gas production, when the cards were laid on the table there was no sign of it. Where has it mysteriously vanished to? Residents of rayons adjoining Chapayevsk recall how mustard gas was buried in the ground. They also remember mustard gas being dumped in the White Sea and the Pacific Ocean, and what people were unable to find out, starfish recalled a couple of years ago. Chemical munitions that had "sprung a leak" were destroyed without any precautions at a small station not far from Nizhny Novgorod. There was also another dirty episode. In an attempt to make use of [utilizatsiya] lewisite and mustard gas in the mid-1980's, it was simply burned in Udmurtia. It was the usual story: The population simply knew nothing about this.

Before the start of serious talks about chemical disarmament our military, according to their own figures, destroyed 438 tonnes of toxins. That is untrue; several tens of thousands of tonnes were destroyed. You need only compare the figure for total stocks circulating in the military-chemical underground before the start of the disarmament process (between 50,000 and 70,000 tonnes) with the figure that has been announced officially. The difference is no joke.

In April 1991 Mikhail Sergeyevich crowned a "group of comrades" with the laurels of secret Lenin Prize winners for developing our own, at the time Soviet, binary weapons and for organizing the industrial production of them (at "Khimprom" in Volgograd). This was not the first lie (after 1987 he promised not to produce anything, still less an experimental industrial batch of a new toxin, without which no prizes are awarded) and not the last. However, the new toxin does not feature on any of the lists recently agreed on at the Geneva talks on chemical disarmament, nor has agreement been reached on methods of detecting it.

You would think that "conventional" concerns regarding chemical disarmament ought to find some place for the people who lived and still live near plants for the production of toxins, storage bases, and sites where they will be destroyed in the future, but the reality is rather more grim. Residents of Dzerzhinsk knew nothing of their toxins, but all of a sudden they have been notified that the dismantling of units for the production of lewisite and mustard gas is beginning at the "Kaproaktam" plant (residents of Chapayevsk were not told even this). It is clear why the dismantling has started only now: The units were being held in reserve, like an armored train. There is another side to this matter, however: The lewisite is long gone—it is at storage bases in Kambarka (Udmurtia) and Gornyy (Saratov Oblast)—but it remains unclear just where there have been discharges of organic arsenic substances, which is what lewisite is. City Nature Conservation Chief A. Pilyugin says not a word about them, although there was pollution of the atmosphere, and to a still greater extent, discharges of effluent (in Dzerzhinsk effluent is discharged not only into the Oka, but also is pumped underground). The soil at and around the plant

must be contaminated with arsenic compounds, which are immortal; they live their lives, some persist, and others change from one form into another, but each new form is toxic. It now transpires that for decades the residents of Dzerzhinsk (and with them those of Chapayevsk and Moscow) knew nothing of their misfortune. We are embarking on the path of chemical disarmament, but no one is proposing that we take a retrospective look at the real pollution of the cities that were involuntary participants in the criminal venture: Volgograd, Novocheboksarsk, Chapayevsk, Ufa, Dzerzhinsk, Berezniki, Volsk, and Moscow. The Americans do not care about the consequences of the many years of activity by the generals of the military-chemical complex in our country, and the generals do not even think of settling accounts with the past. So it is pointless to raise the question of the environmental friendliness of the military-chemical complex's activity until we learn the full truth about polluted Russian soil, mostly in the Volga basin.

Recently we were brought from across the ocean a U.S. promise to allocate dollars to "evaluate the potential for switching one of the chemical plants formerly engaged in producing toxins over to their destruction." Apparently expenditure will decrease, reliability will increase, and so forth. Let us make a parenthetical note: The reference is to Novocheboksarsk, which sprang up around the giant "Khimprom" plant and forms essentially a single whole with the capital of Chuvashia. There is no chance of simply getting away with this.

Neither is the question of storage a simple one. Of course, unlike mustard gas and lewisite, it would be safer to store phosphorus-based toxins in munitions, but that is from the technical viewpoint only. What can we do with the awful memories of the destruction of military storage facilities in Armenia and the Far East? We need only extrapolate them to our powerful storage bases for toxins, of which we have at least seven and about which we know nothing.

The hardest question is the fate of the lewisite. The Americans withdrew lewisite from service before the end of World War II, and the Germans never produced it at all. In the mid-1980's, however, we had to consider what to do with this stuff. Here is what General I. Yevstafyev says about lewisite: "We always fought with the 'beloved' Ministry of the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry to ensure that raw materials were not destroyed thoughtlessly. This is simply terrible from the environmental viewpoint. Each tonne of lewisite produces nine tonnes of waste that have to be buried." The general is being less than straight: Until 1988 there was no alternative, and after fusion [splavleniye] it was proposed to bury all the lewisite in the heart of Russia, within the watershed of rivers flowing south and to the northern seas. Some of the few people who opposed this, and who got into trouble with the military-industrial complex and the KGB, were in uniform; others were not.

It now transpires that Udmurtia is a major "deposit" of arsenic and the destruction of lewisite will be self-financing and will not require money from the state budget. This is wonderful, but untrue: At present there are no environmentally safe techniques for destroying lewisite; neither is there any prospect of cost recovery. The lewisite arsenic is a dead end, and when we see on TV an interview with the leaders of Udmurtia and Saratov Oblast against the backdrop of American equipment for the destruction of toxins, it is useful to remember that the equipment was not designed to deal with lewisite.

The conclusion is obvious: For a start we must see for ourselves that there are no phosphorus-based toxins from the past in the environment of Novocheboksarsk and Volgograd, nor forgotten quantities of mustard gas, lewisite, and their breakdown products in Chapayevsk, Dzerzhinsk, and Moscow. Then all this should be eliminated. Only then will it be time for chemical disarmament programs.

Kuntsevich Asserts Russia Complies With CW Pledges

*PM0211115592 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Oct 92 p 3*

[Interview with Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian president's Committee on the Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, by Aleksandr Dolgikh; place and date not given: "We Do Not Need To Increase Chemical Weapons Stockpiles"]

[Text] A lot of the mass media recently ran a report that Russia, contrary to the statements made by its leaders and to adopted international acts, is producing chemical weapons. Our correspondent asked Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian president's Committee on the Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, to explain.

[Kuntsevich] Russia is fully meeting its obligations not to produce chemical weapons. The fact that such weapons are stored at Defense Ministry stockpiles will be fully submitted to international verification in the established time frame. Russia has no need to increase its stockpiles, they are impressive enough already. But research and testing programs in the chemical weapons sphere are not banned under any of the existing international agreements. Therefore, the charges against departments, organizations, and specialists working in this sphere to safeguard national security have no foundation in law. Incidentally, even the draft of the future multilateral convention on the elimination of chemical weapons does not stipulate any ban on research in the sphere of chemical compounds with a high physiological activeness. So any university, institute, or plant laboratory will be able to synthesize these compounds in amounts of up to 100 grams a year and carry out a range of necessary research projects. In order to implement

programs for developing [sozdaniye] defenses and means of carrying out combat training any participating state will be permitted to produce up to a tonne of chemical agents a year under international supervision [kontrol] at a special small-scale facility.

Now, in accordance with the Russian president's directive "On Priority Measures To Prepare for the Implementation of Russia's International Commitments in the Sphere of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons," the Supreme Soviet decree, and the government's instructions to our committee together with scientists and specialists from the Academy of Sciences, the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Health, and other Russian departments, a draft program for the first phase of the destruction of chemical weapons in our country has been drawn up and submitted to the Russian Federation parliament. We are currently working on how to implement it as quickly as possible.

Committees Examine Program for Destroying Chemical Weapons

Kuntsevich Comments

*OW3010203192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1934 GMT 30 Oct 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A draft of the first phase of a complex program of gradually destroying chemical weapons in Russia was examined Friday [30 October] at a joint session of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committees on Industry and Energy and on Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources. The draft highlights the basic aspects of preparations for fulfilling Russia's international responsibilities in the area of chemical disarmament in accordance with the International Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons and the Russian-American agreement on chemical weapons signed June 1, 1990.

Head of the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian president Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich reports that the first level of the program will cost 45 bn [billion] rubles in 1993 prices. From that number, 4.4 bn rubles will be spent next year. Also \$4.5 mn [million] will be needed to purchase equipment abroad—furnaces for the thermal treatment of chemical weapons and units for recultivating the soil.

In an interview with IF [INTERFAX] Kuntsevich reported that the program should be approved by the Russian parliament at the current session and signed by the Russian International Convention in January 1993. He said the program requires the consent of all Russian Federation regions where manufacturing facilities for destroying chemical weapons will be located or are

already located, and also from territories through which chemical weapons will be transported to the destroying facilities.

Further Report

PM0411160992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Chemical Weapons Destruction Program Approved in Russian Supreme Soviet Committees"]

[Text] The first phase of the Russian program for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks has been discussed at a joint session of two Russian Supreme Soviet committees—the Committee for Industry and the Power Industry and the Committee for Questions of the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources.

IZVESTIYA has already reported on the program in detail, and we will therefore focus attention only on its fundamental provisions and on that which has not yet been covered. The most important point is the intention to recycle toxic substances and convert them into a source of raw resources for Russia instead of burning them off. This applies primarily to arsenic, which is an especially valuable material for the electronics industry.

It is not extracted on Russia's territory, but stocks of it lie "buried" in lewisite, and they amount to almost 2,000 tonnes. With a price of \$3,000 per kilogram and the country's annual requirements amounting to 15-20 tonnes, it will not only meet the country's needs but will also become a source of major currency earnings.

The largest stocks of lewisite are located in the city of Kambarka (Udmurtia)—6,600 tonnes [as published], and in the settlement of Gornyy, Saratov Oblast—around 1 tonne. Warehouses containing yperite and yperite-lewisite compounds are also located there. There are plans to build terminals at those locations to discharge and detoxify the old containers of toxic substances. Then the inert substances will be transported to reprocessing facilities. A pilot industrial facility for recycling the byproducts of detoxification will be located in the city of Volsk-17, Saratov Oblast.

Artillery shells, rockets, and mortar shells containing organophosphorus substances (sarin, soman, and V-gases)—a total of 9,800 tonnes of toxic substances—stored at depots in the city of Shchuchye, Kurgan Oblast, and the city of Kizner (Udmurtia) will be shipped to the "Khimprom" Production Association's modernized plant in Novocheboksarsk (Chuvashia), where they will also be recycled. According to experts, that plant has retained a unique (150- to 200-strong) team of highly skilled specialists who have experience working with such weapons and boast an accident-free record.

The cost of implementing the first phase of the program, including tackling the social problems of the population—and that is its priority—will come to 4.4 billion

rubles [R] in summer 1992 prices, which includes R320 million allocated to Kambarka; R207 million to Gornyy; over R100 million to Cheboksarsk; R29 million to the pilot industrial facility in Volsk-17; R100 million for railroad modernization; R80 million to a diagnostic and prevention center...

The construction of the terminals and the pilot industrial facilities and the modernization of the plant in Novocheboksarsk will take four to six years. Some 43 percent (17,000 tonnes) of all stocks of Russian toxic substances will then be destroyed by the year 2004.

But it will be possible to start this work only if, as was stressed by Vitaliy Vitebskiy, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for Industry and the Power Industry, it receives the approval of not just parliament but also the population and administrations of the localities where it is planned to recycle the chemical weapons.

The program will be examined in parliament after consideration of the comments of specialists and the population of the regions. Appropriations for it should start on 1 January 1993, otherwise Russia will be unable to meet its international commitments and, most importantly, will not for a very long time yet dispose of the danger of being "blown up" by its own chemical "mines."

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukraine's Nuclear Stance Evokes Concern

MK2810142992 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 44, 1 Nov 92 (Signed to Press 27 Oct 92) pp 14-15

[Vladimir Orlov report under the "Atom" rubric: "Ukraine: A 'Quasi-Nuclear' Superpower?"]

[Text] Kiev-Moscow—In the near future Ukraine will accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place all its nuclear reactors under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

This at least is the official information from Kiev. If so, a turning point will be reached in Ukraine's relations with the international community, which is worried by Kiev's nuclear ambitions.

But until final steps have been taken, there is reason to doubt the Ukrainian leadership's resolve with regard to achieving its declared aims: neutrality and a nuclear-free status.

Concern over this sphere of "independent" Ukraine's foreign and defense policy was voiced at an international conference on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This meeting of scientists, diplomats, and parliamentarians was organized by the Moscow and

Monterey (California) Institutes of International Relations. The venue—Kiev—was not selected by chance.

"Among themselves" the conference participants (among whom the only press representative was your MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent) were sharply critical of their hosts. The reason for this was a speech by Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Tsvetkov. It was possible to draw from his woolly phrasing the conclusion that his republic is in no hurry to accede to the nonproliferation treaty "unless it is granted broad security guarantees."

The nonproliferation treaty is the basic international legal document on the basis of which the "nuclear honesty" of a particular country can be examined. Besides the five nuclear powers, on which special obligations are placed, there are dozens of countries where—at various levels—research and development is going on with a view to using nuclear energy for both peaceful and military purposes. These countries include India, both Koreas, Iran, Taiwan, South Africa, and Argentina. In order to monitor this process and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty's signatory countries open their doors to IAEA inspectors.

If this does not happen, history shows that the consequences can be extremely dangerous for peace and international stability. Thus in 1974 India conducted nuclear tests during a confrontation with Pakistan. For a long time Iraq was engaged in nuclear research for military purposes and had gone a long way toward developing a nuclear bomb. Similar dangers exist in the case of at least a dozen developing countries.

But the policy of controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons has recently brought appreciable results. South Africa has acceded to the treaty. North Korea has agreed to a visit by the IAEA's general director.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, it has found itself in a strange position following the collapse of the Union. On the one hand it has the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world on its territory. On the other hand it does not own this arsenal, so to speak. The term "quasi-nuclear power" has even arisen, but, of course, it does not reflect the essence of the problem. Nuclear weapons exist on Ukrainian territory. The country signed the Lisbon Protocol, thereby taking upon itself some of the obligations of the Soviet- U.S. START Treaty together with Russia and Belarus.

However, independent observers assessed official Kiev's behavior during the conference as contradictory and unpredictable. One of the most prestigious experts—Professor William Potter from Monterey—conjectured that Ukraine "is basically avoiding international monitoring [kontrol]." According to him, Ukraine attaches too little significance to this problem.

At the same time it retains the potential to produce heavy water at the Dneprodzerzhinsk combine and is even prepared to establish a closed nuclear fuel cycle, i.e.

to enrich uranium using its own resources. Nor has the problem of safety been resolved with regard to either the civil or the military nuclear reactors on its territory.

The conference saw the disclosure of a report that all Ukraine's storage facilities are full to the brim with spent nuclear fuel, and now Ukraine plans to bury this fuel near Krasnoyarsk. At the same time Ukraine cannot fail to be aware that times have changed and, under Russian laws, the import of spent nuclear fuel from outside Russia's borders is forbidden.

In his speech Russian Foreign Ministry representative Viktor Mizin reacted in an extremely restrained manner to Ukraine's intentions and the steps it has already taken. He agreed that it is not for the CIS, Russia, or the IAEA to resolve the issue of Ukraine's nuclear status; this should be done by Ukraine and its parliament alone. But if Ukraine declares itself a nuclear power, Mr. Mizin added, it will have to leave the CIS—the Commonwealth's documents do not make provision for such a turn of events.

Unlike the diplomat, Dmitriy Yevstafyev, a scientist from the U.S. and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, could allow himself to be more frank: "While putting forward a propagandist slogan of neutrality, Ukraine is in fact striving to preserve its nuclear arsenals."

It is interesting that this desire is particularly striking against the background of the noticeable softening of Kazakhstan's position over the last six months. During his meeting with George Bush President Nazarbayev promised that Kazakhstan is choosing nuclear-free status and will sign the nonproliferation treaty in the near future. Nazarbayev was untroubled by protests from the Kazakh opposition, which regarded this step as a concession to the "great powers" and even picketed the U.S. Embassy in Alma- Ata.

It seems the Ukrainian position can partially be explained by the general political instability within the republic. According to information that percolated to the conference corridors, the Ukrainian leadership is not united on the issue of the country's nuclear future: The Defense and Foreign Ministries, and also the president's apparatus, have certainly not coordinated their steps. Many people here believe that ownership of nuclear weapons is a good "vaccine" against disintegration for a country that will find itself on the verge of falling apart one day soon.

According to Yevgeniy Sharov from the Ukrainian Institute of World Economics and International Relations, "the position of the 'hawks' in the local defense industry and the leadership as a whole is strengthening." There is talk of developing a nonnuclear high- accuracy ballistic missile, and space projects are being looked at.

Defense policy is being built on a double standard. For the future—neutrality and nuclear-free status. But for today—preservation of the status quo in view of "the unpredictability of our neighbors' behavior." It is an open secret that though they use the plural they mean Russia.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

4 DEC. 1992